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 The United States is in a war for competitive survival. While these 
are harsh words, those readers who fear for or have lost their jobs know that 
the world takes no prisoners when it comes to economics. There is no mercy 
if your company is inefficient or lazy or slow to adapt new technology or once 
enjoyed a dominant market position. The business literature is filled with sad 
stories of failures to streamline, upgrade, and understand your customer. The 
American economist Joseph Schumpeter called this “creative destruction,” the 
idea that competition inevitably forces innovation or the decline of the industry 
leaders.
 Realistically, no book or consultant can fix this situation for companies 
that are too arrogant or tradition-bound to change. As an advisor over the years 
to over 250 major corporations and not-for-profits, I have seen many cases of 
disdain, disinterest, or animosity when suggestions are made for improvements 
and efficiencies. Often, it is the leading companies in an industry that are the 
most difficult to motivate, and eventually many of them have had a close call 
with the business graveyard.
 Unreasonable regulation of business – the subject of this book 
– compounds the problem of company inertia. The United States started its 
existence as a nation largely opposed to a strong central government but began 
its movement toward regulatory control as the result of short-term political and 
economic emergencies. Each crisis inevitably ended, but the controls remained. 
And given our position of world power, we have exported these ideas to other 
developed countries, causing the inevitable suboptimal allocation of resources 
in global markets.
 The compliance with business regulation requires the expenditure of 
billions of dollars that could be spent on innovation and research; on developing 
new manufacturing processes; and on reducing corporate costs of capital. 
Conservative business managers simply follow the rules; clever entrepreneurs 
look for ways to subvert the spirit of the regulation. The government cannot 
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keep up with legal and illegal business activities. A few examples, some of 
which will be discussed in this book:
         • In finance – hedge funds (unregulated so far by the government); 
unregulated lending by commercial finance companies like GE; unregulated 
consumer banking services by industrial banks like the proposed Wal-Mart 
operation or PayPal’s consumer finance operation for e-Bay
         • In communications – satellite TV operators; satellite radio; pirated 
DVDs; music downloads without any payment to artists or record companies
         • In general business – raising public funds outside the U.S. or going 
private inside the U.S to avoid Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act jurisdiction; using political action committees and 
lobbyists to influence actions by legislators and government regulators; 
Microsoft’s effectively monopolizing its industry and not experiencing a 
meaningful penalty
 It is essential that the U.S. retain its position as a leading free market 
economy while eliminating artificial barriers to corporate decision-making. 
The world is not yet flat – to paraphrase Thomas Friedman – but it is changing 
rapidly and we must respond. To present this argument, an introductory 
chapter explains the general problem. Part I then examines specific forms of 
business regulation, including general regulation and selected industry-specific 
regulation. Part II reviews broader issues relating to the regulatory process, 
country sovereignty, economics, and globalization.
  The author wishes to acknowledge various forums for allowing me to 
present earlier versions of certain material in this book.
         • The journal Business and Society Review, which published “Antitrust 
as Frontier Justice: Is It Time to Retire the Sheriff?” (in Volume 111, issue 1, 
2006), a preliminary version of Chapter 2
         • The annual meetings of the Society for the Advancement of Management 
in 2004 (Baltimore) and 2005 (Las Vegas), for material in Chapters 3 and 6
         • The 2007 Infiniti International Finance Conference at Trinity College, 
Dublin, for material in Chapter 7. This presentation was rewritten as “M&A 
in the Financial Services Industries: the 2007 Credit Crisis and Regulatory 
Considerations” to appear in a forthcoming issue of the Journal of Corporate 
Accounting & Finance.
         • The Eastern Finance Association annual meeting in 2006 (Philadelphia) 
for material in Chapter 8
Suggestions for content in Chapters 1 and 4 were made by Bernard R. Sloan, 
and his help is appreciated. In all matters, the author accepts full responsibility 
for errors of omissions or commission.
New York City
October 2007
Is U.S. Business Overregulated?
CHAPTER 1: InTRODUCTIOn
Wherever Law ends, Tyranny begins.
John Locke (1632–1704), Second Treatise of Government
There is no more critical issue facing America than its ability to compete in the global economy. The loss of manufacturing 
jobs to countries with five to twenty times lower labor costs may be the most 
important economic problem of our times. The U.S. has become a service 
economy that is heavily dependent on the goodwill of two classes of market 
participants:
• Foreign holders of dollars who keep buying our stocks, bonds, real 
estate, and other assets
• U.S. consumers whose spending drives some 70 percent of our gross 
domestic product
America has never developed a comprehensive public policy toward global 
competition. In fact, the Department of Commerce, the agency charged with 
the promotion of international business, did not begin to emphasize sales to 
foreign markets until the 1970s, some 300 years after countries like Great 
Britain and Holland were actively developing world trade relationships.
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If foreign holders of dollars and/or U.S. consumers ever falter in their 
support for our economy, the result could be a decade-long recession. This is 
no idle threat; by 2007, housing was in a slump with prices likely to be down 
for the year for the first time in decades.1 And in recent years housing “wealth” 
was what sustained the consumer and supported all those trips to Wal-Mart 
and to Orlando or Las Vegas. Although there are no quick fixes, the argument 
of this book is for a new look at our regulation of business to level the playing 
field against foreign competitors. We may well be our own worst enemy in 
limiting America’s ability to compete in the global economy!
COlOnIAl AmERICAn ATTITUDES TOwARD GOvERnmEnT
  
When considering the present, it is important to understand the past. 
Although history, economics, and political science may have been dry subjects 
in high school or college, there recently has developed an interest in the events 
and people that created the American republic. The popular revival of “founding 
father” history has been encouraged with biographies of such leading figures as 
George Washington, John Adams, and Benjamin Franklin. A common theme 
facing the founders was the post-Revolutionary War tension over federalism 
(centralized government managed primarily by the educated elite), as typified 
by the policies of Alexander Hamilton; and republicanism (decentralized 
government with participation by a wide spectrum of Americans), advocated 
by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.  
The bias of the founders was toward small government: President 
Washington’s administration consisted of a legal counsel and three departments, 
including State, Treasury, and War. And amazingly enough, only slightly more 
than 500 employees worked for the new government during peacetime.2  In 
contrast, the number of civilian employees of the U.S. government today 
is nearly two million, equivalent to more than fifty times the growth of the 
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general population over that period of time.3
STROnG vS. wEAk CEnTRAl GOvERnmEnT
 Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures 
advocated that government actively support business,4 rejecting the republican 
assumption that America could prosper with an agricultural base. To foster 
the growth of industry, Hamilton proposed the imposition of protective 
tariffs and restrictions on imported manufactured goods that would compete 
with domestic products. Early federal policy supported the development of 
essential infrastructure for the new country, encouraging banks, canals, and 
roads and later providing governmental assistance to Western railroads. 
The modern corporation was promoted through the enactment of laws that 
limited stockholder liability and conferred new powers to organizers of large 
enterprises. Great Britain, continental European governments, and Japan 
similarly accepted responsibility for the encouragement of private enterprise.
 Until the period of the Civil War, Americans largely resisted entrusting 
too much direct power in the hands of a strong central government. The national 
antagonism toward Great Britain in general and King George III in particular 
repulsed many Americans, and citizens of the new country assumed that local 
control of essential public services was adequate to fulfill their requirements 
for postal delivery, fire and police protection, and similar services.  Central 
government was thought to be needed only for national defense, as in the two 
early wars with Great Britain (the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812); 
in matters of international diplomacy, as managed by the Department of State; 
and in collecting tax revenues from the Customs Service to pay for these 
activities.5
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EARly fORmS Of BUSInESS REGUlATIOn 
 The American experience after the Revolutionary War generally 
rejected everything that was British, especially the concept of a “benign” 
sovereign who would determine the best interests of his or her subjects. 
Republicanism assumed that citizens could make their own decisions about the 
conduct of their affairs with minimal interference from the government. This 
attitude certainly extended to the fledgling business system, which embraced 
capitalism and free enterprise while rejecting mercantilism and a controlled 
economy. 
BRITISH mERCAnTIlISm AnD REGUlATIOn
 “Mercantilism” is often misunderstood today as the successor to 
feudalism that was based primarily on exports and the holding of a treasury 
of precious metals. In actuality, the British and Continental versions evolved 
to this concept only after a lengthy period of localized controls used to 
further national or collective interests rather than individual wealth. Profit 
and competition were discouraged; instead, regulation through guild controls6 
sought to maintain prices so that the maximum number of citizens could be 
provided for reasonably by the economic system.7
 Business regulation in Western society therefore began at the town level 
through restrictions over production and prices. The British guilds determined 
terms and conditions of membership within most industries, focusing on 
business conducted within each local area. Commerce eventually migrated to 
the countryside to escape this regimentation and the accompanying taxation on 
members, with the result that the national government was forced to rely on 
exclusive trade privileges – monopolies – to generate the revenue required to 
pursue such political goals as religious and commercial military campaigns. A 
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major issue over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries became the licensing 
and management of these monopolies, a dilemma that would come to America 
by the end of the nineteenth century.
REGUlATIOn By TARIff
 In the U.S., the regulation of business effectively began during 
the administration of George Washington when Congress approved the 
recommendations in Hamilton’s report on the promotion of American business 
activity as a coherent federal policy.8 Tariffs were thought necessary to provide 
funds for the national government, particularly as there was no other significant 
source of the revenue needed to provide for domestic programs and to develop 
a military. Hamilton also intended to protect infant American industry as it 
struggled to compete with the mature industrial nations of Europe. However, 
the concept of a tariff or any other barrier to free trade gives economic power 
to an appointed or elected authority (the Customs Service in this case) to make 
decisions that more efficiently would be made by free market forces. For more 
on tariffs and other trade restrictions, see Figure 1-1.
Figure 1-1: 
 A Note oN the ImpAct of tArIffs ANd QuotAs 
oN INterNAtIoNAl trAde
 International trade was historically impacted by the 
presence of tariff and quota systems established by nations 
against the free importation of foreign goods. A tariff is 
effectively a tax levied by a customs bureau and is based on 
the country of origin, the nature of the goods, and the value 
of the imports. A quota is a limitation on the quantity of 
goods that can be imported and is established either on all 
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items of a particular class or by exporting country. There are 
some reasonable justifications for both systems, including 
the protection of infant and developing industries that 
would otherwise be overwhelmed by mature manufacturers; 
protection of products that are essential to the national defense; 
and retaliation against countries that are thought to be unfairly 
restricting trade. 
 International cooperation toward tariff reductions 
and such other barriers as quotas began after World War II. 
Nearly two dozen countries initiated discussions through the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), negotiating 
in Geneva, Switzerland. Subsequent “rounds” through the late 
1940s and ending in the mid-1990s resulted in a reduction 
in average tariffs from 40 percent to 5 percent, allowing 
the volume of international trade to increase by twenty 
times. However, nontariff barriers continued to be serious 
impediments to trade, and services – not covered by GATT 
– were becoming increasingly important, affecting about one-
quarter of total global business activities. As the result, a new 
body was created in 1995 – the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) – to continue the movement toward free trade and to 
settle disputes among member countries.
 One of the remaining international trade disputes 
involves subsidies for agricultural products. Developing 
countries have long insisted that they cannot compete with 
developed economies that provide price supports or guarantees 
to their farmers. In late 2005 the WTO was able to negotiate 
the ending of subsidies for agricultural exports by 2013.*   
However, there is still no agreement on domestically grown 
and consumed farm products. In addition, tariffs continue to 
be assessed on manufactured goods, although the WTO has a 
long-term goal of eliminating these charges entirely.
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 The impact of these developments has been to greatly 
increase competition between companies in nearly every part 
of the world. The insulation of U.S. industry by trade barrier 
has effectively ended, and American companies are competing 
with businesses in both developed economy and developing 
economy countries. Antitrust effectively assumes that U.S. 
business experiences minimal international competition; 
nothing could be further from the truth.
* Keith Bradsher, “Trade Officials Agree to End Subsidies for 
Agricultural Exports,” New York Times, December 19, 2005, 
C1-C2.
A tariff is an indirect form of business regulation, because it artificially 
raises the final price of goods and services to buyers. For example, machinery 
imported from Great Britain might face a tariff of 20 percent, effectively 
increasing its price in the U.S. marketplace by that amount. If comparable 
machinery is available from local producers, any buyer would have to seriously 
consider the less expensive domestic alternative. Conversely, tariffs usually 
result in equivalent responses from other nations, making it more expensive 
for foreign buyers to acquire American goods. Thus, the tariff “regulates” 
commerce by reducing exporting opportunities for producers and increasing 
sales of domestic companies.
This became a very real issue in the 1830s, with Northern industrial 
companies profiting from the restriction on foreign competition and Southern 
planters unable to sell their cotton in international markets. South Carolina 
was particularly agitated about the tariff issue, and using the device of a special 
convention (rather than the legislature or an executive proclamation) issued an 
Ordinance of Nullification in late 1832. The purpose of this document was 
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to declare the federal tariffs of 1828 and 1832 unconstitutional and void in 
the state effective in February, 1833. An angry response by President Andrew 
Jackson, including the threat of military invasion, ended the crisis.9
CURREnT TRADE BARRIER ExPERIEnCE
In addition to disrupting the action of a market economy, protectionist 
tariffs do not end when the “infant industries” have matured to adulthood. 
Just prior to World War I, American tariffs were averaging 44 percent (on 
manufactured goods as a percent of their value),10 reflecting the continuing 
desire to raise revenues and to favor U.S. industry. It has only been since the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), begun after World War II, 
and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), that nations have 
made serious efforts at reducing and eliminating tariff protection.11  GATT’s 
eight rounds of trade negotiations resulted in average tariff reductions of 35 
percent, and the amount of the tariff was down to 3.9 percent by 2000.12  
Continuing disputes among the member nations of the WTO and 
anti-globalization protests have hampered additional free trade initiatives. 
Future focus will be on agricultural products, where tariffs still remain high 
as developed countries protect their own farming industries. Agricultural tariff 
rates are still around 40 percent, and rich nations spend some $300 billion a 
year in subsidies to support farming.13 However, progress was made in 2005 
on eliminating protections on agricultural exports by 2013.14 
Restrictions on trade in other forms have existed for centuries, including 
limitations on foreign direct investment (FDI), quotas, and administrative 
procedures. 
• Limitations on FDI restrict the flow of foreign capital into a country to 
make it difficult for international companies to establish facilities.
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• Quotas are limitations on the quantity of items that can be imported 
into a country.
• Administrative procedures discriminate against imported goods or 
services by imposing unreasonable requirements at the point of entry, 
usually to protect a domestic industry.
Many countries have been progressively removing these restrictions to 
encourage global business. For example, in the last decade of the twentieth 
century, 95 percent of all laws concerning FDI created a more favorable 
environment, according to UN statistics.15
THE nEED fOR fEDERAl REGUlATIOn
 
The first significant national laws that provided specific business 
regulation did not appear until the period of the Civil War. Banking regulation 
– the National Currency Act of 1863 and the National Bank Act of 1864 
– established a system of government regulation for banks and established 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The legislation was required to 
assist in the financing of the Civil War and to standardize a system of federally 
supervised national banks. No longer could each state permit its banks to issue 
currency, a practice that resulted in confusion for both businesses and travelers 
who had to determine if specific currency had real value in terms of specie 
(gold and silver).
 The Reconstruction period following the war began a period of 
industrialization that was to continue until nearly the end of the twentieth 
century. However, at the time of the passage of the first laws regulating business 
(other than banking), the U.S. was largely agrarian and continued to prefer the 
republican model. Nearly two-thirds of the population lived in rural America 
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and over 40 percent of all employment was still based on farming.16  A point 
often forgotten by modern commentators is that the first business regulation 
was primarily a response to the demands of farmers and small businesses 
– those groups that historically rejected big government – who sought relief 
from the rates charged by railroads to carry their products to market.
QUESTIOnInG THE ROlE Of BIG BUSInESS
 
Politicians and writers began debating the role of big business within a 
decade of the end of the Civil War, with particular focus on the economic and 
political power of large corporations. The economic environment allowed the 
development of corporate mechanisms that resulted in the restraint of trade, 
which were considered to be artificial and unhealthy limitations on the forces 
of supply and demand in a competitive economy. Restraint of trade usually 
involves actions by a business or a group of businesses acting in collusion to 
restrict competition. Federal law requires these actions to involve interstate 
commerce;17 most states also support competition in business through laws 
that mirror federal legislation.18
 Restraint of trade was often managed through trusts that operated as 
cartels to set prices and quantities of product offered for sale. A trust is an 
arrangement by which stockholders in several companies transfer their shares 
to a single set of trustees. In exchange, the stockholders receive a certificate 
entitling them to a specified share of the consolidated earnings of the jointly 
managed companies. A cartel is similar in structure, although cartel members 
typically retain share ownership in their own names and cooperate to set prices 
and quantities of product offered for sale. The leading example of a cartel today 
is OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. By the 1880s, 
trusts developed in several industries, including rail transportation, petroleum, 
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sugar, and steel. 
THE TRUSTS AnD BUSInESS REGUlATIOn 
 
 Angered by the “concentrated capital”19 of the trusts, the third-party 
Populist political movement developed in America toward the end of the 
nineteenth century. Populist reformers felt that business domination of the 
political process through large contributions to friendly officeholders and 
effective lobbying in Congress and the state legislatures had reached the point 
that the practice had begun to undermine the concept of democracy. Demand 
for a legislative solution led to the passage of two landmark congressional acts 
to control business:
• The Interstate Commerce Commission Act of 1887, which initially 
regulated rail transportation and was applied later to the trucking 
industry 
• The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which extended the concept 
of governmental regulation to any company engaged in interstate 
business20  
 The essence of the Interstate Commerce Commission Act and the 
Sherman Act was governmental protection of competition. In debating Senator 
Sherman’s bill, Congress did not concern itself with economic efficiency or 
actual harm to consumers. Instead, the legislators responded to a widespread 
hostility toward business concentration and the resulting potential for 
governmental corruption and injury to individuals.21 
 These legislative responses were a sort of lynch mob response to some 
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very bad behavior by businessmen wearing black hats. Specific incidents 
included tripling or quadrupling the price of everything controlled by a trust: 
the rail rates to farmers trying to get their produce to market; the cost of steel; 
even the price of sugar.22 In the “high noon” days of the American frontier, the 
sheriff would have deputized a posse, rounded up and jailed the villains, and 
cleaned up the town. Business regulation attempted to placate the citizens of 
a frontier America and got a real sheriff when President Theodore Roosevelt 
used the 1890 law to “pistol whip” the trusts.23  
wHAT IS BUSInESS REGUlATIOn?
 Business regulation is generally considered to be those laws and 
administrative procedures that are intended to protect competition and 
maximize consumer welfare.24 Regulation is used to control the behavior of 
companies when a market economy may lead to results that are suboptimal 
to the public good. In certain situations, regulation is unquestionably useful, 
particularly when injury may occur to parties too weak and too scattered to 
protect themselves. Those parties may be persons, and we safeguard individuals 
through consumer protection and other laws; see Figure 1-2.
Figure 1-2: 
coNsumer protectIoN lAws
legislation Purpose
Pure Food and Drug Act 
(1906)
Protects against the adulteration and misbranding 
of foods and drugs sold in interstate commerce.
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legislation Purpose
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(1938)
Protects against the adulteration and sale of 
foods, drugs, cosmetics, or therapeutic devices 
and allows the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) to set minimum standards and guidelines 
for food products.
Wool Products Labeling Act 
(1940); Fur Products Labeling 
Act (1951)
Protect manufacturers, distributors, and 
consumers from undisclosed substitutes and 
mixtures in manufactured wool and fur products.
Flammable Fabrics Act (1953) Prohibits the interstate transportation of 
dangerously flammable wearing apparel and 
fabrics.
Automobile Information 
Disclosure Act (1958)
Requires auto manufacturers to put suggested 
retail prices on all new passenger vehicles.
Textile Fiber Products 
Identification Act (1958)
Protects producers and consumers against 
misbranding and false advertising of fiber 
content of textile fiber products.
Cigarette Labeling Act (1965) Requires cigarette manufacturers to label 
cigarettes as hazardous to health.
 Fair Packaging and Labeling 
Act (1966)
Makes unfair or deceptive packaging or labeling 
of certain consumer commodities illegal.
Child Protection Act (1966); 
Child Protection and Toy 
Safety Act (1969)
Removes potentially harmful toys from sale 
and allows the FDA to pull dangerous products 
from the market; protects children from toys and 
other products that contain thermal, electrical, or 
mechanical hazards.
Truth-in-Lending Act (1968) Requires full disclosure of all finance charges 
on consumer credit agreements and in 
advertisements of credit plans.
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 Those parties may be inanimate but vital for our long-term existence, 
and we attempt protection through laws designed to avoid pollution and 
ecological damage; see Figure 1-3.
legislation Purpose
Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(1970)
Requires that consumer credit reports contain 
only accurate, relevant, and recent information 
and are confidential unless a proper party 
requests them for an appropriate reason.
Consumer Product Safety Act 
(1972)
Creates an independent agency to protect 
consumers from unreasonable risk of injury 
arising from consumer products and to set safety 
standards.
Magnuson-Moss Warranty/
Federal Trade Commission 
Improvement Act (1975)
Provides for minimum disclosure standards for 
written consumer product warranties and allows 
the FTC to prescribe interpretive rules and 
policy statements regarding unfair or deceptive 
practices.
Alcohol Labeling Legislation 
(1988)
Provides for warning labels on liquor saying that 
women should not drink when pregnant and that 
alcohol impairs a person’s abilities.
Nutrition Labeling and 
Education Act (1990)
Requires truthful and uniform nutritional 
labeling on every food the FDA regulates.
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Figure 1-3: 
eNvIroNmeNtAl protectIoN lAws
legislation Purpose
National Environmental Policy 
Act (1969)
Establishes protections for the environment by 
establishing policy, setting goals, and requiring 
environmental impact statements for major 
construction projects.
Clean Air Act (1970) Regulates air emissions from area, stationary, 
and mobile sources, and authorizes the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
to establish National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards to protect public health and the 
environment.
Endangered Species Act 
(1973)
Provides a program for the conservation of 
threatened and endangered plants and animals 
and the habitats in which they are found.
Safe Drinking Water Act 
(1974)
Protects the quality of drinking water by 
authorizing the EPA to establish safe standards 
of purity; requires public water systems to 
comply with health-related standards.
Toxic Substances Control Act 
(1976)
Assigns to the EPA the ability to track 
industrial chemicals currently produced or 
imported into the U.S.; requires the screening 
of these chemicals and can require reporting, 
testing, and banning of those that may pose an 
environmental hazard.
Clean Water Act (1977) Establishes a structure for regulating discharges 
of pollutants into U.S. waters; gives the EPA 
the authority to implement pollution control 
programs; sets water quality standards for 
contaminants in surface waters.
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Figure 1-4: 
pArtIAlly deregulAted INdustrIes
 Efforts at deregulation began in the 1970s; see Figure 1-4 for specific 
laws. Several formerly regulated industries were allowed to fully compete on 
rates and service, with the general result of lower prices to consumers. 
legislation Purpose
Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act [Superfund] 
(1980); Superfund 
Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act (1986)
Creates a tax on the chemical and petroleum 
industries and provides federal authority to 
respond directly to releases or threatened 
releases of hazardous substances that may 
endanger public health or the environment.
Oil Pollution Act (1990) Strengthens the EPA’s ability to prevent and 
respond to catastrophic oil spills; establishes 
a trust fund to clean up spills when the 
responsible party is incapable or unwilling to 
do so.
legislation Purpose
Airline Deregulation Act 
(1978)
Allows airlines to set fares and determine their 
own route structure.
Motor Carrier Act and Staggers 
Rail Act (1980)
Permits the trucking and railroad industries to 
negotiate rates and service.
Riegle-Neal Act (1994; 
effective 1997)
Allows banks to do business in any state 
regardless of the state of their original charter.
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 The opening of markets led to some disruptions, the leading example of 
which is the airline industry. The major national airlines were suddenly forced 
to compete with start-up carriers, and it became apparent that cost structures 
that were sustainable when competition was controlled by the decree of a 
federal agency (the Civil Aeronautics Board) could not be continued. As a 
result, Delta, Northwest Air, United, and others filed for bankruptcy protection, 
while airlines like Southwest Airlines and JetBlue have flourished.
SmAll STEPS TOwARD DEREGUlATIOn
 In spite of selected attempts to remove federal control, regulation remains 
pervasive and inevitably affects every business. Any listing of governmental 
regulation will depend on the bias and approach of the author; see Figure 1-5 
for such an attempt including business regulations that could be considered in 
whole or in part for elimination. Some industries like banking and insurance 
are regulated in virtually all of their activities. We do this to protect bank 
depositors who have entrusted their savings to their banker and to protect the 
community from a bank failure that might have a widespread catastrophic 
impact. Similarly, the failure of an insurance company would have a devastating 
effect on policyholders.
legislation Purpose
Telecommunications Act 
(1996)
Reduces barriers to competition in long-distance 
and local telephone, cable, and television.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(1999)
Permits financial services providers (banks, 
insurance companies, securities firms, finance 
companies) to enter any related financial 
business.
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Figure 1-5: 
cAtegorIes of goverNmeNtAl regulAtIoN
(BR = areas of business regulation that should be considered 
in whole or in part for elimination)
1. Protections for Individuals and Natural Resources 
  a. Environmental Quality (air, water, noise pollution)
  b. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Race, Sex, Age, or  
   National Origin
  c. Product Safety
  d. Food and Drug Purity
  e. Safety of Aircraft Operation
  f. Safety in Places of Employment
  g. Truth in Advertising
  h. Dishonest Consumer Practices
  i. Labor Organizing and Negotiation
  j. Sale of Alcoholic Beverages
  k. Gambling
  l. Land Use
   m. Licensing of Doctors, Lawyers, and Other Professionals
2. Industry-Specific Protections (BR)
   a. Transportation
   b. Communications
   c. Energy
   d. Banking
   e. Insurance
   f. Securities Issuance and Trading
3. Government Corporations
  a.  TVA
  b. AMTRAK
  c. U.S. Postal Service
  d. Multi-State compacts (e.g., the Port Authority of New  
   York and New Jersey)
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4. Regulations with Broad Economic Impact (BR)
a. Antitrust
b. Corporate Governance
c.     Export and Import Controls and Restrictions
 Other industries are subject to product safety requirements and perhaps 
advertising restrictions but few other limitations. To say that a business 
is “regulated” does not reveal the extent of the regulation. While there are 
obviously various objectives in any regulatory scheme, the theme is the 
protection of competition to provide consumers with a range of choices to 
attain a desired mixture of price, quality, service, and safety. Competition can 
also provide an incentive for businesses to pursue technological innovation 
and other efficiencies to maximize profits, regardless of the extent of the 
competition within a specific industry.
“lET THE COURTS fIGURE IT OUT”
 In a common law system,25 courts function to decide the meaning of a 
statute passed by the legislature. While this sounds reasonable and perhaps 
represents a desirable goal of public policy, the regulation of business to 
prevent injury to other businesses or to competition is not as logical or as 
simple as the law suggests. In fact, the laws of business regulation are among 
the least precise statutes ever passed by Congress, in that the language is often 
either too broad or too complex. 
• Overly broad statutory language pervades the Sherman Act, including 
such vague terms as “competition,” “unfair methods of competition,” 
“conspiracy in restraint of trade,” and “monopolize.”  The same 
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complaint can be made for certain other business regulation that we 
will discuss throughout this book.
• Excessively complex statutory language includes the laws governing 
the securities industry (e.g., the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 
and the Investment Company Act of 1940) and the Custom Service’s 
regulations on importing (i.e., the published U.S. tariff schedule 
extends to several feet of printed volumes). 
 Why did Congress do this? Any legislature is essentially a political 
body responding to the wants and demands of constituents and pressure groups. 
When a public outcry for action occurs, Congress typically holds hearings, 
passes laws, and hopes for the best. The Sherman Act and other antitrust laws 
and the recent law regarding corporate governance – the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 – clearly reflect public opinion but lack specificity as to the intent or 
meaning of critical words and phrases along with other deficiencies. 
wHAT IS COmPETITIOn?
 A market economy allows the unregulated functioning of an economy 
and may result in any of several competitive structures:
• Pure competition: Many buyers and sellers operate, no one of which 
is large enough to control prices or the amount of goods supplied to 
a market. The leading example of pure competition today is certain 
types of retailing.
• Monopolistic competition: Large numbers of buyers and sellers offer 
differentiated products, allowing a small element of price discretion. 
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Examples of this type of competition include pet food and soft 
drinks.
• Oligopoly: Few sellers with some pricing control participate in the 
market because there are significant barriers to entry, including huge 
capital requirements, access to technology and specialized machinery, 
difficulty in establishing distribution channels, and other factors. 
Oligopoly is the most frequently observed form of a competitive 
market structure and can be found in such manufacturing industries as 
automobiles, aircraft, aluminum, tires and rubber products, and steel.
• Monopoly: A single business (or a group of businesses acting 
together) controls a market, and buyers have no alternative source of 
supply. While monopoly is illegal in the U. S., government-regulated 
monopolies do exist for public utilities, and monopoly power is granted 
for limited periods to holders of patents and copyrights.
 Pure competition may be desirable theoretically, but it is an impractical 
goal in an industrial society where a company’s enormous capital requirements 
result in limits on the number of possible competitors. As a result, we have 
always accepted monopolistic competition and oligopoly as natural and 
essential economic institutions. 
THE PUBlIC InTEREST AnD mOnOPOly
 The situation is complicated by acceptance of monopolistic behavior 
when it is deemed to be in the public interest. From the nation’s beginning, 
monopoly has been encouraged in certain situations through a variety of legal 
and economic barriers to market entry and competition: 
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• Legal barriers include requirements for charters, licenses, and permits; 
patent protection for inventions and copyright protection for intellectual 
property; and government-sanctioned monopolies supposedly in the 
public interest, including public utilities (e.g., gas, electric, and water) 
and restrictions on airwaves and other communication access.
• Economic barriers involve those situations where existing companies 
can largely exclude potential competitors, through economies of scale 
in manufacturing and/or distribution, product differentiation, discounts 
for quantity purchasing for large customers, and a variety of other 
devices, all completely legal.
wHO ARE THE REGUlATORS?
 The government has constructed an enormous web of business 
regulators functioning through at least a dozen agencies or departments; 
for a partial list, see Figure 1-6. Certain of these bureaucratic structures 
are absolutely necessary to allow the functioning of a market economy. 
For example, U.S. economic history prior to World War I is filled with the 
chaos of unregulated business cycles, which led to bank failures, corporate 
bankruptcies, and in 1907 a near collapse of the economic system. We could 
not function without the Federal Reserve to establish monetary policy; the 
Internal Revenue Service to collect taxes; and such departments as the U.S. 
Department of Transportation to construct highways, airports, and similar 
infrastructure and the State Department to negotiate treaties and agreements to 
expedite international trade.
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Figure 1-6: 
federAl BusINess regulAtors (wIth stANdArd ABBrevIAtIoNs)
•  Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
•  Department of Agriculture (DOA)
•  Department of Commerce 
•  Department of Justice (DOJ)
•  Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
•  Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
•  Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
•  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
•  Federal Maritime Commission 
•  Federal Reserve System (the Fed)
•  Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
•  Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
 Unfortunately, government bureaucracy is a kind of clumsy “invisible 
hand,”26 in that the judgment of market nonparticipants is often substituted for 
that of business managers and their customers. Using a system of monetary 
exchange, an economic system transforms complex decision problems into 
drastically simplified ones. In the absence of a market system, someone has to 
face complex business problems, such as which goods and services to produce, 
how much of the gross domestic product should be consumed instead of saved, 
what sections of the country should specialize in what kinds of economic 
activity, and whether society should encourage farming or import agricultural 
commodities from abroad. In a market system responsive to individual 
consumer demands, no such questions have to be faced when the invisible 
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hand decides.
THE mARkET SySTEm AnD REGUlATIOn
 Much of what occurs in the market system rests in the hands of managers 
– jobs, prices, production, growth, technology, the standard of living, and the 
economic security of everyone. Consequently, government officials cannot be 
indifferent to how well business performs its functions. Depression, inflation, 
or other economic distress can bring down a government.27 A major function 
of public officials, therefore, is to see to it that businesses perform their tasks 
with a minimum of interference.
 What do managers need as a condition for performing in a market 
system? Government has a responsibility to do whatever is necessary to assure 
sufficient profits to employ citizens and grow the economy in an orderly manner. 
For example, if business needs tax relief to induce investment, governments 
consider the request, acknowledging that the tax concessions may indeed be 
necessary. In these systems such concessions are often granted. Managers do 
not appear simply as the representatives of a special interest, but as functionaries 
performing tasks that governments recognize as indispensable. 
 Any government representative who understands the requirements of 
his or her position and the responsibilities that market-oriented systems place 
on managers will grant a hearing. The official does not have to be bribed, duped, 
or pressured to do so, nor does he or she have to be an uncritical admirer of 
business. He or she simply understands that public affairs in market-oriented 
systems are in the hands of government and management that must collaborate 
toward the public good.
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THEmE Of THE BOOk
 The theme of this book is that there are “positive” regulations, such 
as those described earlier, and “negative” regulations, where government 
officials substitute their judgment for that of the market in situations when 
such substitution is inappropriate and may result in the suboptimal allocation 
of the factors of production. As noted in Figure 1-4, there are numerous areas 
of governmental intervention in business that interfere with its normal and 
necessary activities, including antitrust, corporate governance, and regulations 
that deal with specific industries.
 As previously suggested and as noted in the opening quote to this 
chapter, society cannot survive without laws to protect individuals and the 
environment against the corrupt or criminal actions of business. We must 
protect the public from the current (and future) generations of Andrew 
Fastows, Martha Stewarts, and Jack Abramoffs,28 in the same way that 
earlier generations investigated and prosecuted Charles Ponzi, Ivar Kreuger, 
and Richard Whitney.29 However, this book argues that the laws of business 
regulation must be reasonable and must reflect the changing requirements of 
the U.S. and not assume that conditions of previous generations are in any 
respect similar to those of the twenty-first century.
CHAPTER fORmAT
 The attempts by Congress to protect competition that began in the late 
nineteenth century used business regulation to achieve results that a market 
economy could not accomplish. However, the world has changed completely, 
and the old solutions may no longer be appropriate. This book discusses several 
inherent problems with business regulation, using the following sequence: 
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Part I: The Chronology of Business Regulation. In the first part of 
the book we critically review important areas of business regulation 
– by industry and by subject – in their chronological sequence of 
passage. 
• Chapter 2 evaluates antitrust.
• Chapter 3 examines banking.
• Chapter 4 describes financial services.
• Chapter 5 discusses the airline industry.
• Chapter 6 analyzes corporate governance.
  The historical and current situations are described, including the 
motivations and intentions of Congress and the reasons that the 
regulation either has failed or has serious, perhaps fatal, problems. 
At the conclusion of each chapter we review what the U.S. should 
do. In some instances, laws ought to be considered for repeal; in 
other situations, specific areas of policy need to be reexamined and 
changed in the context of international practice, decisions that were 
made for political rather than economic reasons, new technology, or 
simply obvious or likely program failure.
  
  Part II: The Effects of Business Regulation. The second part of 
the book discusses the impact of regulation on American business, 
particularly in the context of the global economy.
• Chapter 7 discusses the development of the “fourth” branch of 
government, the regulators.
• Chapter 8 examines country sovereignty and the changing 
role of the nation-state in the global economy.
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• Chapter 9 provides economic analysis, examining the costs 
and benefits provided by business regulation.
• Chapter 10 discusses the real issue addressed in this book: 
Should we use regulations to control business activity?
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PART I: 
The Chronology of Business Regulation
 The senior executives of the Megafinancial Corporation (MegaFi) are attending their regular weekly strategy meeting chaired by 
the company’s president and CEO, Seymour Dough. The major agenda item 
is the consideration of a new product idea sponsored by the Vice President 
for Marketing, Will Sell. MegaFi is a leader in the global financial markets in 
securities, insurance, and banking but is facing increased competitive pressures 
and additional scrutiny from regulators in the major developed countries.
 The new product – Guaranteed House Sale – is intended to solidify 
the company’s position in real estate by offering a variation on traditional 
residential property sales. The concept is a sale based on the appraised value of 
the property but with a guarantee of 75 percent of the average annual increase 
in property value experienced in the property’s market area (for example, in 
the county or zip code location in the U.S.). The increase or decrease would 
be determined from transactions for equivalent property from sales data as 
recorded by a local board of realtors.
 In an example provided at the meeting by Will Sell, a house owned 
for ten years with a $300,000 mortgage (based on an original appraisal of 
$400,000) could be sold back to MegaFi at a guaranteed average annual gain 
of 6 percent, which is 75 percent of the area’s residential property increase of 
8 percent. The homeowner would net $446,4001  without having to go through 
the process of selling the house or paying a real estate agent’s commission 
(6 percent in most places in the United States), and without risking a price 
reduction due to a temporary market decline. MegaFi would then be able 
to sell the house for whatever price the market sets, presumably $863,600,2 
through its real estate agency, without paying any agent’s commission (as all 
of the company’s agents are salaried). 
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proceed, Sue explains that the concept probably involves components of 
banking, insurance, securities, and real estate, and if the plan is implemented 
in the U.S., it could require approvals and oversight of an array of federal and 
local agencies, including the Comptroller of the Currency, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Home Loan Bank, the Federal Trade 
Commission, state banking regulators, state insurance commissions, and local 
real estate boards. Seymour, Will, and the other attendees are astonished to 
learn of this situation and wonder how American industry could have become 
so ensnarled in regulation.
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 Of course, the homeowner could always choose to sell his house 
through the conventional process, but he might experience delays in listing time, 
showing time including open houses, mortgage contingency and inspection 
time for the buyer, and closing time. The obvious advantage to MegaFi is 
the potential profit of nearly $150,000;3  the benefit to the homeowner is a 
guarantee executed at the time of the original purchase of 75 percent of the 
appreciation of equivalent property and no waiting period to complete the 
transaction.
1 Calculated as $400,000 times the future sum factor of 1.791 (6 percent, ten years), 
or $716,400, less $270,000 (the amount of the original mortgage less an assumed 
$30,000 paid off by the mortgagee in regular monthly payments).
2 $400,000 times an average annual increase of 8 percent, or $863,600, calculated as 
$400,000 times 2.159 (the future sum for 8 percent and ten years).
3 $863,600 less $436,400<<Should $436,400 here be $716,400?>> = $147,200; this 
calculation excludes the repayment of the outstanding mortgage loan.
 Will Sell is particularly enthusiastic about Guaranteed House Sale, 
because MegaFi is facing cutthroat competition in the traditional mortgage 
lending business. Furthermore, the company can insist on writing the 
homeowner’s property insurance as an integral component of the deal, and 
once insurance is included, other types of policies can be offered, such as life, 
disability, long-term care, liability, and even automobile coverage. Typical 
insurance pricing provides discounts for multiple policies, an attractive feature 
for insureds.
 Sue Lawless is the senior attorney in attendance. She listens carefully to 
Will’s presentation, taking careful notes as his idea is explained. As discussions 
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Still one thing more, fellow citizens – a wise and frugal government … 
which shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of 
industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor 
the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government, and this is 
necessary to close the circle of our felicities.
Thomas Jefferson   (1743–1826), “First Inaugural Address”
 In Chapter 1 we introduced the subject of business regulation, noting that the first significant laws were the Interstate Commerce 
Act of 1887 and the Sherman Act of 1890. America was rapidly changing 
from a frontier economy, composed largely of farmers, ranchers, and small 
merchants, to big industry and what was soon to become big government.  
AnTITRUST In 1890 AnD In THE TwEnTy-fIRST CEnTURy
 In 1890, protections were thought necessary to prevent abusive 
behavior by unscrupulous corporate executives, particularly as there was only 
limited competition from foreign companies due both to distance and such 
trade restrictions as tarviffs and quotas. In 2007, there are unsolvable problems 
in applying antitrust that no one anticipated more than 115 years ago.
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       • Section 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws restraints of trade: “Every   
 contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or   
 conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several   
 States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 
       • Section 2 deals with monopoly: “Every person who shall   
 monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with  
 any person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or    
 commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be  
 deemed guilty of a felony.”3  
As Phillip Areeda notes, “the statutes … are so general that antitrust law shares 
a great deal with the common law,”4 that is, law based on the decisions of 
courts rather than on the language enacted by Congress.  
“fIxES” TO THE SHERmAn ACT
 There have been various attempts to make antitrust more specific in 
subsequent legislation; for a list see Figure 2-1. The Clayton Act of 1914 cites 
illegal anticompetitive behaviors, including prohibitions against exclusive 
sales contracts, local price cutting to freeze out competitors, rebates, and 
interlocking corporate directorates.5 (An interlocking corporate directorate is 
where two or more companies have common individuals serving on the Board 
of Directors and perhaps influencing decisions in favor of the other company.) 
Because specific actions were clearly defined in the Clayton Act, it became the 
basis for several important cases brought against large corporations. 

IS SIzE EQUIvAlEnT TO mARkET DOmInAnCE?
 More than a century later the world has changed completely, and 
we have to at least consider whether the old remedies for anticompetitive 
behaviors are still appropriate. Consider two rather prominent examples of 
recent corporate experience. 
       • General Motors in 1978 controlled 47.7 percent of the automobile  
 market in the U.S.; by 2003, its market share had fallen to 25.7   
 percent.1 Was GM restraining trade in 1978? What changed   
 GM’s behavior? Was it concern about antitrust, or did the   
 superior products and service of  Japanese and other manufacturers  
 simply grab market share? 
Wal-Mart has a 21.7 percent share of the entire U.S. retail market.2 
Is Wal-Mart restraining trade by being more efficient than its 
competitors, using a real-time inventory management and ordering 
system, and insisting on low purchasing costs? Or is it simply 
smarter and more aggressive? And doesn’t the consumer benefit by 
having low prices and a wide product selection?
As a nation, are we better or worse off with a General Motors in decline and a 
Wal-Mart in ascendance? Should regulation be used to substitute for the power 
of “the invisible hand,” in Adam Smith’s famous phrase?
 Making the situation even more difficult was the inability of Congress 
to write the Sherman Act citing any specific violations. Instead, very general 
language was used that proved to be grist for more than a century of conflicting 
decisions by the federal courts. 
•
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 As a second line of enforcement for antitrust (after the Department 
of Justice), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was established as an 
independent agency of the U.S. government in 1914. The principal mission 
of the FTC is the promotion of consumer protection and the prevention of 
anticompetitive business practices. Subsequent legislation strengthened 
antitrust enforcement, including the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 and the 
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950.6
 It is important to note that there has not been any significant antitrust 
legislation in more than fifty years. During that time, the U.S. lost its global 
dominance in nearly all manufacturing sectors, innovations in computers and 
telecommunications have revolutionized all phases of working and personal 
life, and there has been nearly universal acceptance of capitalism. Antitrust 
clearly assumes the economic structure of a developing yet isolated industrial 
society. However, there has been no government initiative in all this time to 
review or revise existing law or regulation.
USA Patriot Act (2001) Limits interactions between U.S. and foreign 
banks to those with “know your customer” 
policies; allows the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury to freeze assets and bar a country, 
government, or institution from doing business 
in the U.S.; gives federal authorities broad 
powers to monitor Internet usage
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Figure 2-1: 
Antitrust LAws
     legislation       Purpose
Sherman Act (1890) Sets a competitive business system as national 
policy, specifically banning monopolies and 
restraints of trade
Clayton Act (1914) Places restrictions on price discrimination, 
exclusive dealing, tying contracts, and 
inter¬locking boards of directors that reduce 
competition or might lead to a monopoly
Federal Trade Commission Act 
(1914)
Establishes the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) to investigate business practices; 
prohibits unfair methods of competition
Robinson-Patman Act (1936) Outlaws price discrimination in sales to 
wholesalers, retailers, or other producers; bans 
pricing designed to eliminate competition
Wheeler-Lea Act (1938) Bans deceptive advertising; assigns jurisdiction 
to the FTC
Celler-Kefauver Act (1950) Closed the loophole in the Clayton Act 
allowing potential restraints of trade through 
acquisition of a competitor’s assets
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wHICH STAnDARD Of REvIEw SHOUlD BE USED?
 The federal courts have constantly struggled with uncertainty over 
the appropriate standard of review to use in deciding an antitrust case. Do 
we condemn any potential restraints of trade or monopolies, or only those 
that have actually happened? If we prevent potential anticompetitive actions, 
we are acting against a crime that has not yet occurred. If we wait until the 
anticompetitive action occurs, innocent competitors and customers will have 
been injured, perhaps long past the point of being adequately compensated for 
their losses. An early case that addressed this issue was Standard Oil, which 
simply affirmed a lower court’s finding9 of a Sherman Act violation due to the 
creation of a holding company which could potentially restrain competition. 
 The evidence is contradictory as to Standard Oil’s ultimate intent, 
and the passage of a century makes objective analysis very difficult.10 At 
the time of the decision and despite years of inaccurate reporting by various 
observers,11 there was no hard evidence of actual harm to consumers. In 
fact, the price of kerosene (the principal home energy source) dropped by 85 
percent in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and there were over 100 
companies competing with Standard Oil for U.S. business. However, Standard 
Oil received preferential shipping rates from U.S. railroads in exchange for 
volume commitments. In the decade before the passage of the Sherman Act, 
the company controlled much of the country’s oil refining capacity, and it 
could have used this power to destroy competitors. 
 The creation of the crude oil pipeline system presented an opportunity 
for significant cost savings, but Standard Oil could only gain this advantage 
through centralized financial and operating decisions. It then expanded 
vertically by acquiring companies engaged in energy marketing and crude 
oil production.12 Through this campaign of growth through consolidation, the 
company became fully integrated by the time of the passage of the Sherman Act, 
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PROBlEmS In APPlyInG THE AnTITRUST lAwS
 
 The Supreme Court has somewhat resolved at least a part of the 
specificity problem by defining the goal of antitrust as maximizing “consumer 
welfare.”7  But in announcing this goal, other problems remain that we will 
briefly discuss in this chapter:
       • How do we define competition? 
       • Do we protect those competing and/or potential new entrants to the  
 market? What about competitors from outside the jurisdiction of U.S. 
 law? 
       • Is the efficient allocation of scarce factors of production the issue? 
       • Should any potential trade restraint be prohibited, or only those   
 restraints that are unacceptable?8
 
Is any of this relevant in the twenty-first-century global business 
environment, particularly if international competitors refuse to 
follow the same rules?
 Important antitrust cases did encourage competition, ending greedy 
business practices and creating a business environment that excluded 
monopolists and other undesirable business practices. However, there has been 
no single procedure in deciding antitrust cases over the past 100 years or so, 
as judges, plaintiffs, defendants, attorneys, and expert witnesses deal with the 
problem of interpreting these laws.
       • 
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Is Walgreen a drug store chain or part of the larger “food and drug store” 
industry?19 Does it compete with CVS? Certainly. Does it compete with 
Kroger? This is a tougher question, because large supermarket chains have 
extensive pharmacy operations staffed with druggists and offering a wide 
variety of products. If the market is food and drug stores, the total revenues 
for the most recent reporting year were $276.7 billion (following the generally 
accepted convention of defining the size of a market by revenues). 
 However, if the market is drug stores, the total market was $90.9 
billion.20 And the answer makes a huge difference, because a hypothetical 
merger of Walgreen and CVS would constitute control of 75 percent of the 
drug store market and a clear target for antitrust review. However, that same 
merger measured against the food and drug store market would represent less 
than 25 percent of the industry’s revenue and would almost certainly escape 
the government’s opposition.
 The economic solution in trying to define a market is to use elasticity 
of demand analysis to establish realistic competitive limitations. Price 
elasticity of demand is a measure of how much consumers respond in their 
buying decisions to a change in price; for example, a one percent increase in 
price that leads to a one percent in the quantity of product that is demanded 
is neutral (or unitary) in terms of revenue received. The demand for a good 
is inelastic if the price elasticity is less than one, meaning that some price 
increases can be tolerated by the market, yielding higher total revenues. The 
classic examples used in economics texts are the demand for salt or gasoline, 
where price increases (or decreases) will not significantly affect the quantity 
sold.
 Elasticity is largely driven by the availability of substitute products. 
In theory, boundaries exist at the inflection point where low price elasticity 
of demand exists for the products in the market and the products outside 
it.21  The Supreme Court has articulated this idea conceptually by noting that 
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controlling about a three-fourths share of the oil refining market. Reviewing 
the Standard Oil history, it is difficult to find actual (as opposed to potential) 
harm to consumers.  
 Similar results can be cited for American Tobacco (1911), U.S. Steel 
(1920), Alcoa (1945), and other leading cases, with the Supreme Court at times 
reading the Sherman Act literally (the per se rule),13 regardless of actual injury 
to competition, and at other times applying a “rule of reason” that limited 
findings of guilt to proven injurious corporation behavior.14  Rule of reason 
analysis includes consideration of the facts specific to the business, the nature 
of the restraint and its effects, and the history and rationale for the restraint. 
Thus, American Tobacco was guilty, U.S. Steel was innocent, and Alcoa was 
guilty, even though the guilty were generally considered to be “good trusts.”15
 The per se rule allows courts to avoid the economic details; the rule 
of reason uses economic logic while placing a significant analytical burden on 
the judiciary. While courts often rely on expert testimony, each party usually 
has its own battery of authorities, and who does the court believe (particularly 
as so few judges are trained as economists)?  Differences between per se and 
rule of reason are now less clear. In the language of a 1984 Supreme Court 
decision, “there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason 
analysis. Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions 
before the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct.”16 In 
fact, other standards exist on the per se and rule of reason continuum, including 
“quick look.” If the outcomes from a potential antitrust violation are unclear, 
courts may make a shortened inquiry into the restraint’s effects before deciding 
which analytical path to pursue.17
  
wHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE mARkET?
 
 Defining the relevant market is often determinative in antitrust.18 
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- Competition from multinational corporations in international 
markets? For example, what is the market for Coca-Cola 
– only the U.S. (the legal reach of U.S. antitrust) or global 
markets including all foreign soda and beverage companies?
- Competition from companies using e-commerce to serve 
distant markets? For example, what is the market for computer 
components when U.S. computer manufacturers can buy 
parts from U.S. suppliers or from their competitors in Taiwan, 
Singapore, or China?
How do we account for nonprice competition, including innovation, 
advertising, service, and financing assistance? Any business manager 
can attest to the relatively inconsequential impact of price on the 
competitive position of a company, with the possible exception of those 
industries where products are essentially similar. Instead, companies 
compete today on quality, assured delivery, customer service, access 
to financing, and various other nonprice factors. 
What are acceptable degrees of concentration in each market? How 
are these limitations derived? Concentration measures are arbitrary 
and subject to statistical manipulation, and Justice Department limits 
on concentration are themselves totally arbitrary numbers with no 
theoretical or empirical significance.23 Are six companies too many 
or too few? Or should the metric be the percentage of an industry 
controlled by the top one or two companies? The tobacco industry 
has only four competitors with the Altria Group’s market share at 85 
percent – is this too much concentration?24 No one has suggested that 
       • 
       • 
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the “outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable 
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product 
itself and substitutes for it.”22  But, how do we measure price elasticity in the 
absence of a practical methodology that is widely accepted by the economics 
profession? Although the concept is interesting and useful as a theoretical 
economic concept, no standard measure exists to calculate these outcomes.
fURTHER DEfInITIOnAl ISSUES
Other ambiguities and problems continue to exist.
What is the market being defined? Antitrust requires the 
monopolization or restraint of trade of a market. But in defining a 
market do we include –
- Used goods? For example, do “formerly owned” cars (to use 
one company’s euphemism) compete in the same market as 
new automobiles?
- Imported goods? For example, for purposes of interpreting 
antitrust laws, do Nokia cell phones (manufactured in Finland) 
compete with Motorola cell phones (manufactured in the 
U.S.)? 
- Inter-product competition? For example, McDonald’s 
hamburgers aren’t usually considered as competing with 
Outback Steakhouse steaks, but they are when the customer 
is feeling economically stressed by high gasoline and home 
heating costs. 
       • 
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Industry 
(including 
Fortune 
Number)
Revenues 
of #1 
Company
Revenues of 
#2 Company
Total of #1 & 
#2 Companies
Total 
Revenues 
of Public 
Companies
Market Share 
of #1 Company
Market Share 
of #1 & #2 
Companies
#48: Petroleum 
Refining
$418.8 $723.8
-Exxon Mobil $270.8 37.4% 57.9%
-Chevron 
Texaco
$148.0
#62: Tobacco $70.8 $75.7
-Altria Group
$64.4 85.1% 93.4%
-Reynolds 
American
$6.4
#68: Waste 
Management
$17.9 $20.6
-Waste 
Management
$12.5 60.7% 86.9%
-Allied Waste 
Industries
$5.4
Source: Calculated from data in the Fortune 500 issue of April 18, 2005
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we instigate antitrust proceedings against Altria to make the tobacco 
industry more competitive. For comparison purposes, Figure 2-2 lists 
selected industries and the market shares of the top one and top two 
companies. Which should we prosecute first? 
Figure 2-2: 
mArket shAre dAtA for selected INdustrIes
(data in billions $)
Industry 
(including 
Fortune 
Number)
Revenues 
of #1 
Company
Revenues of 
#2 Company
Total of #1 & 
#2 Companies
Total 
Revenues 
of Public 
Companies
Market Share 
of #1 Company
Market Share 
of #1 & #2 
Companies
#14: 
Diversified 
Financials
$181.5 $234.8
-General   
Electric
$152.4 64.9%
77.3%
-American 
Express
$29.1
#17: 
Electronics/ 
Electrical 
Equipment
$28.8 $61.7
-Emerson 
Electric
$15.6 25.3%
46.7%
-Whirlpool $13.2
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In addition, what are the synergies of the companies considering a new 
venture? For example, does the acquired firm bring new technology 
or innovative processes to a complacent acquirer, thereby enabling the 
new entity to better compete in the global economy?
Is the proposed merger horizontal or vertical?27 Horizontal mergers 
have typically been considered as “dangerous.”28 If Hewlett-Packard 
and COMPAQ were to merge (which they did in 2002 with less-than-
outstanding results), the result might harm competition. Following 
this “logic,” if COMPAQ and Intel were to merge, the result would be 
benign. Does anyone really believe this?
The following comment by Frederick Rowe gives some indication of the 
complexity in any attempt at “logical” analysis.
More and more, fixation on market shares and concentration 
levels degenerated into “numbers games.” The Justice 
Department hit mergers threatening to raise concentration 
in markets for “frozen dessert pies,” for “artificial Christmas 
trees,” for “vandal-resistant plumbing fixtures” used in prisons, 
for local towel rental services, for “custom-compounded 
reinforced thermoplastics,” for drapery hardware, or for 
commercial trash hauling in Dallas. The Federal Trade 
Commission moved against mergers threatening to raise 
concentration in markets for frozen pizza, for carburetor kits, 
for urological catheters, and for “knockdown casket parts.”29 
       • 
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 What do we do with a company like General Electric? Its market share 
of the Diversified Financial Industry is 65 percent, but is it a financial company 
like American Express? Based on its most recent financial statements, GE’s 
industrial segment contributed 54 percent of total revenues, while GE Capital 
contributed 46 percent.25 Perhaps we should break up GE, forcing it to divest its 
financial businesses – remember it has a 65 percent market share. But anyone 
who has studied the company’s success over the past decade knows that GE 
Capital is a major factor in the sale of its industrial equipment. And by the way, 
why does Fortune magazine list it as a Diversified Financial? 
 Finally, what do we do with privately held companies? Certainly 
antitrust laws make no distinction between public and private enterprise, 
although all of these statistics focus on published financial statements. The 
waste disposal subcategory within waste management, which is one of those 
industries included in Figure 2-2, has over 100 companies that are not included 
in the Fortune 500 list. And other subindustries would probably drive the 
total number of companies to over 500.26 How does this get counted in these 
concentration calculations?
How is competition encouraged if mergers and other strategic 
initiatives are restricted? Major companies would be effectively 
protected in many markets if new competitors – perhaps created from 
the remnants of smaller firms – could be subject to antitrust review. Or 
should we subject the existing companies to antitrust scrutiny in the 
effort to bring in new competitors? 
What are the barriers to entry and exit? If an industry – such as airlines 
or banking – restricts new participants because of market, legal, 
and/or financial requirements, wouldn’t the position of consumers be 
improved by encouraging existing participants to survive and grow? 
       • 
       • 
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 Furthermore, classical supply and demand is essentially static, ignoring 
how companies and consumers actually behave in a competitive environment. 
Some authorities look to behavioral economics, which is concerned with how 
a decision-making process influences the choices that are eventually reached.35 
An important question is: are the utility or profit maximization assumptions 
in classical economics good approximations of real behavior? It is clear that 
actual behavior departs from that of the “rational actor” assumed by standard 
economic models. Behavioral economics attempts to develop a systematic 
approach to the application of economics to these deviations from standard 
assumptions. There have been no cases that consider this approach in antitrust 
review; however, a leading judge has written on the topic and there is the 
possibility of future consideration.36
THE POST-CHICAGO AnD vIRGInIA SCHOOlS
More recent economic analysis, sometimes called “post-Chicago,” overcomes 
the static framework of Chicago analysis through game and information 
theory.37  This approach attempts to consider the sequencing of market entrants, 
the anticipated reactions of competitors, the advantages inherent in being an 
incumbent, and the insurmountable barriers to entry in certain old and most 
new economy industries.38 The Virginia school – often called “public choice” 
– argues that antitrust should be abolished, as the interests of consumers have 
consistently been left unprotected and competition has been reduced rather 
than enhanced.39 Their review of specific cases and more systematic evidence 
indicates that antitrust does not help competition but actually reduces it.40 
For public choice, a deregulated world of private contracts is preferable to 
government intervention. 
 To this point the government has not adopted the public choice 
philosophy and continues its antitrust enforcement. However, this is a somewhat 
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mORE PROBlEmS In APPlyInG AnTITRUST
In addition to confusion in understanding the structure of an industry, there are other 
issues to consider. These include alternative economic theories, in the timeliness of 
the outcome, and global variations in application of antitrust law.
THE CHICAGO SCHOOl
 The Chicago school has provided a leading economic methodology in 
the analysis of antitrust.30 The approach is fairly straightforward and reflects 
classical economic theory: scarce factors of production – land, labor, and capital 
– are most efficiently allocated in the presence of competitive markets. That is, 
forces of supply and demand function to clear markets at prices and quantities 
set by the marketplace. This principle seemingly assures that costs and prices 
will be kept low, that companies will attempt to innovate and develop new 
technologies, and, most important in considering antitrust, competition will be 
fair to consumers.
 A significant problem with the Chicago approach is that efficient 
markets do not necessarily consider how equitably products and services are 
distributed among participants. Robert Bork has written that the “whole task 
of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency.”31 
In other words, the Chicago school seems to equate consumer welfare with 
efficiency. However, the leading federal cases have never turned on efficiency, 
and in fact tend to focus on wealth distribution and economic concentration.32 
Congress intended to prevent the exploitation of consumers through predatory 
(below cost) pricing33 operated through oligopolistic market control. Despite 
these limitations, some cases decided in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s 
were influenced by the Chicago school.34
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courts often focus on whether a past harm has occurred despite the natural 
tendencies of markets toward efficient behavior.44
 The twenty-first-century new or postindustrial economy involves 
global competition in industries that focus on intellectual property, as 
opposed to a manufactured product. Data and technology are used to produce 
information systems, financial services and scientific discoveries. Such 
new economy industries as computer software, Internet-based services, and 
telecommunications initially require very high capital investment in networks, 
intellectual property, and computer systems.45  These technologies were 
obviously never contemplated by the 1890 authors of the Sherman Act, who did 
not see industrial competition and economies of scale as mutually exclusive. 
 The “new” economy requires the accumulation of capital or 
scale outcome that presents barriers to entry to aspiring competitors and 
often requires nearly total control of an industrial sector (such as is the 
situation with the telecommunications industry),46 while creating the risk 
of predatory pricing.  The Microsoft case illustrates the challenges facing 
courts attempting to reconcile innovation, the scale requirements of a new 
economy industry, and antitrust. Many economists today have accepted 
that Schumpeterian “creative destruction”47 is inevitable and can disrupt 
competition in high technology markets with long-term positive effects. 
HOw DO OTHER COUnTRIES vIEw AnTITRUST?
 An interesting irony is the strong influence of the U.S. on European 
Union (EU) policy and the resulting current enforcement of EU antitrust. 
Microsoft experienced a relatively benign result in the U.S. cases brought 
against it (as discussed earlier in this chapter), while the EU is still aggressively 
pursuing the company. Microsoft’s strategy in Europe has been to place its 
operating system into just about every application: corporate networks, 
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“hollow” policy; whether there is active or passive enforcement depends largely 
on the political party in power and on the attitude of the judiciary. For example, 
several commentators have noted the laissez-faire antitrust profile during the 
1981–1989 Reagan Administration.41 In the present day, the Rehnquist court 
did not hear a merger case after 1974, resulting in the problems of ambiguity 
in legal standards and forum-shopping among attorneys.42  
wIll A TImEly AnD lOGICAl OUTCOmE BE ATTAInED?
 Antitrust cases can require a decade or more to prepare and decide. 
After years of consideration, the recent Microsoft case was originally brought 
in 1998, was first decided by one federal district court in 2000, was appealed 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals, was remanded to for retrial in 2001, and was 
finally decided in 2002.43 The government alleged that Microsoft illegally tied 
its Web browser to the Windows operating system, despite the fact that injury 
to consumers was never proven. Numerous cases have similar histories as the 
judicial process slowly wends its way through fact finding, analysis, discovery, 
motions, and trial. Markets move faster than antitrust, and a shrewd litigation 
team can drag out the process for a much longer time than the life or death of 
a competitor.
 A somewhat more subtle antitrust issue in the concern for timeliness 
is the fairly narrow perspective required for deciding legal conflicts. The 
plaintiff (sometimes the federal government) brings allegations that one or 
more antitrust laws have been broken, and the defendant attempts to rebut 
these specific accusations. There is little consideration for the general 
characteristics of the industry, for competitors, or for other factors economists 
typically examine in analyzing a market. Oligopoly is the predominant form 
of industrial structure and is a natural result of the requirement for economies 
of scale in plant, equipment, intellectual property, and marketing capacity. Yet 
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wHAT THE U.S. SHOUlD DO
 In a democracy, the passage of a law – for whatever cause and due to 
whatever pressures – tends to be a permanent action. The principal reason is 
that there often are no constituencies demanding reexamination of the earlier 
decision by the legislature. Exceptions do occur, but they often take decades 
to ripen into action and can require enormous lobbying efforts by interested 
parties; we’ll discuss the efforts required to change the laws on financial 
services in Chapter 4. The antitrust statutes have no wealthy constituencies 
demanding action, primarily because a merger or effort toward the control 
of an industry is often a one-time event in the life of a corporation. Those 
agitating for one fix or another are largely in academic positions, and they have 
little impact on Washington decision makers.
 On balance, it is difficult to argue that the U.S. economic system 
would not proceed in a civil and orderly fashion in the absence of an antitrust 
shield. There has been no significant case in two decades on the domination 
of an industry by a single company or by companies acting in restraint of 
trade. The most recent landmark decision on antitrust – other than Microsoft 
– was possibly the case of AT&T.52 However, in that situation the government 
had allowed a monopoly to continue for much of the twentieth century as an 
expedient to provide communications services to U.S. customers, and there is 
certainly no likelihood of a return to the control of that industry or any other 
industry in the sense of Sherman Act–type anticompetitive behavior.
TwEnTy-fIRST CEnTURy REAlITIES
 The concepts of monopoly and restraint of trade make sense when 
consumers have no choice in their sources of supply, as small businessmen and 
farmers discovered in the late nineteenth century. That situation has clearly 
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consumer electronics, and the Internet. However, in 2004 the EU found that 
the company had abused its dominant position, resulting in an antitrust fine 
of nearly 500 million euros. While the EU actively pursued Microsoft, the 
George W. Bush administration defended the company and, in the words of 
Harry First, was “far less concerned about single-firm dominant behavior than 
previous administrations.”48
 It is no great surprise that Microsoft recently agreed to end its 9-year 
fight against the European Union’s antitrust regulators.49  The company simply 
got tired of fighting a system that claims to support competition without 
consideration for the realities of the marketplace. Will freer competition and 
better customer service result? There may be little actually gained because 
of previous Microsoft agreements with other computer companies for cross-
licensing and the sharing of technology. 
 Developed countries in Asia have a benign attitude toward antitrust, 
unlike the current U.S. and European posture. Japan allows a cartel system 
known as keiretsu, which involves groups of financially connected companies 
that give first preference to doing business with each other rather than in an 
openly competitive system.50   Historically, the keiretsu were supported by 
strong government central planning which directed financial institutions to 
support certain favored companies. Following World War II, the initial Allied 
intention was to dismantle these cartels, as they were thought to be critical 
elements in fomenting and then supporting the Japanese war effort. However, 
they were allowed to continue in existence due to the need for a strong U.S. 
ally as a first line of defense against the Soviet Union during the period of the 
Cold War. The fifteen-year Japanese recession that began in the 1990s has been 
largely attributed to mistaken investment and lending choices made under this 
arrangement, and, as a result, there has been some opening of the economy to 
more competitive market forces.51

Is U.S. Business Overregulated? Chapter 2: AnTITRUST 
EnDnOTES fOR CHAPTER 2
(Endnotes)
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5 See 38 Stat. 730, 15 U.S.C. § § 12-27, 29 U.S.C. § § 52-53.
6 The Robinson-Patman Act, 38 Stat. 730, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936); the Celler-
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U.S. 330, 343 (1979); and Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. v. Bd. Of Regents of the 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984).
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changed in the early twenty-first century, and America is now scrambling to 
compete in global markets with international competitors who are not looking 
over their shoulders at antitrust regulators. It is not enough to approve actions 
that would have been challenged during previous times, as in the recent case of 
the Whirlpool-Maytag merger,53 because the decision makers will change with 
each new national political agenda. 
 We have seen that the Republicans don’t enforce antitrust, while the 
Democrats did during their time in the White House and probably will again. 
This inconsistency of enforcement is patently unfair to society and against 
the intent of Congress when it passes legislation.  The antitrust laws cannot 
be made sufficiently specific to allow fair and consistent application, and, in 
any event, should not impede U.S. companies from developing strategies to 
allow them to compete in global markets. The time may have indeed come to 
consider repealing the antitrust laws.
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CHAPTER 3: BAnkInG
A banker is a fellow who lends you his umbrella when
 the sun is shining, but wants it back the minute it begins to rain.
Mark Twain (1835–1910), Attributed
 In Chapter 1 we briefly mentioned commercial banking, the object of the first American regulation of business that began during the Civil 
War. Banks and other financial institutions that accept deposits are subject to 
extensive scrutiny by an array of government agencies because of the amount 
of their funding by the deposits of businesses and individuals. Some 90 percent 
of all bank capital is derived from deposits, with the remaining capital from 
stockholders’ equity (stock).1 In contrast, most manufacturing companies in 
the U.S. have about 35 to 40 percent in debt on their balance sheets. As can be 
imagined, even a few bad loans by a bank could cause that institution to fail. 
THE DEvElOPmEnT Of BAnkInG REGUlATIOn
 A series of banking panics and economic recessions occurred in the 
decades after the Civil War. The typical pattern was a failure by an individual 
bank due to the actuality or public perception of mismanagement or misguided 
lending practices; a run on that bank which had insufficient liquidity to repay 
depositors;2  the bank’s failure and the accompanying panic which would spread 
to other financial institutions; the withdrawal of reserves from the banking 
system leading to a shrinking loan volume; and, finally, economic recession. 
The U.S. was late in following other developed economies in creating a central 
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bond markets are not nearly as well developed outside the U.S., resulting in 
a much higher rate of corporate lending through foreign banking institutions. 
Because of this vital role and given the unhappy economic history until the 
years after World War II, banks have been among the most regulated of all 
industries; see Figure 3-1. We will briefly note the functions of the two most 
important of the regulators: the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal 
Reserve.
Figure 3-1: 
reguLAtory responsibiLities For FederALLy 
ChArtered u.s. bAnks
Activity Agency Responsible
Chartering authority Comptroller of the Currency
Supervisory and examining authority Comptroller of the Currency
FDIC insurance Comptroller of the Currency
Federal Reserve System membership Automatic with charter
Approval for branch  applications and 
for bank mergers
Comptroller of the Currency
Approval of bank holding company 
formations and acquisitions
Federal Reserve System
Financial holding company 
certification and prior notice of new 
activities
Federal Reserve System
Establishment of uniform principles 
and standards for the examination of 
financial institutions
Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council
 
bank to manage monetary policy and to be the “lender of last resort.” The near 
collapse of the economy in 1907 and its rescue by an individual – J.P. Morgan 
– rather than by any government agency forced Congress to action.3  
 The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created the Federal Reserve 
System, with the primary purpose of allowing loans to member banks to meet 
depositor and borrower demands.4  The cycle of panic and recession led bank 
regulators to establish specific rules for lending, including limits on loans 
to specific customers and to industry groups. In the situation where a bank 
failure is threatened, the regulators can close the bank and authorize an orderly 
liquidation, sell portions of the bank’s assets to other institutions, and/or lend 
funds to the bank (through the Federal Reserve’s discount window) to assist 
until the emergency has passed.5
 As we maintain throughout this book, it is vital to safeguard the 
individual depositor, borrower, and stockholder. For example, the creation of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) during the early years of 
the Roosevelt Administration was a brilliant concept to protect depositors and 
end runs on banks whenever the public perceived that their funds could be 
lost.6 The current guarantee of $100,000 per depositor allows individuals and 
small businesses to safely expect that their funds will be accessible when a 
situation requires access to their cash. Federal Reserve regulations that also 
protect consumers include Regulation CC, which expedites depositor access 
to deposited funds; Regulation P, which protects the privacy of individuals, 
and Regulation Z, which prescribes uniform methods for disclosing the cost of 
credit.
THE BAnkInG REGUlATORS
 Banks are an essential lifeline for American and global companies 
because they supply a significant portion of long-term capital.7  The corporate 
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Figure 3-2: 
reCent u.s. bAnking LAws
legislation Purpose
International Banking 
Act of 1978 
Places foreign and domestic banks on an equal footing 
with respect to branching, reserve requirements,* and 
other regulations; increased the ability of U.S. banks to 
compete in international banking.
Financial Institutions 
Regulatory and Interest
Rate Control Act of 
1978
Increases the ability of regulatory agencies to 
prevent undue concentrations of bank ownership and 
management.
Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and 
Monetary
Control Act of 1980
Equalizes reserve requirements across all insured 
depository institutions; eliminated interest ceilings on 
time and savings deposits; began explicit pricing of Fed 
services; made these services available to all depository 
institutions.
Garn-St Germain 
Depository Institutions 
Act of 1982
Increases the ability of regulators to aid distressed 
banks.
International Lending 
Supervision Act of 
1983 
Strengthens supervision and regulation of U.S. banks 
engaged in international lending.
Foreign Bank 
Supervision 
Enhancement Act of 
1991
Expands authority over the review and approval of 
any form of foreign bank entry into the U.S., including 
supervisory oversight of banking operations, restrictions 
on permissible activities, and termination of any 
activities when deemed necessary; enacted due to 
increasing foreign bank operations.
*See note 2 for an explanation of reserve requirements.
 The Comptroller of the Currency is the agency within the Department 
of the Treasury that supervises the operations of nationally chartered banks. 
The Comptroller’s powers include the chartering of national banks, the review 
of national bank merger applications, the implementation of  regulations, the 
examination and supervision of national banks, and participation (through a 
board directorship position) in the management of the FDIC. Compliance with 
regulations is achieved through cease and desist orders; the removal, suspension, 
and/or fining of bank officials; the replacement of a bank’s management with 
a trustee; and, if necessary, the revocation of a bank’s charter.
 In addition to its critical role in managing U.S. monetary policy, the 
Federal Reserve (“the Fed”) is the primary supervisor and regulator of bank 
holding companies (any corporation that has control over a bank, usually 
requiring ownership of 25 percent or more of the bank’s stock). As an indication 
of this power, bank holding companies include over 95 percent of all U.S. bank 
deposits. The Fed reviews expansion proposals and is assigned responsibility 
for supervising the overall banking organization. The Fed’s powers are similar 
to those of the Comptroller of the Currency.
 Congress has moved toward a more nationally competitive posture for 
banking in the past quarter century. Driving this trend was computerization 
and the use of telecommunications in banking, the need for equal treatment of 
banks and other financial institutions, and increased competition from foreign 
banks. Significant legislation affecting banking is listed in Figure 3-2. Although 
progress has been made in the deregulation of banking, there continue to be a 
few areas of banking regulation only impacting corporations that need to be 
considered for repeal.
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Figure 3-3: 
seLeCted nonCredit bAnk serviCes For 
CorporAte Customers
Service General Description
Payment and Collection Depositing and clearing checks, effecting electronic 
transfers including ACHs and wire transfers
Treasury Information Reports regarding the company’s position with the 
banking community, including DDA balances, daily 
activity, foreign exchange quotes, and various other 
data
Investment Services Various products including overnight sweep accounts, 
mutual funds, and long-term time deposits and 
certificates of deposit
Risk Management Swaps, options, forwards, futures, and other derivatives 
to reduce or eliminate a customer’s exposure to foreign 
exchange, interest rate, or commodity price risk
Capital Markets Services associated with issuing commercial paper, the 
sale of loans, private placements, advice on mergers 
and acquisitions, and corporate structure
Trade Finance Assistance in the financing and collection of trade 
obligations, such as letters of credit, documentary 
collections, and bankers’ acceptances (BAs)
Agent and Fiduciary Managing assets whose title remains with the owner. 
Examples of these services are: registrar, transfer 
agent, paying agent, custody services, corporate 
pension plans, qualified employee benefit plans, and 
corporate trustee
Shareholder Services Providing the activities required by publicly held 
corporations in dealing with their shareholders, such 
as the payment of dividends and the solicitation of 
proxies at the time of the annual meeting
CHAnGES In COmmERCIAl BAnkInG
 Commercial banking is the area of a bank that deals with providing 
lending and noncredit services to business customers. The early decades of 
the last century saw relative stability in this area of banking due largely to 
legislative restrictions on geographic and line-of-business expansion and 
few technological developments. As a result of this competitive inflexibility, 
depositors could expect to receive perhaps 3 percent as average interest and 
banks could charge 6 percent to corporate borrowers (and more to individuals 
except for mortgages). The resulting 3 percent or so of interest “spread” created 
a significant profit margin for relatively little effort; for a bank with a $100 
million commercial loan portfolio, the gross profit was $3 million!
 This happy situation (at least for the bank and its stockholders) began 
to change with the slow but steady erosion of competitive barriers. With new 
participants in the financial marketplace, bankers developed three general 
responses:
1. Noncredit Services. Banks have offered various for-fee products 
to business clients for most of their existence, including trust and 
shareholder services, and trade finance; see Figure 3-3 for a list.8  
Treasury management (originally called cash management) began to be 
a separate business in the 1950s, when banks offered such products as 
lockbox and various overnight investment instruments. By the 1980s, 
with high short-term interest rates and a growing emphasis on working 
capital, a full array of such services was marketed by the top fifty or so 
banks. 
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earned on credit with the above-average returns earned on noncredit products, 
because competition had commoditized most of this business. Within months 
of the introduction of a new product, rivals throughout the industry would 
bring a new and improved version to market, often at a lower price. As a result, 
banks began to demand a greater portion of a company’s financial activities, 
and companies were forced to reallocate their business to fewer banks.
 Relationship banking is a long-established business activity. Indeed, 
the legislative history of the banking laws includes various positive references 
to this practice. For example, the Senate Committee Report on the Bank 
Holding Company Amendments Act of 1970 (BHCA) recognized that a 
customer should be able “to continue to negotiate with the bank on the basis of 
his entire relationship with the bank,” and “where the customer uses multiple 
banking services ... the parties may be free to fix or vary the consideration 
for any services upon the existence or extent of utilization of such banking 
services.”10 
 The preservation of relationship banking is generally viewed as 
positive by both customers and financial institutions for several reasons: 
A “partnership” perspective, developed over time, creating mutual 
synergy
Efficient delivery of financial services saving time and transaction 
costs
Comprehensive analysis of the credit risk of a customer, including 
the use of credit and noncredit services
Negotiation of competitive pricing based on the volume and array of 
products purchased
•
•
•
•
2. Profitability Analysis. Banks became sophisticated in their use of 
profitability models and have discovered that certain customers and 
products simply do not meet their return-on-equity targets. Given the 
amount of capital that must be committed to support a line of credit, 
banks have had to find other ways to make relationships sufficiently 
profitable to support lending activities. The term “relationship banking” 
has come to mean the entirety of the banking services provided to a 
client, and from the bank’s perspective, the profitability generated. We 
will discuss some legal issues related to relationship banking in the 
sections that follow.
3. Mergers. Banks that could not compete were willingly or reluctantly 
courted by larger institutions that needed market coverage, a large 
depositor and lending base, and economies of scale in personnel and 
systems. The volume of merger and acquisition activity has been so great 
that banks with decades or even centuries of history have disappeared. 
For example, the author was an officer at the First National Bank of 
Chicago, founded in 1863, which was merged into Bank One in 1998 and 
then into J.P. Morgan Chase in 2004. Similarly, Manufacturers Hanover 
and Chemical Bank were merged in 1992 into what became Chase 
Manhattan (in 1996) and eventually J.P. Morgan Chase. As a result, the 
number of commercial banks has declined from over 14,000 in the early 
1980s to about one-half that number today.
CREDIT RATIOnInG
 One result of these changes has been the rationing of credit to corporate 
borrowers during periods of difficult business conditions.9  Banks decided that 
it was no longer a viable strategy to subsidize the meager profits now being 
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Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914.
 The BHCA15 goes considerably further than the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts by making a tying arrangement illegal per se, that is, without regard to the 
economic impact of the seller or other rule of reason balancing.16 The relevant 
language is as follows: 
A bank shall not in any manner extend credit … on the 
condition or requirement – that the customer shall obtain 
some additional credit, property, or service from such bank 
[or bank holding company].17 
 Congress did not intend to interfere with traditional banking activity;18 
instead, the objective was to prohibit anticompetitive practices that could 
force customers to accept certain services or to refrain from dealing with other 
financial institutions to obtain the desired services.19 Statutory assurance was 
provided that the economic power of a bank in a community or region would 
not result in an unfair business practice.20
 
wHAT DO THE lAwS PERmIT?
 A recent analysis concludes that there are seven possible relationship 
banking scenarios applicable to the BHCA, only one of which violates the 
antitying prohibition.21 The six permitted situations are: 
1. The customer requests multiple products.
2. The customer conditions the purchase of a bank product on obtaining 
additional product (a customer-initiated tie).
Generation of adequate return on capital to support credit facilities
TyInG ISSUES In BUSInESS AnD In BAnkInG
 Courts typically examine all of the issues in such arrangements and apply 
a “rule of reason” that examines the market power and control of the seller. For 
example, in the Kodak case the Supreme Court found that the requirement that 
replacement parts would be sold only to the buyers of photocopiers constituted 
an illegal tying arrangement. The decision was based largely on rule of reason 
economic analysis, and found that there were significant life cycle costs that 
would affect the behavior of customers, forcing them to accept a higher price 
for servicing rather than change the equipment vendor.11  A recent study of 
the practice of tying found the practice to be common in competition, with 
product-specific scale economies a major factor in making tying efficient and 
in reducing overall costs.12
THE STRICTER TREATmEnT Of BAnkS
 This linkage of credit and noncredit services was addressed in a recent 
survey conducted of senior managers at several hundred companies. A major 
trade group, the Association of Financial Professionals, stated that nearly 
two-thirds of corporate financial managers report their companies were denied 
credit or that the terms of credit agreements were changed after noncredit 
business was awarded to other banks.13 The results indicated that over half 
have been denied credit or have seen changes to lending terms because they 
did not purchase other services from their bankers.14 A linkage of services 
is known in law as a tying arrangement, the demand by a seller that buyers 
also purchase another, often associated product. In the attempt to protect and 
promote competitive behavior, such “ties” have been illegal since the Sherman 
•
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the company claiming injury was not required to contract all of its business to 
the specified financial institution, and so no violation occurred.24 
wHAT IS APPROPRIATE POlICy?
 The debate is ongoing as to whether tying exists. The General 
Accounting Office (GAO),25 the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC),26 and the Federal Reserve Chairman27 have issued recent reports and 
communications on the issue of illegalities in the securing of corporate credit. 
However, to clarify its position, the Fed has issued proposed internal controls 
that banks should adopt to avoid any BHCA violations.28 
 Savvy bank attorneys instruct relationship managers (account officers) 
to avoid explicit statements demanding that clients purchase “linked” products, 
although there have been numerous instances where bank officers clearly 
indicate their expectations.29 However, no company has instituted legal action 
under the BHCA, both from lack of documented proof (the so-called smoking 
gun) and the fear of antagonizing lenders. Regardless of the determinations 
of the GAO, the OCC, or the Federal Reserve, the real issue to be examined 
is: what is appropriate policy given the changes in financial regulation and 
industry structure since Congress passed the BHCA? 
Should tying arrangements continue to be a per se violation?
Or should the concept of a rule of reason govern, with consideration 
for the market power of the bank? 
 Congress decades ago envisioned a parochial and limited banking 
structure that did not permit banks to engage in all types of financial services. 
When the original legislation, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,30 was 
•
•
3. The bank terminates its relationship with an insufficiently profitable 
customer. 
4. The nonbank subsidiary of a bank holding company conditions 
product on the customer obtaining additional product.
5. The bank conditions product on the customer obtaining a traditional 
bank product. 
6. The bank conditions product on the customer obtaining either 
traditional or nontraditional bank products, at the customer’s choice. 
 The seventh case – the tie of the desired product to a nontraditional bank 
product – is illegal because the bank has created a “condition or requirement” 
that customers must purchase an additional product.22 Recent concerns about 
anticompetitive tying practices have focused on commercial loans to large, 
sophisticated companies. Borrowers in this market are often multinational 
corporations with the resources to negotiate on equal terms with banking 
organizations.23 Loan syndicate members frequently include commercial and 
investment banks with no other relationship with the loan customer. Such 
independent participation in a syndicate makes it unlikely that the lead bank(s) 
would underprice a loan as a “loss leader” to secure additional business that 
would benefit only itself (themselves). 
 There are no legal cases that deal directly with the tying of credit 
and noncredit banking services in the sense of the concerns of the finance 
profession. A partial list of the “ties” to credit permitted by courts includes the 
purchase of real estate, guarantees of business indebtedness, relinquishing of 
financial control, requiring the services of a financial advisor or a management 
services arrangement, and the sale and leaseback of a building. Possibly the 
closest case in point to the tie of credit to a noncredit bank product found that 
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will not provide much comfort to injured borrowers that are starved for 
credit. In fact, the complainant could be in dire financial straits or out of 
business by the time the case is heard and decided. 
3. Equality of access. Through financial deregulation, Congress sought 
to increase competition and the efficiency of U.S. financial markets. 
However, the remnants of restrictions in such legislation as BHCA make 
banking subject to more stringent limitations than other financial service 
providers, such as investment banks and insurance companies, which are 
subject to lesser standards under the general antitrust laws.34 This is not a 
“level playing field” with equal rules fairly applied to all participants. 
OTHER REGUlATORy ISSUES
 
 There continue to be some minor issues which should be addressed 
in future banking legislation, including interest rate restrictions on corporate 
accounts, the general matter of bank charters, and the review of bank 
mergers.
InTEREST RATE RESTRICTIOnS On CORPORATE ACCOUnTS
 Prohibitions on payment of interest on corporate demand deposits 
accounts (DDAs), which are also known as checking accounts, were legislated 
after the banking panics in the early 1930s.35 These controls were used to limit 
interest rate competition among banks which had artificially raised interest 
rates to attract deposits, to preserve their liquidity and survival. Over the past 
several sessions, Congress has considered eliminating these restrictions;36 
however, they remain on the statute books and effectively force corporate 
treasurers to seek alternative uses of excess short-term funds.
enacted, Congress decided that safeguards were needed against the undue 
concentration of bank power and control within a particular market area where 
an established local bank could deny credit to a company if a tied product 
was not also purchased. In that environment, there was limited competition 
in a market area, and businesses needed protection from unfair competitive 
practices.  The BHCA specifically addressed tying arrangements and provided 
statutory relief if the economic power of a bank is misused. However, this was 
before the recent focus on deregulating financial industries.
IS THE BHCA BAD lAw? 
In the current environment, the BCHA may be bad law for three reasons: 
1. Economics. A banking market is no longer defined by geography. In 
today’s deregulated environment, banks can and do enter any appealing 
market and depart from unattractive markets. Given this situation, 
Congress should reconsider whether tying arrangements should be per se 
violations. After all, it is the market power of the financial institution, and 
its potential to coerce anticompetitive behavior, that may restrain trade. 
With financial markets now open to all interested providers, the concern 
for control and intimidation is lessened. 
2. Remedies. The BHCA directs the Department of Justice and the 
federal banking agencies to monitor bank behaviors, specifying that the 
OCC, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation “shall prescribe regulations establishing such procedures as 
may be necessary.”31 In addition, private parties can sue for injunctive 
relief.32 While the civil penalties can be substantial,33 judicial remedies 
require the expenditure of considerable time, effort, and money and 
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SwEEPS
 Banks assist treasurers in managing excess balances by offering sweep 
accounts, an investment mechanism that automatically moves balances from 
a DDA at the close of business, invests the funds overnight, and returns the 
investment to the account the following morning. Interest is calculated and 
paid on the invested balances daily. Sweeps have grown in popularity because 
of several converging pressures:
The recognition that daily investment decisions involve transaction 
costs, both for wires or internal bank funds transfers and for the 
purchase and sale of the security, and the realization that the Fed’s 10 
percent required reserves on balances earns no ECR credit. 
The promotion by banks of families of inexpensive sweep products, 
as contrasted to the traditional disdain for sweeps due to the negative 
impact on bank deposit balances. Various sweep alternatives, 
often managed as money market funds, include U.S. government 
instruments, repurchase agreements (repos), and commercial paper. 
Offshore sweeps (e.g., offshore Eurodollar deposits) offer attractive 
interest yields, unaffected by reserve requirements. Banks today 
can manage their balance sheets and derive fee income from sweep 
products, now estimated in the hundreds of  millions of dollars per 
year, with typical fees of about fifty basis points on swept funds.
The ongoing development of sweep products, which will make such 
products attractive alternatives to traditional investment vehicles. 
For example, some banks offer intraday sweeps to optimize interest 
yields in the prime late morning time period; tiered sweeps, with 
•
•
•
 To compensate corporations for DDA balances, banks developed 
the earnings credit rate (ECR), a noninterest credit which is used to pay for 
charges accrued for services rendered. The value of the earnings allowance 
is determined by multiplying the balance, less certain deductions such as 
required reserves, times the ECR percentage, which is usually derived from 
market rates on three-month U.S. Treasury bills. Balance credits are accepted 
as the method of bank compensation for several reasons, including:
DDA balances are liquid and are immediately accessible in the event 
of a business need.
Balance credits represent “soft dollars” and are not budgeted or 
otherwise subject to close review by senior management.
Late cash in the corporate account, such as from wire transfer 
activity, may earn more from an ECR credit than from a late-day 
overnight investment.
Balances may be required by the bank to support a credit line or 
to support a cash management service subject to debits (e.g., NSF 
checks redeposited), although this practice has largely disappeared. 
The rising interest rate period beginning in the late 1970s made it apparent 
that the potential value of balances left at banks exceeded the credit received. 
Financial managers then began to consider paying for services in fees and 
managing down balances to minimal amounts.
•
•
•
•
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can limit competition and reduce market pressures on existing institutions. 
While no changes are proposed in chartering rules, bank regulators must be 
cognizant of the need to create a system that permits active financial market 
competition while also protecting depositors.
BAnk mERGERS
 Banking has its own legislation governing mergers, the Bank Merger 
Act of 1966 (as amended).38 This law was passed at a time when there was 
confusion as to whether antitrust applied to banking, and it requires that the 
Department of Justice and the agency that would supervise the surviving 
banking organization pass on the merger based on various criteria regarding 
the resulting competitive situation in the market area of the banks affected. 
The HHI previously discussed and criticized in Chapter 2 is used in this 
analysis.39 
 It is particularly ironic that geography is the primary definition of 
the market, as banks can easily do business in any part of the U.S. or the 
globe using electronic communications. Furthermore, some mergers that 
have resulted in near-monopoly conditions have been allowed to proceed. 
For example, the merger of Fleet Financial into Bank of America in 2004 
effectively eliminated commercial banking competition for the large corporate 
customer in the Northeastern states.40 The recent acquisition of MBNA by 
Bank of America results in just under 10 percent of all deposits in U.S. banking 
being in that institution. Regardless, the Federal Reserve approved the merger, 
stating that it “would have no significant adverse effect on competition or on 
the concentration of banking resources in any relevant banking market and that 
competitive factors are consistent with approval.”41
predetermined amounts going to overnight funds and the balance to 
a long-term U.S. government fund with higher yields; and even “real 
time” sweeps, with intermittent funds investment of available funds.
Low short-term money rates in recent years, with Federal funds 
between 1 percent and 4.25 percent in the May 2001–December 
2005 period.37 In this interest rate environment, the marginal gain 
from direct investment activity is too small to be worth the effort. 
In addition, the attempt to invest at optimal rates requires decisions 
by late morning, whereas funds may be credited to a DDA anytime 
during the day.
 The restriction on paying interest on corporate DDAs is an anachronism 
from seven decades ago. While the concept may possibly have been valid in 
times past, there is no reason to force corporate treasurers and bankers to find 
end-runs around an arbitrary restriction that is impossible to justify in the 
current economic environment. Furthermore, this regulation probably harms 
smaller companies more than large multinationals, because the former are 
unable to take advantage of sweeps, direct overnight investments, or careful 
management of bank balances.
BAnk CHARTERS
 Bank chartering rules were established to ensure sound banks and stable 
banking markets. The prospect of dishonest behavior or of banks operated 
by inexperienced management justifies review of bank charter applicants. 
The Comptroller of the Currency investigates such attributes as the proposed 
capital structure and prospects for profitable operations, and the experience and 
integrity of directors and officers. However, restrictive chartering provisions 
•
Is U.S. Business Overregulated?
1
Chapter 3: BAnkInG 

boundaries no longer exist, and banks have been forced to learn to 
compete or become the target of a corporate takeover. Industrial loan 
banks established by corporations and beyond the reach of traditional 
federal regulation now have assets of nearly $150 billion.44 Some 
banks have responded by aggressively acquiring other institutions, 
including Wachovia Bank’s expansion throughout the Southeast 
and into New York.  Others refocus on specific market sectors, for 
example, Mellon Bank’s focus on the commercial market and its sale 
of its retail operations. Others have extensively worked a particular 
industry segment, such as State Street Bank’s emphasis on insurance 
and mutual funds.
 New products. Various new financial instruments have been 
developed in recent years, including products to manage interest rate 
and foreign exchange rate risk, option and hedging strategies, and 
derivatives. This latter category has been particularly attractive to 
bankers and their corporate customers because they permit a risk to 
be divided into components, for example, the principal and interest 
portions of a fixed-rate loan. This allows financial managers to retain 
or hedge against price movements for specific elements of the risk. 
 Other products include securitization of loans or other 
debt which experiences regular, periodic payments;45 various 
checking account products, such as the sweeps discussed earlier; 
and comprehensive payables, a product that allows the bank to 
accept a file of disbursements from a corporation and handle the 
entire issuance (including the remittance advice), funding, and 
reconciliation. Banks are even being permitted to develop and 
own hotel and office properties, which may open the possibility of 
entering the commercial real estate business.46
•
wHAT THE U.S. SHOUlD DO
 Bankers have been pulled into the world of business competition by 
a series of structural transformations that were inevitable yet necessary for 
the survival of the industry. Among the change factors affecting commercial 
banking have been:
 Technology. Most transactions today are initiated through 
dedicated treasury workstations, through data terminals (like 
Bloomberg), or, to an increasing extent, through the Internet. 
Banks no longer see their corporate customer except at times of 
credit reviews, when service changes are being discussed, or on 
relationship sales calls. Because of the widespread use of electronic 
funds transfer mechanisms,42 about the only reason to visit a bank for 
transaction business is to deposit checks.43 
 The most significant impacts of technology have been to 
greatly reduce the costs of banking, which have been largely passed 
along to corporate customers, and to make geographic boundaries 
irrelevant. A corporation in Northern California can transact 
business through banks in New York and Chicago without any 
effort or difficulty and with few service problems. The remaining 
technological issues relate to activities that have been traditionally 
paper-based, such as disbursement checks and letters of credit, and 
the current trend is clearly toward reducing the use of the paper form 
of these transactions.
 Competition. In the past, banks accepted deposits and 
made loans, securities firms sold stocks and bonds, and insurance 
companies wrote policies and collected premiums. The old product 
•
•
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Figure 3-4: 
mArket vALue-to-book vALue For independent 
CommerCiAL bAnks
Note: The list excludes banks with stock market values over $50 billion.
Source: “Outlook Scoreboard 2005,” Business Week, December 26, 2005, 138.
AmSouth Bancorporation 259
BB&T 208
Comerica 187
Commerce Bancorp 276
Compass Bancshares 271
Fifth Third Bancorp 238
First Horizon National 217
Huntington Bancshares 209
KeyCorp 180
M&T Bank 209
Marshall & Isley 222
National City 165
North Fork Bancorporation 139
PNC Financial Services Group 223
Popular 195
Regions Financial 145
SunTrust Banks 157
Synovus Financial 306
TD Banknorth 80
UnionBanCal 230
Westcorp 229
Zions Bancorporation 227
 These changes have so far required some three decades for corporations 
and banks to absorb, with further developments likely to occur. This was not 
the easiest of transitional periods, particularly given the widespread problems 
during the period of 1980 to 1995 involving bank failures47 and the near 
depletion of the FDIC insurance fund. However, unlike the airline industry (to 
be discussed in Chapter 5), banking was never in danger of widespread collapse 
or bankruptcy filings, threatened job actions by militant labor unions, soaring 
costs of jet fuel, or the expense of instituting universal security procedures. 
wHAT THE U.S. SHOUlD DO
 Various proposals have been floated for refinements to current banking 
regulation, generally focusing on increased market discipline, better risk 
management, and more effective supervision.48 Less or minimal regulation may 
be the better alternative, allowing banks the freedom to compete with all other 
companies that require lender (depositor) and investor capital. The financial 
markets perhaps provide the best indication of the position of banking in the 
context of the perception of efficiency, performance, and creditworthiness. 
Banks currently trade at 211 percent of book value, the lowest of all U.S. 
industries (except for insurance and thrifts).49 This is despite two competitive 
strengths that should attract bank investors:
 The possibility of being acquired. Because of the changes 
in the laws regarding lines-of-business and geographic market 
areas, banks are constantly being considered for acquisition. The 
remaining independent banks are generally in attractive market areas, 
are profitable, and should be but are not trading at prices above 300 
percent of book; see Figure 3-4 for a listing including individual and 
average market-to-book values.
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And it is great
To do that thing that ends all other deeds,
Which shackles accidents, and bolts up change.
William Shakespeare (1564–1616), Antony and Cleopatra
 The financial services industries include commercial banking and other bank-like institutions (such as savings banks and credit 
unions); securities firms (often referred to as investment bankers); insurance 
companies (generally categorized as life and health, and property and casualty); 
and finance companies. Chapter 3 reviewed commercial banking in detail; this 
chapter discusses the business regulation of financial service industries with a 
focus more on the securities markets and insurance.
EARly AmERICAn ExPERImEnTS wITH fInAnCIAl SERvICES
 Alexander Hamilton’s reports to Congress (see Chapter 1) included 
the first policy statement on financial services, specifically with regard to the 
creation of a national bank.1 However, the national distrust of a strong federal 
government extended to the financial sector and directly affected the fortunes 
of the first national banks and, later, the securities markets.
THE BAnkS Of THE UnITED STATES
 The idea of a national or central bank (like the Bank of England), 
as proposed by Hamilton, was an early litmus test for the country. The 
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paper currency, equivalent to about 20 percent of the nation’s money supply. 
This currency and credit activity were at the expense of state banks, which led 
agrarian interests and those who were opposed to a strong central government 
to defeat the application for charter renewal.5 
AfTERmATH AnD THE SECOnD BAnk Of THE UnITED STATES
 The 1BkUS narrowly failed to win charter renewal largely because of 
considerations of “unfair” competition with state chartered banks. However, 
reliance on a state banking system works only when three conditions hold:
1. The U.S. experiences relatively peaceful relations with other nations, 
without the need to make massive expenditures on defense and to 
overcome the loss of tariff revenue generated through international trade.
2. State banks conduct their business in a prudent manner, with 
conservative lending supported by adequate collateral.
3. No political or economic panic occurs to affect the stability of the 
financial system.
 No longer accountable to a central bank or regulated by the government, 
state banks went on a spree of printing bank notes.  State banks were chartered 
indiscriminately.  J.K. Galbraith writes: “Every location large enough to have 
a church, a tavern or a blacksmith shop was now deemed a suitable place 
for setting up a bank.”6  Not only did these banks issue notes, but so did 
barbers and bartenders and just about anyone who wanted to get into the act. 
Exacerbated by the War of 1812 with Great Britain, this irresponsibility caused 
rapid inflation, with prices rising over 13 percent per year, and led to general 
economic uncertainty.
Revolutionary War had left the new nation deeply in debt, with some states 
facing bankruptcy. The U.S. government had not issued currency, so state banks 
issued their own currency whose soundness could range from impeccable to 
worthless.  There were over 700 state banks, some of which carried sufficient 
specie to meet any demands.  But others, issuing currency far exceeding their 
specie deposits, were forced into insolvency when an unexpected number of 
depositors demanded gold or silver for their notes, leaving depositors with 
worthless money.
 In 1791 the Bank of the United States (1BkUS) received a charter 
from Congress, signed by President Washington. Agrarian interests opposed 
the bank, fearing that it would favor commercial and industrial interests over 
their own and that the use of paper currency would be promoted at the expense 
of gold and silver specie.2  Foreign ownership was another concern; by the 
time the charter was up for renewal, foreigners owned about 70 percent of 
its stock.3 Then Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson claimed that the bank 
was unconstitutional because it was an unauthorized extension of federal 
power.  Hamilton argued that because Congress had the power to tax, borrow 
money, and regulate both interstate and foreign commerce, it would certainly 
be empowered to charter a corporation to enable it to carry out those powers. 
Hamilton’s arguments prevailed, and the 1BkUS carried out its duties with 
great success.4  
 The 1BkUS had both public and private functions. Its primary public 
function was to control the money supply by regulating the amount of notes 
state banks could issue and by transferring reserves to different parts of 
the country.  It was also the depository of the Treasury’s funds that would 
otherwise go to politically favored private banks.  It not only competed with 
state banks but also set the rules for those banks.  The 1BkUS was extremely 
profitable, earning most of its income through loans to governments and 
private businesses. By 1811, the 1BkUS had circulation of about $5 million in 
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that a rechartering, due for consideration in 1836, should be prevented.9 As a 
result, the U.S. would have no central bank until the Federal Reserve System 
was established in 1913.
InDUSTRIAlIzATIOn AnD THE CORPORATIOn
 Although Hamilton’s national bank idea was abandoned during the 
Jackson Administration, other elements led to significant structural innovations 
in the American financial system. A major initiative was the refunding of 
the American Revolutionary War debt, referred to during the Congressional 
debates as “assumption.” Hamilton advocated the consolidation and taking 
over (or assumption) of debts incurred by the states and still outstanding as a 
de facto obligation of the national government.10   
 This was opposed by those states – like Virginia – that had already 
repaid much or all of their debt and saw the plan as a subsidy to the remaining 
debtor states. With Hamilton’s entire economic program at risk, the issue was 
resolved at a famous dinner in the Summer of 1790, at which a compromise 
was struck among the parties representing the conflicting issues of the day: 
assumption and the permanent location of the capital city.11  The new federal 
bonds that resulted from the passage of the assumption plan were known 
as “Hamilton 6s” because of the interest rate that was paid. Proceeds were 
primarily used to retire the outstanding debt obligations of the states.
THE ORIGInS Of THE SECURITIES mARkETS
 Because the Hamilton 6s were redeemable at par, they became extremely 
popular investments and regularly traded above par, that is, above the value of 
the bond at maturity.12  Confidence in the U.S. economy and the restructuring 
of the economy resulted in active trading in the Hamilton 6s and in state bonds, 
 The new or Second Bank of the U.S. (2BkUS) opened in 1817, with 
its primary mission to limit the amount of paper money issued by state banks 
against holdings of specie. The bank’s charter accorded it the power to act as 
the federal government’s sole fiscal institution by accepting deposits from tax 
collections and handling interstate fund transfers. Despite these responsibilities, 
the bank was not owned by the U.S. government; instead, it was a private bank 
answerable to its board of directors and some 4,000 stockholders.
 The 2BkUS immediately encountered global changes that were 
largely beyond its ability to contain. A significant disruption resulted from the 
aftermath of the Battle of Waterloo and the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815, 
which allowed British companies to dump previously unsold goods on the 
American market. In addition, agricultural prices rose sharply, reflecting the 
requirement for food exports by European countries facing crop failures as well 
as an inexhaustible demand for cotton. However, the European situation began 
to stabilize by 1818, and with increasing competition from Indian cotton, the 
post-1815 speculation ended in a ruinous economic collapse.7
 The 2BkUS aggravated the situation by increasing its issuance of 
paper currency and by encouraging imprudent business investments. Forced 
to reverse policy, the contraction of the money supply and the calling in of 
loans drove the recession of 1819-1820 into a prolonged depression, resulting 
in failures of individuals, businesses, and state banks. As Sean Wilentz notes, 
this economic disaster affected every region of the U.S., including farmers, 
small-town merchants, and the industrial cities of the East and Midwest. The 
result was a severe economic contraction that did not begin to lift until 1822.8
 The election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 brought an antibank president 
into office who saw and condemned economic rule by an elitist few who could 
exert undue influence over national policy. In addition, Jackson believed that 
the Constitution did not permit Congress to create a national bank and that it had 
asserted powers not provided by the Founding Fathers. He therefore decided 
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Permanence, in that the business would continue despite the 
retirement or death of a principal (unlike the sole proprietorship 
or partnership, which would end at the loss of an owner) or the 
cessation of activities (as in the earlier joint-stock companies).
Legal shelter, in that state legislatures and courts created a unique 
body of law for governance as protected by the finding of the 
Supreme Court in the Dartmouth College case.16
Centralized management, permitting the accumulation of the 
appropriate expertise to operate a large business enterprise.
RAIlROADS AnD InDUSTRIAlIzATIOn
 Although the republican distrust of business continued, state 
legislatures and courts allowed corporations considerable latitude to finance 
and expand their activities. The principal beneficiaries were the railroads, 
given the enormous capital amounts required to acquire rights-of-way, hire 
managers and laborers, construct tracks and stations, and purchase rolling 
stock.17 As U.S. migration headed westward, rivers were inadequate to allow 
easy movement of agricultural and manufactured goods to and from the East 
Coast.18  The early railroads proved to be economic boons to the communities 
they served, which increased the frenzy of railroad construction. Prior to the 
Civil War there were over $1 billion of securities issued; by 1870 that amount 
had reached $2.5 billion, and by 1890 the amount was $10 billion. 
 U.S. and European bondholders were attracted, for both the safety 
of their principal and reasonable interest rate returns. The preference was for 
debt instead of stock ownership, for a railroad in default could be reorganized 
and bondholder capital recovered.19 The inevitable result was rapid growth 
•
•
•
leading to the decision in 1792 to organize an exchange that would eventually 
become the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).13 Other exchanges developed 
in major industrial cities on the East Coast, including Boston, Philadelphia, 
and Baltimore. The creation of these markets allowed businesses to raise 
new equity capital, today called “primary” market operations, and permitted 
investors to buy and sell securities at fair prices, known as the “secondary” 
market.
 The resulting liquidity encouraged foreign investors to participate in 
these markets, with a significant portion of American securities eventually 
owned by Europeans who perceived the opportunity for greater returns and 
growth in the new world. These innovations in the capital markets were a 
fortuitous development at a time when the U.S. was experimenting with a 
new form of business organization – the corporation – and with the financial 
requirements of the Industrial Age. 
THE CORPORATE fORm Of OwnERSHIP
 The corporation had been used for at least two centuries by European 
nations for specific national purposes. Two leading British examples of such 
government charters were the East India Company created in 1600 with a 
monopoly on trade with India and the Hudson Bay Company created in 1670 
that controlled the fur trade throughout much of British-controlled North 
America.14  The American innovation allowed state governments to charter 
corporations based merely on the request of investors who desired to both 
limit their liability and sell enough shares to attain the vast amounts of capital 
required by industrial companies. 
 These requirements were accompanied by several essential 
characteristics of the corporate form:15
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If scenes of anarchy are to be avoided, if New York is to retain its 
preeminence as the commercial metropolis of the country, if foreign 
capital is to be retained here, something must be done to prevent, in 
the future, the unseemly abuses of power into which certain of our 
state judges have been betrayed in the past.23
 There were continuing issues concerning the control of this railroad, 
leading to various disputed shareholder elections for board members, further 
lawsuits with conflicting outcomes depending on the jurisdiction of the court, 
and inaction by corrupt state legislatures.24 The result was the demand by J.P. 
Morgan for board membership for a senior member of his firm (J.P. Morgan 
& Co.) as a condition for his willingness to act as the client’s investment 
banker. The role of this party would be to assure the security of investors 
by requiring disclosure of financial and business activity. Other investment 
bankers followed this precedent, and within a relatively short time, the practice 
became institutionalized.25
THE STOCk ExCHAnGE AS “REGUlATOR”
 The dual requirements for share liquidity at a fair price and the ability 
to raise debt and equity capital have justified the uniquely capitalistic concept 
of exchanges to trade securities for more than three centuries.26 At the time of 
the founding of the U.S., the leading industrial country was Great Britain and 
therefore the principal financial market was in London. The NYSE and similar 
American markets based their structures and form of organization on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) and those of major European cities but chose 
to develop several important differences in their model of administration:27
in track mileage, in industries that supplied the railroads and that supplied 
manufactured goods to the U.S. and the world, and in population movement 
into territories that eventually became new states.
ExPERImEnTS In SElf-REGUlATIOn
 
 Given the sums being invested in the U.S. after the end of the Civil 
War, the twenty-first-century observer might well wonder how the federal 
government ignored this ripe opportunity for regulation, particularly given 
the recurrent abuses and swindles that occurred in the securities industry. 
Scoundrels like Jay Gould and Jim Fisk could single-handedly interrupt the 
smooth functioning of the securities markets and the economy.20  Remedies 
were eventually developed but by the private sector rather than through 
Congressional action, which was considerably more palatable to a country still 
clinging to a republican ethos of individuality and small government.
THE InvESTmEnT BAnkER AS “REGUlATOR”
 The first solution to the regulation problem largely resulted from 
a contentious battle for control of the Albany and Susquehanna railroad in 
1869.21 A hot dispute between Cornelius Vanderbilt and his associates against 
Jay Gould and his allies resulted in the election of two separate boards, forcing 
the issue into state court. J.P. Morgan represented Vanderbilt in his capacity 
as chairman of the New York Central railroad and arranged to have the case 
tried in the friendly venue of Delhi, New York, where Vanderbilt prevailed. 
The Court of Appeals then reversed this decision except for the critical issue 
of control.22 The resulting public outcry demanded reform; a leading magazine 
of the time, Harper’s Weekly, insisted that: 
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became law to finally reestablish an American central bank.31
fEDERAl SECURITIES REGUlATIOn
 The crash of the stock market in 1929 ended the era of self-regulation 
that the securities markets had enjoyed for 135 years. In the landslide election 
of 1932,32 Franklin Roosevelt campaigned on various issues related to what had 
become known as the Great Depression, including the failures of the securities 
markets in general and the collapse of the Samuel Insull electric utility empire 
in particular.33  The Democratic Party promoted a platform with “Three R’s 
– relief, recovery, and reform,” and the candidate coined the term “New Deal” 
when he stated: “I pledge you, I pledge myself, to a new deal for the American 
people.”34
 Roosevelt inherited an economic catastrophe that had been brewing 
for several years, involving agricultural prices that had been falling since 1927, 
unrealistically low 10 percent margin requirements for stock purchases,35 
and overinvestment in industrial capacity.36 However, much of the spotlight 
focused on financial industry corruption and self-dealing.37 The regulation 
that eventually resulted from the Insull situation and other scandals involved a 
series of laws passed in the first two Roosevelt Administrations. 
SECURITIES ACT Of 1933
 The objectives of the Securities Act of 1933 were to require that investors 
receive financial and other significant information concerning securities being 
offered for public sale; and to prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other 
fraud in the sale of securities.38 Evidence developed during the Senate’s 
Pecora hearings led Congress to conclude that information on publicly traded 
securities was either inadequate or, in some instances, deceptive and that 
 The NYSE was a closed system, requiring aspiring 
participants to buy their seats (or evidence of membership) from 
current owners.28 In contrast, the LSE has been an open system, 
with five times the number of members as the NYSE in the years 
before World War I. The U.S. model has allowed the growth of a 
limited number of large, diversified financial services companies 
that dominated investment banking through much of the twentieth 
century, particularly as the American rules allowed these firms to 
raise capital from external sources.
 The NYSE had fixed brokerage commissions until 1975, 
raising transaction costs and dissuading trades in low-priced 
securities.29 This decision drove many small companies to other 
exchanges (like the American Stock Exchange and the Over-the-
Counter/NASDAQ Market) while reinforcing the image of the 
NYSE as a safe and somewhat elitist trading exchange. In contrast, 
the LSE permitted variable commissions throughout its history.
 The NYSE mandated disclosure rules for members to end 
the manipulation and other unethical practices of unscrupulous 
scoundrels. The LSE had no such requirements, and the smaller 
investor could well question the honesty and integrity of the market.
 The effect of this self-regulatory administrative approach worked 
reasonably well into the early twentieth century. However, there were very 
severe recessions and business failures caused by honest but uninformed 
speculation and by dishonest stock promotion, particularly in securities traded 
on exchanges other than the NYSE. The panic of 1907 which was finally abated 
by the actions of a considerably older J.P. Morgan was the last time Congress 
was willing to allow self-management;30 by 1913 the Federal Reserve Act 
•
•
•
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all aspects of the securities industry.44 Responsibilities include the registration, 
regulation, and oversight of all participants in the securities industry, including 
transfer agents, clearing and settlement, and trading exchanges.45 An important 
function of the SEC is to determine that adequate publication of relevant 
data has been provided to investors through the mechanism of a registration 
statement called a prospectus. The act also specifies and prohibits certain 
types of conduct in the markets considered detrimental to fair dealings and full 
disclosure, and disciplinary power is provided to oversee regulated firms and 
individuals.46
THE InvESTmEnT COmPAny ACTS Of 1940
 Further legislation – often grouped together as the Investment 
Company Acts – regulates organizations that primarily invest in securities 
of other companies (such as mutual funds) and firms that are engaged as 
investment advisors.47  Investors buy shares in a mutual fund which, in turn, 
invests in stocks, bonds, and other securities. An investment advisor makes 
day-to-day decisions about which portfolio securities the mutual fund should 
buy or sell.  Congress wanted to address perceived abuses in the mutual fund 
industry and to minimize conflicts of interest that could arise in the operation 
of these companies. The remedies are similar to those provided by the 1934 
act, including mandatory disclosure of a fund’s structure, operations, financial 
condition, and investment policies.
REGUlATIOn Of THE InSURAnCE InDUSTRy
 Following the republican tradition, regulation of the insurance industry 
has been the responsibility of the states, although specific products with 
investment features (such as variable annuities) are also subject to the rules of 
securities offered for sale should provide potential investors with sufficient 
information about the issuer to make an informed decision. Supreme Court 
Justice Louis Brandeis coined the phrase “sunlight is the best disinfectant,”39 
which is part of the philosophy underlying the 1933 act.  
GlASS-STEAGAll ACT Of 1933
 The Glass-Steagall Act separated investment and commercial banking 
activities40 to prevent commercial banks from holding securities that had been 
underwritten and “parked” in inventory or held for purposes of speculation.41 
Unsound loans had been granted to companies in which the bank had invested, 
and clients of the bank were encouraged to invest in those same stocks. The 
Pecora hearings elicited some evidence of “improper banking activity,” and 
this was considered at the time to be a principal factor in the stock market 
crash.  Cooler heads and objective analysis later showed that the actions of 
these firms were a minor component of the total situation, but Congress found a 
convenient scapegoat for the economic costs and loss of investor confidence.42 
 Securities firms were forced to choose commercial or investment 
banking as their principal line of business, and if they selected commercial 
banking, they could retain only 10 percent of their total income from 
securities. An exception allowed commercial banks to underwrite 
government-issued bonds. J.P. Morgan43 and other large banking and 
securities operations were forced to sever their investment banking 
services and, as a result, had to forgo an important source of their income. 
 
                                SECURITIES ExCHAnGE ACT Of 1934
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was created by 
Congress in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with broad authority over 
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Finance Corporation,51 and the value of insurance assets was negatively 
affected by the low returns on debt securities and the surrender of policies by 
insureds unable to afford their coverage. However, Congress saw much worse 
distress in other financial services companies and proceeded to legislate and 
regulate these problems while leaving insurers to the states. 
 Just prior to World War II, the Temporary National Economic 
Committee (TNEC) rejected an SEC proposal to create a federal agency to 
regulate insurance companies after vigorous opposition from the industry.52 
The Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. SouthEastern Underwriters 
Association53 then threatened the industry, holding that insurance was 
subject to federal antitrust. Congress responded by enacting the McCarran-
Ferguson Act,54 which granted insurance companies immunity from the 
antitrust laws to the extent that they were regulated by state insurance laws. 
DEvElOPmEnTS AfTER wORlD wAR II
 The McCarran-Ferguson Act largely excluded any federal regulation 
until insurance companies began offering variable annuities in 1952.55 The 
SEC claimed that variable annuities were securities subject to regulation under 
the federal securities laws because returns were based on the investment of 
the annuitants’ premium payments in securities. The Supreme Court found for 
the SEC in two leading cases,56 resulting in the dual regulation of insurance 
companies selling variable annuity contracts and the requirement to separate 
reserves for such products from reserves for more traditional insurance.57 The 
loss of business to other financial services companies by the beginning of 
the 1990s forced industry restructuring through demutualization,58 company 
mergers, and expansion of product offerings. 
 There have been occasional attempts to switch to some form of federal 
insurance regulation.59  The various problems experienced by the industry 
the SEC. The historical development of insurance was largely based on what 
is known today as property and casualty lines. Insurance underwriting began 
with the recognition by colonial businessmen and homeowners that marine 
risks arise from ocean (and later inland waterway) shipping and construction 
risks arise from the threat of fire to wood, the predominant  material used 
in construction. The participation of such luminaries as Benjamin Franklin 
brought recognition to the industry and the very real economic function 
provided by property and later by life insurance.48
EARly TwEnTIETH-CEnTURy COnCERnS
 As with the securities industry, scandals erupted periodically, and 
critics responded with demands for federal regulation. A leading example 
was the ostentatious spending by James Hyde, president of the Equitable 
Life Assurance Company, causing the New York Insurance Superintendent to 
investigate the company and the entire industry. The Armstrong Committee 
concluded that insurance companies were placing reserves established to pay 
claims at unreasonable risk by speculating in stocks.49 Various constraints 
were then implemented to protect policyholders and stockholders, including 
restrictions on common stock investing and prohibitions on securities 
underwriting. These actions hampered the ability of investment bankers to 
raise capital and may have exacerbated the post–World War I recession. The 
insurance companies initially opted for federal regulation to avoid sometimes 
harsh and conflicting state regulation but eventually preferred oversight by the 
states.50
 This more conservative investment philosophy mandated by insurance 
regulators actually saved much of the industry during the Depression, while 
commercial banks and securities firms experienced a much higher rate of 
failure. Hundreds of insurers were forced to borrow from the Reconstruction 
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respectively. However, it is apparent that the different areas of the financial 
services industry have been gradually intermingling over the last quarter of 
a century and that this functional separation of regulation does not address 
current business practices. 
 Computers and telecommunications are reducing the importance of the 
traditional intermediation function. The Internet is turning financial services 
into a commodity that can be bought online, just like a book or a DVD. Utilizing 
technology to sell new financial products to existing customers may also be less 
expensive than acquiring a bricks-and-mortar entity. Depositors and borrowers 
can now bypass banks in favor of direct access to the capital markets to obtain 
higher returns not subject to the transaction costs imposed by an intermediary. 
HOw DO OTHER COUnTRIES REGUlATE fInAnCIAl SERvICES?
 In contrast to the U.S. model of functional regulation, the United 
Kingdom and Japan use a consolidated regulator for financial services; see 
further discussion in Chapter 7. The single regulator approach permits financial 
regulation from the larger perspective of the strategic objectives and decisions 
of a financial services organization, rather than of specific product lines and 
operations. There is an interesting aspect to the U.K. model which is reminiscent 
of the early U.S. attitude: the culture of avoiding governmental interference in 
business.64  British regulators have learned from long experience that, while there 
will always be scandals and failures, each should be dealt with accordingly and 
with remedies specific to the circumstances. This is in sharp contrast to the current 
American approach to business regulation: that fraud and the misappropriation 
of company funds can be prevented only by severe civil and criminal penalties. 
 In contrast, Japan has a regulatory culture of intervention and 
economic management. The Ministry of Finance largely controlled the 
economy with some success in its early stages; Japan even threatened the 
include low profitability,60 the failure of some smaller and the distress of 
some larger companies,61 lawsuits over abusive sales practices,62 and inroads 
into the traditional insurance market by direct writers (e.g., GEICO, AARP 
through the Hartford Insurance Group, USAA) and by other financial services 
companies (e.g., Merrill Lynch Life Insurance Company, General Electric 
Capital Assurance Company).
THE U.S. fUnCTIOnAl APPROACH TO fInAnCIAl REGUlATIOn
 It was recognized fairly soon after the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act 
that Congress had perhaps overreacted to the bad behavior of a few scoundrels 
in the years before the Crash of 1929. However, nearly seventy years passed 
before there was consensus to impose less onerous restrictions on commercial 
and investment banks. 
THE GRAmm-lEACH-BlIlEy ACT
 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 was the product of years 
of lobbying by the financial services industries and successful primarily 
because the federal government perceived the need to retain and enhance the 
competitiveness of U.S. financial institutions in the global economy.63 This 
act allows any bank, securities firm, insurance company, or finance company 
to conduct business activities in any area of financial services without 
restriction.
 However, Gramm-Leach-Bliley is based on “functional regulation,” 
continuing the established scheme for the various activities of a financial 
services company.  For example, if a financial company engages in banking, 
insurance, and securities, each business would be separately regulated – by the 
Comptroller of the Currency, by state insurance commissions, and by the SEC, 
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documentation exists to support financial transactions.
Systemic risk for the security of the financial system. This would 
involve uniform capital requirements, payment system regulation, 
and the monitoring of financial system liquidity.
For individual investors, depositors, and consumers: protection 
for those who are too weak, uninformed, and scattered to defend 
themselves. The securities industry has long recognized that 
institutions and other sophisticated market participants do not need 
the same regulatory protections as unsophisticated investors.66 
Financial services for retail customers would be subject to regulation 
and the protections afforded such investors, policyholders, and 
depositors across product lines. This includes prevention of deceptive 
sales practices and prosecution of “churning” of securities and of 
fraudulent profit claims.
 The financial services industry is becoming a global business as banks, 
securities firms, and insurance companies seek clients in every country where 
there is a profit opportunity. American firms must compete with global firms 
that cross-sell financial products and are subject to much lighter regulation.67 
The confusion, complexity, and costs associated with multiple regulators will 
certainly place U.S. financial institutions at a severe competitive disadvantage 
with European and Asian firms that operate under a single regulatory 
umbrella.
•
•
U.S. competitively until about 1990. That model, largely the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Finance, was successful during the growth period of 
the Japanese economy, but failed as the economy became more complex 
and as centralized decision-making prevented a market economy from 
functioning efficiently. The creation of a Japanese consolidated regulator 
appeared to search for market solutions to financial problems. However, 
that agency still appears to cling to the culture of managing the economy by 
supporting large banks and resisting foreign competition. Consequently, the 
Japanese model does not seem to be as suitable for a developed economy. 
 
wHAT THE U.S. SHOUlD DO
 Because there will certainly be problems with and political opposition 
to a single regulator, the organizational solution may be to split regulation into 
its logical constituencies:65 
For institutional investors, management of financial services 
businesses in terms of such risk categories as:
Insurance risk for the safety of customer funds that are on deposit 
with a financial services firm. This would include the segregation 
of customer funds and administration of account insurance (like the 
FDIC discussed in Chapter 3).
Business risk to protect the integrity of the intermediation process 
used by all financial services companies. This would include 
assurance that adequate collateral exists for loans, that appropriate 
due diligence has occurred in deciding whether to establish 
and continue relationships with customers, and that necessary 
•
•
•
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– was arguably the most important meal held in the history of the nation. It was 
hosted by Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State under Washington and later 
the third U.S. president. Attendees included Hamilton and James Madison, then a 
congressman and later the fourth U.S. president.  For an account of the proceedings, 
see Joseph J. Ellis, “The Dinner,” Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation, 
48-80 (2000).
12 Bonds that trade above par in a stable interest rate environment are valued largely 
on the perceived strength or creditworthiness of the issuer. As noted by Professor 
Gordon, by 1794 the U.S. had the highest credit rating among issues trading in 
Europe. John Steele Gordon, Hamilton’s Blessing: The Extraordinary Life and Times 
of Our National Debt, 38-39 (1997).
13 A formal organization was created in 1817 called the New York Stock & Exchange 
Board. This name was shortened to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1863.
14 For a historical perspective, see John Keay, The Honourable Company: A History 
of the English East India Company (1991); and George Bryce, Remarkable History 
of the Hudson’s Bay Company (2005).
 
15 For a succinct review of the development of the corporate form of business 
organization, see Morton Keller, “The Making of the Modern Corporation,” 27 The 
Wilson Quarterly 58-69 (1997). For a legal analysis of the early history, see Douglas 
Arner, “Development of the American Law of Corporations to 1832,” 55 Southern 
Methodist University Law Review 23 (2002).
16 17 U.S. 518 (4 Wheat.) (1819). The court cited the Contract Clause of the 
Constitution (article 1, 10, cl. 1) in establishing that the State of New Hampshire 
could not interfere in the activities of the college. According to Chief Justice John 
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The focus of the law is on those who provide personalized investment advice to 
specific clients rather than general advice as through a newspaper column; see Lowe 
v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985). The Investment Advisor Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847, is 
codified at 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.
48 Joseph S. Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations 234-35 
(1965).
49 See Monographs 28 & 28-A of the Temporary National Economic Committee, 
76th Cong. 3rd Sess., Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power (1940 & 
1941), quoting the Armstrong Committee’s 1906 report.
50 These issues are discussed in an excellent historical review of the regulation of 
the insurance industry by Lissa L. Broome and Jerry W. Markham, “Banking and 
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of assets. See, e.g., Lawrence Malkin and Jacques Neher, “French Insurer to Put $1 
Billion into Equitable: Axa Buys Stake in U.S. Firm,” International Herald Tribune, 
July 19, 1991; at www.iht.com/articles/1991/07/19/axa_.php. 
62 Various newspaper stories recount these incidents. See, e.g., Barry Meier, 
“Metropolitan Life in Accord for Settlement of Fraud Suits,” New York Times, 
August 19, 1999, A1; Deborah Lohse, “Suits Settled by Prudential for $62 Million,” 
Wall Street Journal, February 16, 1999, C1; Jenny Anderson, “Indictments Raise 
Pressure in Insurer Case,” New York Times, February 3, 2006, C1, C4 (citing federal 
civil and criminal indictments against executives of General Reinsurance and AIG). 
63 The McFadden Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1224, was repealed first by Congress in the 
Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
1811 (prohibiting and then permitting interstate banking). The Glass-Steagall Act 
of 1933, 47 Stat. 56, originally codified at 12 U.S.C. 347a, 347b, 412 followed, as 
repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 
codified in various sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C. (prohibiting and then permitting 
commercial and investment banking within the same institution). According to 
Robert Kuttner, “Financial companies spent $300 million over nearly 20 years to 
lobby Congress to get it to change the legislation [Glass-Steagall],” “A Requiem for 
Glass-Steagall,” Business Week, November 15, 1999, at 28.
64 The interested reader may wish to review Sean Wilentz’s excellent history of 
America in the eighteenth century, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to 
Lincoln (2005).
65 Portions of the following material are based on Heidi Mandanis Schooner, 
“Regulating Risk Not Function,” 66 University of Cincinnati Law Review 441, 
478-86 (1998).
57 Broome and Markham, reference in note 50, at 737 (2000). 
 
58 Demutualization involves the conversion of mutual ownership by policyholders 
to stock ownership by investors; the primary motivation is to enhance opportunities 
to raise external capital. Representative companies recently demutualizing include 
Metropolitan Life, Prudential Insurance, Equitable Life, and Mutual of New 
York. For materials on demutualization, see Edward X. Clinton, “The Rights 
of Policyholders in an Insurance Demutualization,” 41 Drake Law Review 657 
(1992); and Gordon O. Pehrson, Jr., David R. Woodward, and James H. Mann, 
“Demutualization of Insurance Companies: A Comparative Analysis of Issues and 
Techniques,” 27 Tort & Insurance Law Journal 709 (1992).
59 Insurance companies have come to believe that federal oversight would simplify 
the process of regulatory review. Joseph B. Treaster, “States vs. U.S.: Who Will 
Police Insurance Firms?” New York Times, December 31, 2004; at select.nytimes.
com/search/restricted/article?res=F60C1EF63F5D0C728FDDAB0994DC404482.  
One proposal by Congressman Richard Baker (R-La.) would require states to adopt 
common standards, thereby avoiding national regulation. “A Crazy Quilt of Rules,” 
Business Week, November 1, 2004; at www.businessweek.com/@@sNWVmIUQ@
fB*7QAA/magazine/content/04_44/b3906009_mz001.htm.
 
60 Recent return-on-equity (ROE), a standard measure of profitability, in insurance 
was 11.7 percent; for the same period, the ROE for banking was 15.4 percent and 
20.1 percent for diversified financials (including the securities industry). The all-
industry composite was 17.3 percent. “Outlook Scoreboard 2005,” Business Week, 
December 26, 2005, 130-53. Data for earlier periods show equivalent results.
61 Equitable Life became distressed after writing guaranteed investment contracts 
(GICs) at interest rates substantially above what could be earned from its portfolio 
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66 For example, the SEC permits the private placements of securities to qualified 
institutional investors without meeting the requirements of filing a prospectus and 
complying with agency review. Rule 144A, 55 Federal Register 17945, April 30, 
1990, as amended at 57 Federal Register 48722, October 28, 1992.
67 Basel II has promulgated rules on risk-adjusted capital requirements of 
international banks; see www.bis.org. The Basel Committee is currently coordinating 
such regulation, but its role is simply placed on top of the bank regulators in the 
U.S. Growth in international exchange linkages and increasing use of electronic 
transactions are other challenges facing these regulators.
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CHAPTER 5:
 AIRlInES AnD THE TRAnSPORTATIOn InDUSTRIES
Success. Four flights Thursday morning. All against twenty-one-mile wind.1
Wilbur Wright (1867–1912) and Orville Wright (1871–1948), 
Telegram from Kitty Hawk
 T ransportation has arguably experienced greater deregulation than any other sector of American business. Entire books and 
long, scholarly articles have been devoted to the history, outcomes, and 
possible future remedies for the current problems in the industry; see Figure 
5-1 for a listing of recent legislation to reduce government oversight of the 
transportation industries. Rather than a comprehensive review of the situation, 
this chapter focuses specifically on the airline industry. However, analysis 
would be roughly equivalent for motor carriers, rail, inland and ocean shipping, 
and other sectors within the transportation industries.
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                EARly DEvElOPmEnTS In THE AIRlInE InDUSTRy
 Nearly every schoolchild knows the story of Orville and Wilbur Wright, 
including their struggles to fly and the eventual invention of the airplane. 
The development of heavier-than-air flight was accomplished through their 
research, was funded by them, and evolved from their knowledge of mechanics 
and engineering.  Once the concept of a commercial aviation industry became 
a realistic possibility – particularly due to the use of the airplane in World War 
I – the U.S. government became an active supporter in the industry’s growth 
and development.2 
 By the end of thatwar, the Post Office and the Army coordinated the 
development of airmail service, originally along the Washington–New York 
corridor. Routes were rapidly expanded to California and throughout the 
country, all served initially by military pilots. The high fatality rate among 
these early flyers (estimated at nearly 75 percent) forced Congress to end the 
involvement of the military in airmail service, resulting in the privatization of 
mail carriage.3
THE POST OffICE In CHARGE
 The Postmaster General, who was authorized to award contracts for 
airmail service, selected five companies whose routes essentially established 
the route structure for U.S. air service that would largely continue for the next 
six decades. Commercial aviation began to grow to include both passenger and 
freight service, and Congress recognized this change by assigning jurisdiction 
to the Department of Commerce in 1926.4  The nonstop flight of Charles 
Lindbergh from New York to Paris the following year greatly increased global 
enthusiasm for and private and government investment in aviation.
 This was an era of cronyism in government, a period that included 
Figure 5-1: 
signiFiCAnt LAws in trAnsportAtion dereguLAtion
Law Citation Purpose
Air Cargo 
Deregulation Act 
of 1977
Pub. L. 95-163, 
91 Stat. 1278 
Deregulates air cargo and ends limitations 
on size of aircraft used to haul freight
Airline 
Deregulation Act 
of 1978
Pub. L. 95-504, 
92 Stat. 1705
Ends CAB rate, route, and entry/exit 
governance
Staggers Rail Act 
of 1980
Pub. L. 96-448, 
94 Stat. 1895.
Eliminates most common carrier 
obligations and grants railroads greatly 
increased commercial freedom
Motor Carrier 
Act of 1980
Pub. L. 96-296, 
94 Stat. 793
Significantly reduces federal economic 
regulation of trucking operations
Bus Regulatory 
Reform Act of 
1982
Pub. L. 97-261, 
96 Stat. 1102
Liberalizes entry, exit, and pricing of the 
U.S. bus industry and largely preempts 
state regulation
Civil Aeronautics 
Board Sunset Act 
of 1984
Pub. L. 98-443, 
98 Stat. 1704
Ends the existence of the CAB and 
transfers remaining duties to the 
Department of Transportation
Trucking 
Industry 
Regulatory 
Reform Act of 
1994
Pub. L. 103-311, 
108 Stat. 1683
Removes remaining barriers to entry in 
the trucking industry and eliminates the 
requirement of tariff filing
Abolishment of 
the Interstate 
Commerce 
Commission in 
1995
Transfers remaining functions to the 
National Surface Transportation Board
Ocean Shipping 
Reform Act of 
1998
Pub. L. 105-258, 
112 Stat. 1902
Ends tariff filing and enforcement and 
simplifies contractual issues with shippers
Note: Pub. L. = Public Law. 
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legislation as the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 and the National Recovery 
Administration, which was subsequently found unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court in 1935.12
 Congress saw aviation as a public utility, not as a private, competitive 
industry, and as was the case with the railroads and gas and electric utilities, a 
regulatory structure was created to determine routes, rates, and other matters 
normally decided by corporate management. As a result, the 1938 act led to the 
creation of the CAB, a relatively small institution governed by five members. 
The CAB issued certificates of convenience to the sixteen existing airlines to 
provide stability and continuity to the industry.13 World War II then effectively 
halted civilian activities, and after the war, the CAB attempted to revitalize 
the industry by authorizing new local carriers to provide feeder services to the 
existing main or “trunk” carriers.14 Other authorized services included air taxis 
and commuter airlines, and such intrastate airlines as Southwest later began 
operations exempt from CAB jurisdiction.
A mATURInG InDUSTRy
 Technology and economic prosperity were the most significant 
developments for the airlines in the period after World War II. Technological 
innovations included advanced propeller and jet aircraft that allowed 
passengers to quickly reach their destinations, while the postwar economic 
boom caused significant increases in the demand for flights for the business 
and leisure traveler. However, excessive fleet capacity by about 1970 and the 
1973 oil embargo and quadrupling of oil prices caused significant economic 
problems, and the CAB responded by using its regulatory powers to again 
stifle “destructive” competition.
Teapot Dome and other scandals of the Harding Administration.5 A similar 
incident occurred in the burgeoning airline industry, where the usual government 
business practice of competitive bidding was ignored in the awarding of airmail 
contracts. Although the Department of Commerce had responsibility for the 
safety and maintenance of airways, airports, and air navigation facilities, the 
Post Office controlled airmail contracts. Desirous of establishing a limited 
number of large competing airlines, Postmaster General Brown assigned 
routes at closed-door meetings with airline executives in 1929.6 
 The secret process of awarding routes to a favored few companies7 
was eventually uncovered in a Congressional investigation, which resulted in 
the termination of these contracts by President Roosevelt on the grounds of 
collusion between the airlines and the Post Office.8 New legislation9 required 
competitive bidding and a study of the industry, which eventually led to the 
establishment of the Civil Aeronautics Authority, later renamed the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB).10 Safety issues were originally assigned to the Air 
Safety Board, originally a subagency of the CAB, but later assigned to the 
independent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).11
DEPRESSIOn-ERA ECOnOmICS
 The economic philosophy that drove the subsequent recommendations 
on the structure of the airline industry may be difficult for the modern reader to 
appreciate. However, it was entirely consistent with Depression-era concerns 
that unfair or excessive competition should be suppressed so that air carriers 
could survive the extraordinary circumstances that existed in the 1930s. There 
was general concern that the destructive power of competition could harm 
the industry, lead to further air safety problems, and weaken the ability of 
the U.S. to defend itself in a time of war. That same attitude permeated New 
Deal dissatisfaction with the business system and led to the passage of such 
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rates, and ended the CAB’s existence in a “sunset” provision, effective at the 
end of 1984.22 Remaining air transportation duties were transferred to the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (USDOT), the most important of which is the 
negotiation and supervision of international airline routes.
DEREGUlATIOn AnD THE AfTERmATH
 This chapter has focused on the airlines as representative of the 
transportation industry, as a complete discussion of the railroads, buses, marine 
shipping, and other modes would require its own book-length treatment.23 
Governments for centuries have treated transportation as having a “common 
carrier” obligation, that is, to serve all passengers and freight with service open 
to all upon request and on fair and nondiscriminatory terms.24 Furthermore, 
taxpayers have funded the majority of the investment costs in creating the 
necessary infrastructure for each mode to function, from granting public lands 
to the railroads for rights-of-way in the nineteenth century to constructing and 
operating airports in the twentieth century. As a result, transportation has been 
treated differently from private enterprise; considered more analogous to such 
public utilities as gas, electric, and water; and subject to regulation in many of 
its business practices.
lOnG-TERm InEffICIEnCIES
 The effects of airline regulation, no matter how well intended, were 
to create inherent inefficiencies and structures that have plagued the industry 
for much of the last one-third of a century. The major carriers, entrenched by 
regulatory fiat, assumed they would always receive rate and competitive relief, 
and when the CAB could not protect their positions, used predatory pricing 
to try to strangle new entrants in their markets. These  companies did not 
mORE REGUlATIOn, THEn DEREGUlATIOn
 To improve the economic condition of the industry, the CAB imposed 
a moratorium on new routes, allowed carriers to enter into capacity agreements 
to limit major market competition (a clear violation of the Sherman Act), and 
permitted the primary international carriers Pan Am and TWA to swap routes. 
It was following these actions that consumerism and deregulation began to gain 
popularity through the work of Ralph Nader15 and Congressional hearings that 
supported lessened administrative activity by government.16 Even the CAB 
supported less regulation, as stated in an internal report that recommended full 
deregulation by 1980.17 The political climate was ready for change, and the 
election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 began that process.18
 Carter believed that less government would be good for business and 
a popular cause, and he was a proponent for deregulation of the transportation 
industries. He appointed Alfred Kahn, an economist and former chairman of 
the New York Public Utilities Commission, as chairman of the CAB. Kahn had 
testified before Senator Edward Kennedy’s Subcommittee on Administrative 
Practice and Procedure and criticized CAB regulation as leading to unduly 
high air fares, inefficiency, poor customer service, and a tendency toward 
excess capacity.19  In searching for allies, he found that Federal Express had 
been prevented by the CAB from flying large aircraft to reduce operating 
expenses because of the agency’s protection of the trunk carriers who used 
freight revenues to improve their financial performance. Instead, FedEx was 
forced to operate smaller planes which were exempted from CAB controls.
 Congress responded by passing the Air Cargo Deregulation Act of 
1977,20 after hearings by its own committees, prodding by President Carter, 
and a general demand for deregulation. Passenger travel received equivalent 
treatment the following year through the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.21 
The 1978 act eliminated many controls, including those on entry and exit and 
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enormous increase in the price of aviation fuel, which has more than tripled 
in the past decade. Carriers attempt to manage their fuel costs by hedging fuel 
in the commodities markets and by switching to more efficient aircraft. Other 
significant costs are labor, with many airline positions covered by collective 
bargaining agreements; equipment, although leasing has reduced the required 
cash outlay for the acquisition of aircraft; and weather delays. Standard & 
Poor’s estimates that the percent of total revenues required for the controllable 
expenses of the industry are as follows:30
Labor  35 percent
Fuel  20 percent
Equipment 10 percent
 Revenues have been affected by new carriers motivated by the 
opportunity to compete in a deregulated market; by periodic weakness in the 
economy; by the reduction in business travel and its accompanying high ticket 
prices, made possible by new communications and computer technologies and 
by the declining expectation for businesspeople to meet face-to-face; and by 
the fear of terrorism and the resulting security checks and delays. It can be 
argued that no global industry has been more adversely affected by recent 
events than the airlines. Airline executives were ill prepared to move from a 
regulated environment to a market economy, and management has not always 
made wise business decisions. In many respects this is the inevitable result in 
the period following decades of governmental control, and not inherently the 
fault of deregulation.
 Any fear of anticompetitive behavior has simply not been realized. The 
mergers that have occurred are primarily survival based rather than oriented to 
restraint of trade; according to the Brookings Institution, 72 percent of merger 
•
•
•
hesitate to overinvest in fleet and airport capacity and to agree to unsustainable 
contractual agreements with labor unions, while failing to expeditiously move 
to fuel efficient aircraft. 
 Deregulation occurred because of the confluence of various factors at 
a time when there was general disgust over and distrust of a powerful central 
government.25 Congress was influenced by free-market economists like Milton 
Friedman, who believed that regulation inevitably distorts decisions on the 
allocation of economic resources and results in the “capture” of regulators by 
a far wealthier industry.26 Friedman and others believed that unfair business 
practices were unlikely in open competition, because an airline could easily 
enter or leave a market (e.g., there were no significant barriers to entry); 
new entrants could acquire the necessary capital to begin operations (e.g., 
economies of scale were not insurmountable, particularly when aircraft, gates, 
and maintenance facilities could be leased); and markets would be competitive 
and profits would not be unreasonable (e.g.,  markets were contestable).
 Unfortunately, the sudden deregulation of the airline and other 
transportation industries, when coupled with various negative events (noted 
in the next section), produced as many failures as successes.27 Among the 
successes have been significantly lower fares, increased flight schedules and 
fewer required connections, and estimated annual benefits to the public of 
more than $20 billion.28 Dissatisfactions include more crowded flights; poorer 
customer service; the collapse of some smaller airlines, often without warning 
or compensation to ticketholders; the bankruptcy and, in some cases, the 
reorganization of major airlines; and erratic pricing driven by the conflicting 
pressures of fuel and other costs and the need to manage seat capacity.29
COST PROBlEmS
 The most significant factor influencing cost structures has been the 
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not support this outcome, particularly as other carriers have maintained 
competitive levels of pricing and service. The Brookings study determined that 
fares at hub airports were nearly 6 percent lower (in real terms) than before 
the hub system, primarily due to the impact of Southwest Airlines and similar 
smaller carriers.33
A COmPETITIvE mARkET
 These conclusions do not ignore the peril for the small airlines 
attempting to seize a share of the airline market. Few of the startups 
that attempted to operate after deregulation have survived; some were 
undercapitalized, some were poorly managed, and some were unlucky due 
to adverse economic conditions. Southwest Airlines and various others have 
succeeded; the failures are too depressing to list. However, success or failure is 
the essence of capitalism, and there is no evidence that the U.S. would be better 
off if competition were replaced by regulators plotting ways to “stabilize” the 
industry.
 Although painful, competition is the appropriate remedy for the 
airlines and for the transportation industries. If competition leads to oligopoly 
involving several companies that provide a significant proportion of passenger 
and freight service, that is the inevitable result in any industry involving some 
economies of scale. Fears of concentration in the industry are misplaced; a 
limited number of efficient, profitable carriers would be in the best interests of 
all stakeholders.
CURREnT AIRlInE ISSUES
 Regulation cannot solve the most serious issues facing the airlines: 
energy costs, unbalanced aircraft and airport capacities, and weather. A fourth 
issue – terrorism – is being addressed through the Department of Homeland 
activity was based on operational and financial motives, and industry-wide 
factors accounted for 22 percent. Raising prices and stifling competition do not 
appear to be a major role in these decisions, and in fact, lower fares are the rule 
on most routes since deregulation.31 The Air Transport Association reports that 
the average inflation-adjusted cost per mile on domestic flights fell by one-half 
since deregulation.32 This is no surprise – the marketplace will always price 
correctly at marginal cost to provide the next seat on an airplane and clear the 
available supply. Regulators sitting in Washington are merely guessing at the 
appropriate amount to charge and do so largely on the basis of the recovery of 
the airlines’ average historical costs.
THE HUB-AnD-SPOkE SySTEm
 Deregulation forced the major airlines to learn to operate in a market 
economy without governmental protections or guarantees. An early competitive 
innovation was the hub-and-spoke system, in which airlines designated major 
hub cities where they had substantial gate capacity as well as ancillary services 
like ticket counters, maintenance, and hangar space. For example, hub cities for 
American and United include Chicago (O’Hare), whereas Continental’s hubs 
consist of such cities as Newark and Cleveland. Radiating from these hubs 
were spokes to smaller locations served by that airline’s regular and commuter 
aircraft. The passenger would fly into the hub city, experience a one-hour or so 
connection time to a nearby gate, and fly on to the desired destination.
 The resulting “collector” system was intended to manage costs by 
reducing point-to-point schedules, centralizing maintenance, increasing 
large aircraft load factors, and using smaller planes for small and mid-size 
locations. At the time that hub-and-spoke developed, there was some concern 
that excessive concentration would result at hub airports; that is, one or two 
airlines would dominate available flights. However, economic analysis does 
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in one month in mid-2007, and short of a better air traffic control 
system (as discussed below), weather delays are inevitable.35 
 What should be done is to adjust those situations that continue to 
interfere with the workings of the market economy. The sections that follow 
briefly discuss gate access, mergers, airport capacity and air traffic control, 
privatization, international open-skies, and consumer protection.
GATE ACCESS  
 Access to gates at U.S. airports continues to be restricted in such 
important cities as New York and Chicago. Gates are often unavailable at 
preferred times or are excessively costly. In some situations, competitive 
carriers have built their own terminals to guarantee access; examples include 
the new Southwest facilities at Baltimore-Washington Airport and St. Louis. 
However, Southwest is profitable, whereas many start-up airlines simply 
cannot afford this expenditure or are precluded from existing gates by long-
term lease arrangements. This situation can be traced to the practice in the 
years after World War II, when airports expanded based on airline guarantees 
or outright purchases of revenue bonds issued to fund expansion projects, in 
return for which they received gate exclusivity or preferential treatment. 
 Other countries have not been as constrained by these precedents. For 
example, at some European airports, and at Terminal 3 in Toronto, the airline 
signage at each gate is electronic so that it can be changed in moments from 
one airline’s name to another. The same technology will be employed at the 
gates in the new International Arrivals Terminal at New York–JFK, a $1 billion 
project being developed and operated by a private consortium including the 
for-profit company that owns and operates the airport in Amsterdam. Airports 
and airspace are public property, and the practice of exclusive or preferred gate 
Security and other federal initiatives, and there are few additional measures 
that can be taken without delaying and alienating the flying public. 
The problem of the cost of jet fuel can only be addressed by market 
solutions, including exploration, development of energy-efficient 
aircraft, and research on alternative fuels. In addition, airlines have 
become knowledgeable about hedging the cost of fuel through the 
energy markets, are introducing fuel-efficient aircraft to replace 
aging fleets, and are eliminating excess weight loads wherever 
possible.
Unbalanced aircraft and airport capacity is inevitable in an industry 
of large egos and reasonable costs of entry, and interference 
by regulators can only exacerbate the situation in the long run. 
However, the operators have recently made significant progress in 
managing their equipment to match expected passenger demand, and 
2007 results show that the airlines are flying at 80 to 85 percent of 
capacity.34 
Many readers with flying experience in the past eighteen months 
can attest to the impact of weather on their travel plans. The most 
infamous example may be JetBlue’s problems over Presidents’ Day 
2007, when over one thousand flights were cancelled; however, 
this is only one of numerous weather problems experienced by the 
airline industry. Operators may lose take-off slots if passengers are 
allowed to disembark, and an open gate may not be available. Bad 
weather disrupts a fragile system, one attempting to handle nearly 15 
percent more flights than one year earlier with effectively no increase 
in physical capacity. There were more than 20,000 cancelled flights 
•
•
•
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Nine of the ten largest airlines had losses in 2004, with the exception being 
Southwest. Standard & Poor’s estimates that the combined 2004 loss was 
$10 billion; “Airlines,” S&P Industry Survey, May 2005, §AAR 1.
 Among recent problems, United and US Airways filed for bankruptcy 
protection in 2002 and recently emerged from Chapter 11; Delta and Northwest, 
which filed in 2005, are in similar situations. Other recent bankruptcy filings 
included ATA, Southeast Air, Aloha Air, Great Plains Air, and Midway Air. 
 There is a significant difference between anticompetitive behavior 
and survival based on sharing reservation, scheduling, pricing, and accounting 
systems; maintenance facilities and other ground facilities; marketing; aircraft; 
and other costs. We have argued that the airlines should not be treated as public 
utilities any longer; they are businesses that must be allowed to search for 
revenue and cost efficiencies through mergers and a conservative expansion 
policy.
AIRPORT CAPACITy AnD AIR TRAffIC COnTROl
 While total U.S. airport capacity is adequate at the present time, certain 
airports (Chicago-O’Hare, New York–LaGuardia, and Atlanta) experience 
chronic overcrowding and delays. The practicable solution will not lie in 
building new airports, such as has been planned for an area south of Chicago, 
because of land acquisition and construction costs, environmental and noise 
concerns, and the chronic problem of raising scarce and expensive capital.37 
More realistic solutions would be improved scheduling through global 
positioning technology; improved gate access; the imposition of congestion 
tolls, that is, pricing based on competition for landing slots at peak times; and 
the modernization of air traffic control systems. 
 The Air Transport Association is promoting a major modernization 
access should not be allowed to continue. 
mERGERS
 Both the CAB and the antitrust laws have worked against significant 
merger activity in the airline industry; a recent cancelled attempt was that of 
US Airways and United in mid-2001.36 An unregulated industry with significant 
fixed costs naturally evolves toward oligopoly, and it is difficult to justify the 
position that airlines remain independent, particularly as they are experiencing 
profits far below general business levels. Comparative returns-on-equity are 
provided in Figure 5-2.      
Figure 5-2:
CompArAtive roes For AmeriCAn industry 
And the AirLines
Return-on-Equity
Airlines -0.1%
Alaska Air 10.4%
American/AMR loss
Continental loss
Southwest Air 7.7%
US Airways loss
Transportation 16.4%
U.S. Industry 17.3%
Source: Data are from “Outlook Scoreboard 2005,” Business Week, 
December 26, 2005, 130-53, and calculated from the most recent company 
annual financial statements (as of early 2006). US Airways results are based 
on six months of data because of its merger with America West in 2005. 
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congestion pricing, open gate access, parking and retail expansion, and other 
improvements. 
 There are several examples of private contractor management in the 
U.S., including Indianapolis and Newburgh, NY–Stewart Airport; see Figure 
5-3.41 Canada has privatized its air traffic control system;42 the international 
airport in Sydney, Australia, was leased for $3 billion (U.S.) to Southern Cross 
Airports Corporation, a consortium led by Macquarie Bank and Hochtief 
AirPort; and other world locations have adopted this approach to airport and 
air traffic management.43 
Figure 5-3: 
u.s. Airports mAnAged by privAte ContrACtors
Airport Contractor
  
Air-Carrier Airports 
 
  Atlantic City, NJ 
  Albany, NY 
  Indianapolis, IN 
  New Haven, CT 
  Rochester, MN 
  White Plains/Westchester Co., NY
  
 
 
 Johnson Controls World Services 
 Airport Group Int’l (AGI) 
 BAA, USA 
 Johnson Controls World Services  
 Rochester Airport Company 
 Johnson Controls World Services 
of the air traffic control system costing $30–40 billion, shared by the U.S. 
government and the airlines. The impediments to these actions include the 
continuing inadequate funding for the FAA, local and state government 
operation of the airports, and Congressional opposition to most innovative 
solutions largely for political reasons.38 This would improve utilization of 
existing facilities and avoid the collapse of entire FAA regions when computer 
or other technology failures occur.
 As one example of politics at work, the Wright Amendment limits 
travelers using Love Field in Dallas (primarily Southwest Airlines) to just 
sixteen cities in Texas and a few surrounding states as a way of protecting 
the dominant position of the newer Dallas–Ft. Worth International Airport 
(D/FW). This restriction does not protect the regional economy, as local 
officials assert; instead, it protects the near-monopoly on long-haul air travel 
at D/FW dominated by American Airlines.39 While no rational person would 
end the government’s responsibilities in protecting the safety of flying, other 
barriers – political and otherwise – could be largely overcome by restraining 
regulation and oversight and by privatization. A recent compromise agreement 
ends these restrictions by 2014 assuming that Congress and the affected local 
governments agree.40
 
PRIvATIzATIOn
 The outcry in February 2006 over the plan to entrust a Dubai company 
with the management of East Coast ports clearly indicates American sensitivity 
to the privatization of critical transportation facilities. However, as former 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher so keenly observed, private industry 
does a far superior job in managing assets than does any government. Assuming 
that an acceptable manager is found, private-sector control could end political 
pressures and allow airports to implement rational economic policies including 
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Shannon in western Ireland.  There has been limited progress at what is often 
called “open skies,” access to airports for any carrier able to pay reasonable 
fees for gates and landing.44 One estimate is that open skies would reduce fares 
by 30 percent, primarily in the U.S.-Asian markets.45
 A historic U.S.–European Union (EU) arrangement was made in 2005 
and negotiated into 2007 that apparently allows free access to American and 
European cities, ending bilateral agreements between the various countries, 
permitting carriers to continue on to third countries, and ending restrictions 
on fares and the number of flights. Approval by the EU was delayed by 
U.S. ownership rules which ban foreign ownership of more than 25 percent 
of the voting stock in a U.S. airline or 49 percent of the total stock.46 The 
George W. Bush Administration has agreed to allow European airlines to 
exceed this ownership cap without a legal challenge. The existing restrictions 
reflect political concerns for foreign control of a “critical industry” as well as 
economic arguments that there could be a significant loss of jobs in the U.S. 
airline industry. 
COnSUmER PROTECTIOn
 Passengers need to be protected from unreasonable and unfair airline 
practices, and as we have stated throughout this book, consumer protection 
laws must be maintained. The USDOT reports that complaints have been 
declining; a recent period showed that the incidence of complaints is less than 
one per 100,000 enplanements.47  Consumers continue to note such problems 
as lost luggage, inadequate information on delayed flights, failure to provide 
compensation for extra meal or hotel costs when the fault is with the airline 
(and not the weather), occasional overbooking and bumping of passengers 
with confirmed reservations, and similar complaints. 
 There are also situations when airlines have ceased operations, leaving 
Airport Contractor
  
General Aviation (GA) Airports 
 
  Alliance Airport, Fort Worth, TX 
   Brackett Field, LaVerne, CA 
   Capital City Airport, Fairview, PA 
   Compton Airport, Compton, CA 
   Danielson Airport, Killingly, CT 
   El Monte Airport, El Monte, CA 
   Peru Municipal Airport, Peru, IN 
   Fox Airfield, Lancaster, CA 
   Republic Airport, E. Farmingdale, NY 
   Whiteman Airport, Pacoima, CA 
   Windhem Airport, CT
  
 
 
 Alliance Air Services 
 COMARCO, Inc. 
 Johnson Controls World Services 
 COMARCO, Inc. 
 Northwest Air Service 
 COMARCO, Inc. 
 Miami County Air Services 
 COMARCO, Inc. 
 Johnson Controls World Services 
 COMARCO, Inc. 
 Windhem Aerobim, Inc.
Source: The website of the Reason Foundation, at www.privatization.org/
database/policyissues/airports_local.html
InTERnATIOnAl OPEn-SkIES
 For decades, governments used national airlines to market their 
countries; examples include British Airways, Air France, Lufthansa (Germany), 
and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines. However, these promotions came at a stiff 
price; most national airlines chronically lost money until the idea began to be 
abandoned and the airlines were privatized, merged, or managed efficiently. 
Similarly, international airports have restricted access to landing rights, giving 
preference to their own carriers. 
 Or the airlines were required to make mandatory stopovers at 
“marginal” airports to gain landing rights in major cities. For example, airlines 
wishing to fly into Dublin were required to land a portion of their flights at 
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EnDnOTES fOR CHAPTER 5
(Endnotes)
1 The rest of this famous message announcing the invention of the airplane is as 
follows:  “Started from level with engine power alone. Average speed through 
air thirty-one miles. Longest fifty-nine seconds. Inform press. Home Christmas.” 
Telegram to the Reverend Milton Wright, from Kitty Hawk, NC (December 17, 
1903).
2 An excellent history of the transportation industry is Paul Stephen Dempsey and 
William Thoms, Law and Economic Regulation in Transportation (1986); this point 
is discussed at page 26. For a recent, thorough analysis, see Dempsey’s article 
“Transportation: A Legal History,” 30 Transportation Law Journal 235 (2003).
3 Contract Air Mail Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 805 (1925).
4 Air Commerce Mail Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
5 See David H. Stratton, Tempest over Teapot Dome (1998).
6 This history is discussed in Alexander T. Well and John G. Wensveen, Air 
Transportation: A Management Perspective (5th edition, 2003), 33-45. 
7 The companies receiving the favored treatment were Northwest Airways, United 
Air Lines, Transcontinental and Western (predecessor to TWA), and Eastern Air 
Lines.
8 Although Postmaster General Brown’s motives were suspect, all corruption charges 
were eventually dropped.
ticketholders without recourse. Obviously, consumers should be leery of 
patronizing start-up airlines with limited experience. In any event, the USDOT 
needs to continue and strengthen its programs of consumer protection and 
assure that remedies are provided, as appropriate.48
wHAT THE U.S. SHOUlD DO
 As the industry struggles to survive, passengers continue to fly. A recent 
FAA estimate is that the volume of U.S. passengers will rise 45 percent in the 
next twelve years to more than one billion, attracted mostly by low fares.49 
This means that aircraft and airways will be more crowded, and innovative 
structural changes will be required to manage the traffic loads. Private-sector 
initiatives should be encouraged to enable the transportation system to proceed 
without further disruptions.
 While regulation may have been appropriate at a time when the 
shipping public needed protection from the monopoly power of the railroad 
barons, changing competition, technology, and national interest inevitably led 
to deregulation in the transportation industries. The public utility analogy is 
no longer sufficient to justify special treatment, and competitive response has 
become paramount in survival or failure. The true deregulation of the airline 
industry (as opposed to the 1978 version) would involve measures to improve 
access to gates for all airlines, permission for strategic mergers to allow airline 
companies to achieve economies of scale, actions to increase capacities at 
airports and in the air, privatization of publicly owned facilities, and a policy 
of open skies in global markets.   
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15 Nader’s organization of law students published a 1,200-page critique of the 
ICC; Robert Fellmeth et al., The Interstate Commerce Omission (1970). Nader’s 
subsequent book, Unsafe at Any Speed (1972), which discussed the automobile 
industry, brought him worldwide fame.
16 Senator Kennedy (D.-Mass.) chaired the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Administrative Practice and Procedure. Hearings conducted by that committee 
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pricing flexibility and generally improve the profitability of the airline industry. 
See “Oversight of Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures,” U.S. Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure, 94th Cong. 
(1975). See also Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (1982).
17 Roy Pulsifer and CAB Staff, Regulatory Reform: Report of the CAB Special Staff 
(1975).
18 A thorough analysis of the pressures driving airline deregulation is in a paper by 
Jeffrey W. Hayes, “Airline Deregulation: A Financial Markets Perspective on Who 
Mattered When”; at polmeth.wustl.edu/mailinglist/posting.php?id=243&title=August
%201998&order=dateposted&startdate=1998-08-01&enddate=1998-08-31.
19 See Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation (1971).
20 Public Law 95-163; 91 Stat. 1278 (1977), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44301-2.
21 Public Law 95-504; 92 Stat. 1705 (1978), codified in sections of 49 U.S.C. § 
41505 and at 49 U.S.C. § 49101.
22 Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Public Law 98-443, 98 Stat. 1704, 
codified at 49 U.S.C. 419.
9 Black-McKellar Act, 48 Stat. 933 (1934).
10 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
11 The approaching introduction of jet airliners and a series of midair collisions 
spurred passage of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Public Law 85-726, 72 Stat. 
731. For additional information, see www.faa.gov. 
12 The National Recovery Administration (NRA), 48 Stat. 195 (1933), was created by 
the National Industrial Recovery Act to have industries create codes of behavior to 
reduce destructive competition and to help workers by setting minimum wages and 
maximum weekly hours. Most economic historians consider the NRA to be a failure, 
as the codes allowed cartels to be established in many industries. As these firms 
increased their prices, sales fell, employment fell, and the recovery from the Great 
Depression stalled. The legal dispute arose from the labor provisions of the NRA 
code, with the Court holding the law invalid on grounds of the attempted regulation 
of intrastate transactions which only indirectly affected interstate commerce. A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corporation v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
13 James Callison, “Airline Deregulation – A Hoax?” 41 Journal of Air Law & 
Commerce 747, 758 (1975). 
14 In addition to the original four carriers (referenced in note 7), those issued 
certificates were American, Braniff, Chicago & Southern (merged subsequently 
into Delta), Continental, Delta, Inland (merged subsequently into Eastern), Mid-
Continent (merged subsequently into Braniff), National, Northeast, Penn Central 
(merged subsequently into United), and Western. Paul Stephen Dempsey, “The State 
of the Airline, Airport and Aviation Industries,” 21 Transportation Law Journal 129, 
139-40 (1992). Readers will note that several of these companies no longer exist or 
have been involved in recent bankruptcy reorganizations.
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Winston, eds.), AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 2000, 1-2.
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to San Antonio to present a talk at a conference in 2005. My round-trip ticket cost 
$300; my seatmate’s round-trip ticket cost $850 (and he was in a center seat!).
30 “Airlines,” S&P Industry Reports, May 2005, § AAR 24.
31 Morrison and Winston, referenced in note 28, at 17.
32 Reported in “Why the Skies Have Gotten Crowded,” Wall Street Journal, July 
21-22, 2007, A5.
33 See note 31, at 4-7.
34 See note 32.
35 Ibid.
36 The most significant merger in recent years was the American (number 2 in the 
industry) combination with TWA (number 8) in 2001.
37 In 2004, the South Suburban Airport Commission held a competition and selected 
a team led by LCOR and SNC-Lavalin to finance, design, build, and operate 
what is now called Abraham Lincoln National Airport. The Illinois Department 
of Transportation is buying land at the preferred site in Peotone, forty miles south 
of downtown Chicago. The basic model is a public-private partnership, with 
government owning the land and the private entity owning and operating the 
facilities.
23 Indeed, Paul Steven Dempsey’s article “Transportation: A Legal History,” 
referenced in note 2, runs to over 78,000 words, 130 pages, and nearly 1,200 
footnotes!
24 In Munn v. Illinois, the Supreme Court upheld state regulation of certain 
enterprises that were of such character as to become quasi-public institutions; see 
94 U.S. 113 (1876). The Court cited English practice to regulate ferry service and 
common carriers in its decision.
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years after the Watergate investigation and Nixon’s subsequent resignation and 
pardon. Negative public opinion toward the incumbent Ford Administration was a 
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CHAPTER 6: CORPORATE GOvERnAnCE
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law.1
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841–1935), Northern Securities Co. v. U.S.
 Justice Holmes could have been referring to the recent business 
ethics/fraud/insider trading cases (hereinafter grouped as the “fraud cases”), 
including Enron, WorldCom, Martha Stewart, or any of the others that have 
resulted in investigations, criminal convictions, plea bargains, and civil fines.2 
He might also have been referring to regulatory responses hastily enacted to 
“protect” against corporate fraud, which may do a bit of good while doing 
significant harm.3 At the same time, it seems clear that the fraud cases have 
increased the general level of market risk and reduced market valuations, other 
things, including corporate earnings, remaining constant. Since markets seem 
to have failed, regulation might seem to be worth trying even if it is unlikely to 
help.
“THERE OUGHTA BE A lAw!”4
 Corporate governance has become a defining business issue of the early 
twenty-first century, and in some ways is nearly an obsession with legislators 
and regulators. Although there have been numerous instances of outrageous 
behavior throughout American economic history, Congress – following the 
republican tradition – long rejected demands for federal legislation on how 
public companies should be managed. As Roberta S. Karmel notes, early SEC 
Chairman (and later Supreme Court Justice) William O. Douglas criticized 
the full disclosure philosophy of the Securities Act of 1933 (see the Brandeis 
comment in Chapter 4 [at footnote 39]) in its failure to protect uninformed 
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SUnBEAm: A CASE Of fRAUD
 The slippery slope of fraud often begins with managing financial 
numbers to meet analysts’ and Wall Street’s expectations. Apparently, the senior 
managers at Sunbeam expected that the future periods would be successful 
enough to make up for earlier shortfalls. The situation at Sunbeam occurred 
early in the most recent cycle of fraud cases. Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer “Chainsaw” Al Dunlap authorized misstatements in financial reports to 
meet investors’ and analysts’ expectations for Sunbeam’s stock. To raise cash, 
Sunbeam sold $60 million in accounts receivable and initiated an “early buy” 
program for gas grills, allowing retailers to “purchase” grills in Fall 1997 but 
not to be paid until mid-1998. Once the retailers were loaded up with grills, 
Sunbeam started a second sales program. A “bill and hold” plan permitted 
customers to buy and store their unpaid merchandise in Sunbeam’s facilities. 
 The two sales arrangements accounted for a major portion of the 
revenue gains in 1997 but were in fact future sales booked now. As a result of 
Sunbeam’s misleading actions, a series of class action lawsuits were filed on 
behalf of all persons who purchased the common stock through April 1998. 
The complaints charged Sunbeam with issuing a series of materially false 
and misleading statements regarding Sunbeam’s fourth quarter 1997 and first 
quarter 1998 sales and earnings. Investigation by the SEC finally resulted in 
payments by Sunbeam of $18.5 million to settle various lawsuits while denying 
any wrongdoing. Dunlap appears to have many millions left and has never 
faced criminal charges. 
IS REGUlATIOn THE AnSwER?
 One of the disadvantages of the democratic system is that bad law or 
regulations are sometimes enacted to appease an angry public. As we previously 
investors who “either lack the training or intelligence to assimilate … and find 
… useful [financial statement data].”5 
fEDERAl REGUlATORS GET In THE GAmE
 For four decades Congress denied the SEC overt regulatory power 
over most actions by corporations on the theory that such activities historically 
have been subject to state jurisdiction.6  However, the atmosphere of corporate 
corruption in the post-Watergate era allowed the agency some leeway. As 
a result, the SEC began prosecuting or threatening to prosecute situations 
involving illegal political contributions and questionable foreign payments.7 
Later SEC programs involved the composition and independence of boards 
of directors, shareholder access to the corporate electoral process, the public 
accounting profession, and other matters of corporate governance. Congress 
assisted these attempts at federal intervention by passing the National Markets 
Improvements Act of 1996, which preempted state law governing corporate 
behavior in the area of securities regulation.8
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20029 (“Sarbox”) broke new ground 
by mandating that U.S. publicly traded corporations regularly assess their 
processes to ensure transparency and protect shareholder value.  The law 
was enacted to restore investor confidence by requiring actions concerning 
financial reporting, conflicts of interest, corporate ethics, and accounting 
oversight. Heavy fines for senior managers and their corporations, and even 
imprisonment, are available remedies under Sarbox; the idea was to construct 
a strong enough incentive for business executives to obey the law.
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ImPORTAnT SARBOx PROvISIOnS
 Sarbox makes new law in several important areas, some of which may 
create havoc for corporate managers, accountants, and regulators. Some of the 
more difficult provisions are noted below.
CERTIfICATIOn
 Chief executive officers are now required to certify that a periodic 
financial report “fairly represents, in all material respects, the financial 
condition and results of operation of the issuer.”10 A knowingly false 
certification can result in a fine of up to $5 million and imprisonment of 
up to twenty years. Although Sarbox does not contain any clarification for 
this process, many public companies are requiring junior and middle-level 
managers to “subcertify” the sections of the financial reports for which they 
are responsible. One survey noted the following areas as the most common 
areas where financial professionals were being asked to subcertify, leaving 
them with unresolved issues of liability: 
disclosures in management’s discussion and analysis or in footnotes
 
specific account balances in banks
compliance with company policies and procedures
 
adequacy of internal controls in their department or business function
compliance with company code of conduct11
•
•
•
•
•
discussed, the Glass-Steagall Act was law from 1933 until 1999; Congress 
passed Glass-Steagall to separate investment and commercial banking, to end 
the evils of a few unscrupulous financiers whose stock manipulations “caused” 
the October 1929 stock market collapse. History has shown that many other 
factors led to the crash and the Great Depression and that financial market 
excesses played a relatively minor role.
 Our purpose is not to plow over the thoroughly documented fraud 
cases that led to the current obsession over corporate governance. Rather, the 
subject is the choice of the remedies selected by Congress to steer the behavior 
of senior corporate executives. In short, is the benefit to the public worth the 
cost?  Expenses have risen for business for everything from accounting and 
legal fees to a higher cost of capital for multinational corporations unwilling to 
list on American exchanges. Society pays for such administrative costs as new 
governmental oversight and regulation and such judicial costs as indictments, 
trials, and prison time.
 This book keeps repeating the theme that more regulation is not 
necessarily the best solution. Rather, with all their imperfections, contract and 
market-based approaches are more likely than regulation to reach efficient 
results. Sarbox reforms rely on increased monitoring by independent directors, 
auditors, and regulators, who have both weak incentives and low-level access 
to information. This monitoring has not been and cannot be effective in 
dealing with fraud by highly motivated insiders. The only effective antidotes 
to fraud are active and vigilant markets and financial market professionals 
with strong incentives to investigate corporate managers and uncover relevant 
information. 
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of publicly traded companies who assist in the investigation of conduct that 
the employee “reasonably believes” is a prohibited action. Criminal liability 
is established for whistleblower retaliation, and audit committees of public 
companies are required to establish procedures for “the receipt, retention, and 
treatment of complaints.”14 
 The inherent problem with protection for whistleblowers is that any 
employee could reveal proprietary secrets to the media or to government on 
the grounds that something illegal is going on, when the real intention is to “get 
even” for some real or imagined injustice. Such revelations might be entirely 
without merit, but the damage would have been done. Whistleblowing by angry 
employees is inevitable; according to one estimate, the SEC’s Enforcement 
Complaint Center annually receives more than 20,000 communications on 
potentially illegal corporate actions.15 There are no statistics on the rate of 
validity to these claims.
REGUlATIOn Of THE ACCOUnTInG PROfESSIOn
 The failure of Arthur Andersen in 2002 was caused by the accounting 
firm’s participation in several fraud cases, the most critical of which 
undoubtedly was Enron.16 Congress feared a general loss of investor and 
business community confidence in auditors and the independence of their 
opinions in financial reports. In addition, lawmakers were not convinced 
that the accountants’ self-regulatory organization, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB), would have adequate power to restore credibility. 
As a result, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was 
created in Sarbox to be the federal regulator over the profession.17 
 The PCAOB has responsibilities to register and inspect public accounting 
firms that prepare audit reports for public companies; adopt and modify auditing, 
quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards for public company 
AUDIT COmmITTEE InDEPEnDEnCE
 A continuing problem with public companies is the “rubber stamp” 
attitude of many boards of directors, whose responsibility is to protect the 
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. This situation occurs because 
outside directors – those not employed by the company – are frequently too busy 
to attend to corporate affairs with appropriate diligence. Another contributing 
factor is the cronyism and lack of independence of inside directors who are not 
likely to comment critically on the actions of the chairman or chief executive 
officer, who is also their boss. The SEC has long recognized this dilemma and 
has pursued various initiatives to increase the participation of outside directors 
on audit committees.12
 Sarbox establishes independent audit committees with authority 
over external auditors and requires disclosure of whether an audit committee 
includes a financial expert.13 Financial reporting has effectively become the 
responsibility of the audit committee, and that body is a potential antagonist 
of and separate from the CEO and CFO. The audit committee and its members 
must be independent and cannot be compensated for other services provided 
to the company. With these and other rules, Sarbox places the audit committee 
in a unique position in the corporation, overriding hundreds of years of state 
regulation and the principle of senior executives having responsibility for the 
affairs of the corporation.
wHISTlEBlOwInG
 Because fraud requires the participation of several people, most 
of whom are relatively junior employees, there is only slight potential to 
maintain secrecy over an extended period of time. Sarbox supports internal 
whistleblowing by establishing a civil cause of action that protects employees 
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CHAnGInG DEmAnDS On CORPORATE GOvERnAnCE
 Modern regulatory theories of corporate governance began with Berle 
and Means,26 who argued after the 1929 stock market crash that owners of 
publicly held corporations could not effectively control their corporations. This 
effectively involves two problems. First, as Adam Smith observed, corporate 
managers do not watch over “other people’s money” with the “anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch 
over their own.”27 In other words, public corporations involve agency costs, 
including the owner’s costs of monitoring the agent, the agent’s cost of posting 
a bond to protect the owner, and residual losses that agents impose on owners 
despite monitoring and bonding. Second, agency costs are not trivial because 
it is impractical for shareholders with small, dispersed interests to invest much 
time and money in monitoring managers. 
mAnAGERS In THE fRAUD CASES
 The fraud cases appear to involve a new breed of corporate executives 
who were unconstrained by traditional restraints.28 These executives are 
hypermotivated survivors of a highly competitive environment (Enron called 
its periodic manager evaluation process “rank and yank”) who proved their 
ability to make money while putting on a veneer of loyalty to the firm. In the 
words of Larry E. Ribstein, “They are Machiavellian, narcissistic, prevaricating, 
pathologically optimistic, free from self-doubt and moral distractions, willing 
to take great risk as the company moves up and to lie when things turn bad, and 
nurtured by a corporate culture that instills loyalty to insiders, obsession with 
short-term stock price and intense distrust of outsiders.”29 
 An understanding of the perpetrators’ motives would seem to be 
essential in designing regulation that has a significant chance of preventing 
audits; investigate registered accounting firms for violations of rules relating 
to audits; and impose sanctions for violations. To prevent conflicts of interest, 
other provisions prohibit accounting firms from providing most consulting-type 
services, require periodic rotation of the audit partner, and impose restrictions 
on audit professionals from becoming senior executives at their client 
companies.18 It is unclear whether these changes are adequate, as accounting 
judgment can still be compromised by the desire to please clients to retain 
audit business and to collect additional fees for Sarbox compliance services.19 
OTHER CORPORATE InITIATIvES
 Other selected initiatives required of company executives include the 
following:
Loans are prohibited to directors and executive officers, including the 
modification and forgiveness of currently outstanding loans.20
Executive bonuses must be forfeited when financial restatements 
result from corporate misconduct.21
All material off-balance-sheet transactions and arrangements must be 
disclosed.22
Pro forma financial statements must be reconciled with generally 
accepted accounting principles.23
Internal controls must be explained as to their management and 
assessment.24 
Management must reveal whether a code of ethics has been 
adopted.25
•
•
•
•
•
•
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failures.
 Carefully worded opinions are then prepared regarding the extent 
of their responsibilities and investigations. Typical language is: “These 
financial statements are the responsibility of the company’s management. Our 
responsibility is to express an opinion on the statements based on our audits.” 
As audits are currently performed, it is fairly clear that a clever fraud will not 
be detected by the external accountant. Even when fraud has been detected, 
auditors can resign from clients but are under no compulsion to publicly 
disclose the reasons. Despite these limitations, this system worked reasonably 
well until the accounting firms (e.g., Arthur Andersen) aided the business 
frauds by failing to adjust to the new profit-maximization goals versus their 
traditional, professional focus.32 
THE OUTSIDE AUDITORS
 Arthur Andersen and other firms pressed the business side, exhorting 
its partners to sell nonaudit services like consulting and tax planning to audit 
clients and tying partner compensation to business production. These firms 
used their auditing services, which firms must buy, as “loss leaders” to sell 
nonauditing services. In some situations, auditors’ loss of independence in 
effect may have made them part of the management team. Years of working for 
a client, with prospects of joining the client’s management and participating 
in its success, may have made auditors subject to the same pathologies that 
affected client management, including excessive optimism and loyalty, and 
reduced their concern for their auditing firm’s reputation.
 The fraud cases illustrate weaknesses in the auditing of corporate 
ledgers. In general, the problems have involved some combination of 
excessive ties between auditing firms and the companies they are supposed to 
be scrutinizing, inadequate review of the accounting firm’s work by corporate 
future frauds. It is too simplistic to ascribe these frauds to “greed” without 
accounting for the risk of detection. None of the main characters in the recent 
scandals have absconded with the loot beyond buying expensive homes. 
Moreover, the alleged perpetrators were not shady criminals but seemingly 
responsible business people who had earned the trust of their even more 
respectable monitors. For example, Scott Sullivan, who was convicted of 
manipulating WorldCom’s books in order to meet earnings targets, was 
regarded as “one of the best chief financial officers around” and “the key to 
WorldCom Inc.’s financial credibility.”30
 How could such a man have engaged in blatant financial manipulation? 
Similar questions arise regarding the blatant behavior of some Enron insiders, 
including the former CEO Kenneth Lay, CFO Jeffrey Skilling, and treasurer 
Andrew Fastow. Indeed, the insiders’ conduct seems particularly puzzling, at 
least at first glance, given agents’ usual incentives. Since agents bear severe 
penalties in firms if they fail, including loss of job and reputation, but normally 
do not get the full benefit of success, it follows that they would tend to be more 
cautious than their employers would want them to be, rather than the reverse. 
COnTRIBUTIOnS Of ACCOUnTInG TO THESE PROBlEmS
 The process often begins with journal entries made by company 
accountants without knowledge of their accuracy as verified by physical counts 
of materials, work-in-process and finished goods inventories, machinery, and 
other company assets.31 We rely on internal auditors to verify these entries, but 
a substantial portion of their energies are now devoted to Sarbox compliance. 
The external accountant then provides an independent audit of financial records 
and opinions as to the accuracy of the financial statements presented by the 
business enterprise. It has not been the external accountant’s job to seek or 
discover situations involving fraud or to warn the company of possible control 
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may also be very costly. Moreover, given the shift in incentives when the end 
seems near, increasing punishment may actually increase the risk of a cover-
up, even as it has little effect on the fraud itself. All of this suggests significant 
uncertainty about how best to craft the law to prevent future frauds. 
PROBlEmS wITH THE REGUlATORy APPROACH
 Regulation can send a signal to investors that helps shape their behavior 
and may mislead them into inaction. If this hypothesis is correct, then additional 
regulation, accompanied by new exaggerated claims for its efficacy, might 
inhibit markets from self-adjusting to fraud by giving investors a reason for 
continued complacency. For example, Sarbox provisions calling for increased 
SEC review of corporate filings36 and a significantly increased SEC budget37 
may give investors the impression that the SEC is effectively protecting them. 
This is an additional reason for being concerned about the actual effectiveness 
of these and other proposed regulatory responses to corporate fraud. 
OTHER “UnInTEnDED COnSEQUEnCES” 38
 Sarbox has been a misdirected reaction to solve a problem where there 
is ample prosecutorial and market surveillance of corporate activity, assuming 
that investors and analysts care to make the effort. As long as the penalties 
remain, concern over a possible Sarbox violation by some corporate manager 
may lead to one or more of the following outcomes:
Competent individuals may be reluctant to serve on boards or as 
senior executives, given the potential for investigation by federal 
regulators conceivably leading to jail time. 
•
audit committees, inadequate industry or government scrutiny of accounting 
firms’ work, and excessively lax accounting standards. Even the largest 
accounting firm may have an incentive to overlook misconduct from a client 
from which it makes significant fees for consulting and other nonaudit work. 
Auditors may believe that their conclusions are honest, but only because their 
judgments are affected by a “self-serving” bias to view behavior in the most 
favorable light.33 
DRIvERS Of fRAUD
 Senior insiders face punishment in the form of job and reputation loss 
even for lawful conduct that fails to meet investor expectations – that is, for 
their firm’s failure to meet investors’ earnings expectations. These managers 
may believe that they are no longer susceptible to potential discipline by their 
firms or the employment market because failure to distort earnings also will 
result in loss of their job and reputation.34 Since executives are convinced 
that they are doing the right thing in defending their company’s value from 
destruction by misguided markets, they are also not subject to a significant 
moral constraint. 
 Once fraud begins, the result is additional alterations of manager 
incentives. At this point, insiders risk loss of wealth and even personal freedom 
unless they continue the cover-up. Indeed, the consequences of discovery may 
be so severe that even a small chance of success might lead a rational person 
to cover up. This calculus may be reinforced by a psychological tendency to 
prefer risk when choosing whether to take a present loss or take a chance on 
avoidance or on future loss.35 
 Strong measures may be necessary to significantly reduce the risk of 
future fraud. Insiders who think that they are doing the right thing may be harder 
to detect and deter than those who were simply greedy. Effective deterrence 
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would replace the “entire corpus of state corporation law.”42 Sarbox changes 
this landscape, by assigning powers to the SEC to regulate corporations that 
were never previously within the purview of a federal agency. 
 The states are scrambling to decide what future path to take, particularly 
as they largely ignored the situations that led to the Enrons, WorldComs, and 
Tycos. In at least one situation – that of the State of New York – the reaction 
by the attorney general’s office has been to institute prosecutions against the 
more notorious alleged perpetrators, including the New York Stock Exchange, 
AIG, Moody’s Investors Services, SONY BMG Music, and several others. 
Most states have been content to let the SEC lead the charge, particularly given 
the “capture” of many state officials by corporations through contributions to 
election campaigns.
 The individual investor is probably indifferent as to whether the states 
or the federal government protects his or her interests, as long as there is 
no repetition of the financial scandals of the past fifteen years. For business 
managers, the danger is that the free market orientation of American capitalism 
could turn into control by government regulation, with the SEC effectively 
setting policy on compensation, accounting and financial procedures, acceptable 
risk limitations in business strategy, and other matters more properly the job 
of directors and senior managers. Whatever its faults, state law has been 
accommodating and has encouraged risk taking, allowing such successes as 
Microsoft, Starbucks, and e-Bay; federal regulation can be heavy handed and 
limiting and may result in second guessing by Washington bureaucrats that 
could interfere with innovation and creativity.. 
mARkET RESPOnSES TO fRAUD
 The corporate governance problem goes beyond the issue of U.S. 
jurisdiction, affecting companies in Europe and Asia. There have been scandals 
Financial managers will spend much of their time on compliance 
issues rather than on developing the optimal capital structure for their 
companies.39 One report states that there is general dissatisfaction at 
careers in finance due largely to Sarbox;40 in Chapter 9 we examine 
specific situations faced by these managers. 
A huge increase in fees has and will be paid to accounting firms, 
lawyers, consultants, and risk managers for guidance on Sarbox 
compliance and the development of internal control processes.
Auditors will choose conservative treatment of accounting entries 
motivated by self-defense and their fear of an Arthur Andersen–type 
meltdown rather than by the desire to accurately match revenues and 
expenses.
Plans will be reconsidered and perhaps shelved by multinational 
and private U.S. corporations that are considering a listing of their 
shares on U.S. exchanges, given the clearly restrictive requirements 
of Sarbox.
There will be ongoing worry and litigation as to what constitutes 
“fair” and “material,” as there are no objective standards on the 
certification of statements. The chief executive officer who guesses 
wrong may well be indicted. 
wHO’S In CHARGE, THE fEDS OR THE STATES?
 As previously noted, the traditional regulators of business have been 
the states following the mandate and Supreme Court interpretations of the 
Commerce Clause; for example, corporations are creatures of state law”41 and 
the finding that Congress did not have the power to create federal law that 
•
•
•
•
•
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ExPlICIT COSTS Of SARBAnES-OxlEy
 There are limited “hard” data on the implementation costs of Sarbox, 
primarily because companies have requirements that must be accomplished by 
certain dates following enactment in 2002. Various results have been reported 
in media stories about the cost thus far of Sarbox compliance, all suggesting 
that the expense for each company is in the multi-millions of dollars and that 
the total cost would be in the billions of dollars. Most board directors now 
believe that the benefits of compliance are not worth the costs, particularly as 
the law is causing senior managers to become more risk averse.45
 Compliance costs were expected to rise by 4 percent in the second 
year and decline by 2.5 percent thereafter. One study found that average 
audit fees about doubled in 2004 for Fortune 1000 companies, while another 
estimate was for a three-fifths increase. In 2005, it has been estimated that the 
total cost of Sarbox would exceed $6 billion.46 Nearly 60 percent of smaller 
companies (those with annual total revenues under $1 billion) reported that 
compliance was costly.47 In a separate study, AMR Research estimated that 
Fortune 1000 companies would spend an aggregated $2.5 billion,48 while 
Financial Executives International (FEI) reported the amount as closer to $4.5 
million.49
 It is estimated that audit costs would increase by 30 percent annually,50 
partly as a result of new auditor responsibilities and also because of higher 
hourly audit fees. The Big Four51 have focused on their largest, most profitable 
clients, pushing some corporations to second-tier firms less knowledgeable 
about their clients’ businesses.52 Many executives have stated that reforms 
are too strict, and one-quarter agree that the costs outweigh the benefits. 
Furthermore, audit firms appear to be less willing to provide guidance on 
regulatory issues.53
 Businesses with more than $5 billion in revenue expect to spend 
in every major economy, from Vivendi, Parmalat, and Royal Ahold in Europe 
to financial companies and the keiretsu cartels in Japan and Hyundai and the 
chaebol cartels in South Korea.43 Significant differences exist in each region’s 
reaction, with the U.S. clearly the most stringent with regard to the extent of 
the required controls for public companies and the penalties for executives 
who are successfully prosecuted. No evidence yet exists that Sarbox is the 
most rational approach to preventing future incidents. The only commonality 
is that the fraud occurred, the fraud is discovered, and the fraud is prosecuted. 
 Before adopting regulatory solutions, thoughtful American lawmakers 
should have considered the feasibility of market-based responses. Market-
oriented discipline has high prospects of success now that the risks of 
defective accounting have become as obvious to market participants as they 
have become to politicians, regulators, and the public. Indeed, it was markets 
and not regulators that uncovered the problems and adjusted the share prices 
of offending companies, while years of regulation of securities disclosures and 
of the membership of boards of directors failed to prevent the business fraud 
cases. In other words, dishonest insiders were able to “outrun” the kinds of 
monitors that regulators favor; ultimately (if belatedly) the markets exposed 
these situations. If markets can react, there are significant benefits to allowing 
them to do so. 
  Markets can significantly reduce their vulnerability to fraud simply 
by paying closer attention to warning signs. This might include watching for 
discrepancies in the figures of similar firms within an industry,44 reading such 
fine print as financial statement footnotes, and relying on “harder” numbers 
such as free cash flow that are not affected by firms’ decisions on capitalizing 
and amortizing expenses. Market skepticism is more likely now that investor 
biases have appeared to move from over-optimism to neutrality or pessimism. 
In the current environment, firms, analysts, auditors, and others have a strong 
incentive to signal their integrity and independence. 
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increased regulation has not been made. While the fraud cases have exposed 
gaps in the existing monitoring structure, the benefits of eliminating those gaps 
are not as clear as they might seem to be. Aggressive executives determined 
to ignore the risks of their actions, including their personal exposure to 
punishment, breached the existing regulatory framework. Promoting more 
independent monitors with lower-powered incentives to scrutinize the actions 
of highly informed and motivated insiders cannot solve this problem. 
 Furthermore, the costs of increased regulation are significant. On the 
one hand, Sarbox may reduce the incentives of both insiders and monitors to 
increase shareholder value. Even if the law is ineffective, Sarbox could cause 
harm simply by misleading the market that regulation can solve its problems. 
In fact, as history has often shown, from the South Sea Bubble to the Great 
Crash,61 frauds manage to stay one step ahead of the regulators. Even if some 
highly sophisticated and nuanced regulation theoretically could increase social 
welfare, it is not likely that this type of reform will arise out of the present 
highly charged political environment. 
 The resulting private and public costs may far exceed any potential 
benefits. Expenses will rise for business for everything from accounting and 
legal fees to a higher cost of capital for multinational corporations unwilling to 
list on American exchanges. Society will have to pay for such administrative 
costs as new governmental oversight and regulation, and such judicial costs 
as indictments, trials, and prison time. Meanwhile, corporate criminals will 
continue to commit white-collar crime – they will just be cleverer and more 
circumspect – while the rest of the world looks at the U.S. in disbelief at its 
high-mindedness. 
nearly $5 million to implement Section 404, according to Financial Executives 
International, with expenditures on consultants, attorneys, audit fees, software, 
and information technology. Ongoing costs for each company will be some 
$1.5 million.54 Compliance with Section 404 requirements will involve 
spending $300 million on process automation solutions.55  The Wall Street 
Journal reports that there is no evidence that Section 404 rules will protect 
investors despite the enormous billing by accounting firms (estimated at 12 
million hours) and internal company efforts (perhaps 120 million hours). This 
survey estimates Section 404 costs at $10 to $13 billion and suggests that the 
promise of Sarbox may create “a false sense of security” for those who may be 
injured by future business frauds.56
wHAT THE U.S. SHOUlD DO
 
 To paraphrase Justice Holmes’s comment noted at the beginning of 
this chapter, bad law can result from anger and revulsion at the criminal acts 
of a few. The then-chairman of the PCAOB, William McDonough, stated 
that “the reason this legislation is so tough is because the American people 
rose in fury.”57 To a large extent, this explains the muted reaction of portions 
of the business community when Sarbox relief is discussed, although some 
corporate leaders have been vocal in their opposition.58 The current position of 
the legislative leaders is silence or continued belief that the costs are justified 
to strengthen American capital markets.59 However, other leaders are worried 
and are preparing studies of the impact of Sarbox on the economy.60
 In the fraud cases, many levels of market and monitoring devices 
simultaneously failed. Proregulatory theorists argue that this demonstrates 
that securities markets cannot be trusted to work on their own without strong 
regulatory support and that the new regulation was needed to restore investor 
confidence. However, we have attempted to show that the case for significantly 
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PART II: 
The Effects of Business Regulation
 After hearing the brief explanation by Sue Lawless of U.S. regulation 
(see Part I), the MegaFi executives are obviously concerned that it might take 
years to gain the necessary approvals to proceed with the Universal Mortgage 
product, at least in America. Seymour, Will, Sue, and the other executives 
wonder if perhaps the company should investigate less onerous regulatory 
environments in other jurisdictions. At least from a distance, they conclude 
that the regulatory model developed by the United Kingdom – that of the 
super regulator – has a great deal of theoretical appeal. This is becoming an 
increasingly popular approach and has been implemented in various major 
countries. 
 The MegaFi executives wonder whether the concept would be 
appropriate for the U.S. and if an industry lobbying effort would be a useful step. 
Of course, they realize that while there have been some efforts at deregulation 
there is still a climate in the U.S. that supports the continued oversight of 
business. They are also concerned about the ability of the U.S. to compete in 
an increasingly global economy. They also question how MegaFi will be able 
to compete against strong global financial companies in the future.
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CHAPTER 7:
 REGUlATIOn: THE fOURTH BRAnCH Of GOvERnmEnT
“Government of the people, by the people, for the people…”
Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865), Gettysburg Address
 In Part I of this book we reviewed five fairly diverse areas of regulation, 
including those pertaining to specific industries and to business in general. In 
order to keep the discussion to a manageable length, we did not attempt to 
comprehensively analyze every area of business oversight that survives early in 
twenty-first-century America; it has been left to others to examine the agencies 
and departments that control communications, energy, and other industries 
that operate under some degree of federal jurisdiction. The areas of regulation 
and the regulator that were discussed are listed in Figure 7-1; others include 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
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necessary at an earlier time may no longer be appropriate to the needs of the 
present. To their everlasting credit, the founders were building for permanence, 
not for temporary emergencies.
 This chapter reviews the development of the American concept of 
regulation; explains the continuing struggle over control between the President 
and Congress, with periodic review by the judiciary; and notes the current 
situation with regard to external changes in industries affected by business 
regulation. We then describe two important areas of regulation – antitrust and 
banking – in other developed societies, in the analysis of comparative global 
experiences.
THE POPUlIST CRISIS
 Regulation assumes that free markets will not function to efficiently 
allocate factors of production and that competition will be subverted to the 
disadvantage of consumers. There have been abundant instances of this 
outcome throughout the history of the U.S.. However, each situation, with the 
exception of banking, has been of a relatively short duration, driven largely by 
an economic emergency that eventually was resolved.
  Presidents and Congressmen cannot wait for cycles to naturally end; if 
they do, people will be without jobs and may starve, there may be a significant 
loss of confidence in the future, the country could become ungovernable, 
and elected officials will be voted out of office. A businessman-engineer like 
Herbert Hoover waits for the inevitable cyclical upswing, does nothing, loses 
his bid for re-election, and is generally considered as one of America’s worst 
presidents. A professional politician like Franklin Roosevelt sees a problem, 
knows that something must be done, does it, and was one of our greatest 
presidents.
 The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was not reviewed in 
Figure 7-1: 
AreAs oF reguLAtion And the FederAL reguLAtor (As 
disCussed in pArt i)
(reguLAtory AgenCies in itALiCs)
Antitrust Department of Justice
Federal Trade Commission
DOJ
FTC
Banking Office of the Comptroller of the Currency OCC
Financial 
Services
Securities and Exchange Commission
Insurance regulated by state commissions
SEC
Airlines Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Authority
DOT
FAA
Corporate 
Governance
Securities and Exchange Commission
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
SEC
PCAOB
REGUlATIOn Of U.S. BUSInESS
 It is highly unlikely that Jefferson, Lincoln, and the other great 
American leaders envisioned regulatory agencies as a fourth branch of 
government, and there certainly is nothing in the Constitution or the Federalist 
Papers that discusses the phenomenon.1 Yet that is precisely what developed 
at times of national crisis, including banking during the Civil War, antitrust 
during the populist movement of the late nineteenth century, financial services 
and the airlines during the Depression, and corporate governance during the 
financial scandals at the turn of the present century. Temporary situations that 
threaten the security of the country must be addressed, but actions that seemed 
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 Regulatory “alphabet soup” was the principal economic pillar of 
the first FDR administration. Agencies such as the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (AAA), the National Recovery Administration (NRA), and the 
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) were among numerous attempts to create 
jobs and raise prices industry and farmers received for their production.7 At 
the beginning of his first administration, FDR encountered the problem that 
the existing regulatory agencies were creatures of Congress and ostensibly 
independent. This does not imply that the President was restrained in his 
attempts to influence policy,8 and in fact, the issue of Congressional versus 
executive control did not receive a hearing until 1935. 
wHO’S In CHARGE, THE PRESIDEnT OR COnGRESS?
 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S.9 decided 
that a regulatory agency was an “administrative body created by Congress to 
carry into effect legislative policies . . . . Such a body cannot in any proper 
sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive.”10  FDR had 
attempted to remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission because of 
policy differences. This conclusion has been widely criticized11 and largely 
ignored by various modern presidents in their attempts to “manage” the goals 
of the regulators.
 The problem of the control over regulatory agencies derives from 
the wording of the Constitution, specifically Article II, which states that “The 
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the U.S. of America” (the 
Vesting Clause) and that “[the President] shall take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed” (the Take Care Clause). Proponents of the supremacy of 
the President use Article II to argue that the power of Congress to divest the 
President of control of the executive branch is limited. Therefore, it may be 
argued that independent regulatory agencies are unconstitutional to the extent 
Part I because it no longer exists. However, it is instructive to note that, after 
banking, the ICC was the first agency characterized by regulatory oversight 
and not a part of an existing cabinet department.2  The paradigm that was 
created ensured that shippers would have access to rail services at standard 
rates as established in a schedule of public tariffs. The ICC was empowered 
to assure reliability and used its Congressional mandate to control entry and 
exit and to regulate rates so that reasonable but not excessive profits would be 
earned by the railroads. 
 This structure continued even though the motor carrier industry became 
a viable competitor to rail after World War I, and in fact, the ICC later created a 
separate regulatory organization for this new transportation mode.3 Following 
populist agitation for relief from the unfair practices of the trusts, Congress 
enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 and two additional laws in 1914 designed 
to assist in the implantation of antitrust policy; these laws were discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
THE GREAT DEPRESSIOn CRISIS
 The next major economic disaster addressed by Congress was the 
Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression.  To avoid 
nationalizing private enterprise, a “solution” that was used in Europe in the 
1930s, or other anticapitalistic measures,4 President Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) 
decided to follow the successes of his cousin Theodore and use free trade 
and regulation to “save” capitalism; see comments on FDR in Chapter 4 with 
regard to financial services. Although it is not generally remembered today, 
FDR’s Secretary of State Cordell Hull was a strong supporter of free trade 
and convinced the President to push the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
of 19345 through Congress, reversing the high tariff barriers enacted in the 
Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930.6  
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financial services industries.
 Regulatory changes through forceful Presidential leadership have 
occurred, usually in times of national emergencies. Action is demanded, and 
it is fortunate that most Presidents have taken the necessary steps to safeguard 
the Republic. During the crisis of the Great Depression, FDR responded with 
pressure on the existing regulatory agencies and the creation of new bodies. 
As Angel Moreno notes, he used such tactics as appointing and removing 
commissioners, jawboning, and public relations to coerce desired behaviors.13 
REGUlATORy CHAnGES SInCE fDR
 An important FDR advisor, Harvard Law School professor and later 
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, persuaded his protégé James Landis 
to come to Washington to assist with the administration’s oversight of business 
practices. Landis arrived in early 1933 when the economy was at its nadir, 
with one-quarter of the labor force unemployed. He and other New Dealers 
conceived the idea of using regulatory agencies to administer the necessary 
policy to resuscitate the economy and prevent future disasters. The vision 
was to create and empower agencies that could respond to the Depression 
unhampered by the slow pace of congressional debate.14 The Humphrey’s 
Executor case provided the agencies sufficient flexibility to accomplish the 
intended independence of action.
THE GROwTH Of THE fOURTH BRAnCH
 The most prominent agency created during the early years of FDR’s 
first term was the SEC, which was conceived as the regulator to prevent stock 
market abuses through increased disclosure and required independent audits. 
The SEC’s first chairman was Joseph P. Kennedy, the father of future President 
that they exercise discretionary executive power and are not controlled by the 
President.
 Critics note that the Constitution grants Congress the exclusive 
power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution ... all ... Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government 
of the U.S., or in any Department or Officer thereof”; that the Constitution 
grants Congress the exclusive power “To make Rules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces”; and that the Constitution specifically 
obligates the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 
Commentators generally refer to the power of Congress to pass laws and to the 
separation of powers as the actual intention of the framers. 
 The issue has never been absolutely resolved by the Supreme Court 
with regard to the regulatory agencies and has been a matter of some debate 
for some time.12  However, it is clear that departments of the executive branch, 
such as the Department of Justice and the Department of Transportation, are 
subject to presidential control, while the independent agencies are creatures of 
Congress but subject to presidential appointment and influence. 
AnSwER TO wHO’S In CHARGE: IT DEPEnDS!
 
  This situation is relevant because the majority of business regulation 
is a creature of the Legislative rather than the executive branch. Once created 
by law, a regulatory agency is substantially independent and generally focuses 
on its narrowly defined mission unless redirected by Congress. The few 
significant legislative changes to regulatory agencies, noted in Part I, included 
the demise of the ICC and the CAB and the expansion of the duties of the SEC to 
include corporate governance. However, it has usually been difficult to interest 
Congress in fixing regulatory problems; as an example, see the comment in 
Chapter 4 regarding the efforts and years required to pass deregulation in the 
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PRESIDEnTIAl STRUGGlES wITH THE fOURTH BRAnCH
 The Presidential struggle to regain the control envisioned by the 
original framers of the Constitution has continued through current times with 
various results. FDR prudently foresaw the more pressing problems of the 
impending world war and limited his requested changes to the assignment 
of budgetary control over the regulators to the executive branch.20 President 
Truman sponsored the appointment of the first Hoover Commission,21 chaired 
by the former President, which ultimately defended the validity of the 
independent agency. A second Hoover Commission was created early in the 
administration of President Eisenhower;22 its findings focused on the need for 
greater federal government coordination. 
 Studies during the Kennedy and Ford Administrations recommended 
that mechanisms be developed for agency coordination rather than basic changes 
in the management structure of the “fourth branch.”23 The tortured history of 
efforts at Presidential control includes procedures stated in executive orders 
and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directives. Every President 
since Nixon has attempted to achieve some degree of supremacy, and the 
devices with the most sustained success have been budgetary control and the 
appointment power of commissioners. When matters do reach the courts, the 
deregulation era tends to favor the executive branch rather than the earlier 
deference to Congress.24
THE PATH TO DEREGUlATIOn
 While Congress has shown limited enthusiasm to address the regulatory 
environment, there has been an important shift in the goals of the regulatory 
agencies. While the original intent was to control the relations of business with 
its customers, the current focus is to promote competition. 
John F. Kennedy. The concept of federal securities regulation received 
public support when Richard Whitney, the president of the New York Stock 
Exchange and a leading opponent of the new regulatory environment, was 
accused of embezzling tens of millions of dollars to cover his debts. Whitney 
was eventually convicted and imprisoned.15 
 Landis later wrote that the concept of the regulatory agency was 
necessary because of “the inadequacy of a simple tripartite form of government 
[Congress, the President, and the courts] to deal with modern problems.”  The 
fourth branch of government – the administrative branch – would be comprised 
of parts of the three other branches (in Landis’s words, “quasi-legislative, 
quasi-executive, quasi-judicial”) to use expert staff in the implementation of 
policy.16 As a result of the exigencies of the 1930s, the regulatory idea vested 
new authority in the existing ICC and FTC and in the new agencies: the 
Federal Power Commission, the SEC, the FCC, the CAB, and the National 
Labor Relations Board. In sum, Congress avoided difficult political issues by 
assigning broad power to regulatory agencies that were able to use and extend 
their powers with relatively scant scrutiny from the courts.17 
 Eventually there was concern about the spreading regulatory umbrella, 
and FDR appointed the Brownlow Committee to review the administration 
of the federal government.18 The final report criticized the independence and 
spread of the regulatory agencies and recommended that the executive branch 
manage their functions. It was in this report that the often-quoted observation 
appeared of regulators as “a headless fourth branch of government” that had 
created “a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated 
powers.”19
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TECHnOlOGy
 Advances in technology have eliminated many of the monopolistic 
attributes of industries regulated by Congress. Although we did not review the 
communications industry in Part I, it has clearly undergone a revolution in nearly 
every aspect. The FCC cannot cope with satellite radio, telephony through the 
Internet, or any of numerous recent technologies. The pace of development has 
forced established service providers to continuously innovate, to create new 
distribution systems, and to merge with or acquire competitors.27
 Technology has similarly altered the airline and the motor carrier 
industries, with new equipment and routes available that significantly reduce 
operational costs while allowing much faster delivery of service. A few 
examples:
The airlines have taken advantage of the enormous expansion of 
airport capacity despite the less dynamic changes to air traffic 
control; see Chapter 6. 
Refinements in motor carrier design and engines allow double- and 
triple-tandem hauls (where permitted by state law), and the Interstate 
Highway System has significantly reduced total travel times. 
Intermodal cooperation – such as piggybacking28 – provides a 
combination of speed, flexibility, and cost efficiencies. 
SURvIvAl AnD GROwTH
 In some situations, participants in a regulated industry have advocated 
deregulation. At times the situation appeared to be sufficiently hopeless that 
deregulation was perceived to be the only alternative; the railroad industry is 
•
•
•
fROm REGUlATIOn TO DEREGUlATIOn
 Movement toward deregulation has been accomplished through three 
general schemes:25
Detariffing – the elimination of the requirement that the regulated 
companies file schedules of rates and service for agency approval
Unbundling – the ending of packages of bundled (linked) product 
groupings, allowing customers to choose specific service elements 
that meet their requirements
Ending cross-subsidies – the practice of subsidizing certain 
customers who might pay less than the average cost for their services 
by fees paid by supposedly wealthier customers, thereby moving 
closer to the economists’ objective of pricing at marginal cost26
These initiatives mean that the regulator is now expected to intervene only 
when the markets do not demonstrate competitive behavior.
 This is significant progress on the path to deregulation and in some 
ways reflects the shifts in the marketplace faced by businesses both in the U.S. 
and throughout the globe. Legislators who enacted regulation seven or more 
decades ago could not have anticipated the speed of the changes in technology, 
the intensity of the struggle for survival and growth, and opportunities in 
international markets. A comment on the first two of these influences follows; 
the discussion of global competition will be deferred to Chapter 10.
•
•
•
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(yet). 
 While the U.S. has been a leading advocate of regulation, other 
nations have had similar histories. Selected experiences and attitudes may be 
instructive in considering appropriate policy. Other than banking, the oldest 
and most influential American regulatory “products” are antitrust and financial 
services. How do our friendly competing regional economies or nations handle 
these regulatory issues? 
AnTITRUST In EUROPE
 Europe borrowed various American ideas in its struggle to recover 
from the devastation of World War II.  Although the concept of a common 
market and later a European Economic Community was not envisioned by 
the various nations at war’s end,36 the Western European nations eventually 
signed the Treaty of Rome that led to the current-day European Union (EU).37 
The treaty included agreements on the competitive behavior of companies and 
the anticompetitive actions of member nations such as providing subsidies 
to local businesses.38 European antitrust is similar to American law39 and is 
embedded in the laws of the EU and in the laws of the various countries. In 
most situations, the EU takes precedence.40
 The curious but perhaps predictable course of enforcement by the 
EU has been largely doctrinaire without much evidence of “rule of reason” 
thinking based on injury to consumers. At least a portion of the explanation for 
this outcome is that enforcement is through a large EU bureaucracy that does 
not answer to voters or even to national governments. Some commentators also 
suggest that the European attitude may be simply because of the need to create 
a strong, controlling position regardless of American policy or considerations 
of what constitutes a logical approach to assuring competitive behavior.41  The 
attitude of the European regulators in two situations is revealing. In the proposed 
a leading example.29 Regulatory failure was often blamed for the problems of 
that industry,30 and the railroads believed that they needed freedom to abandon 
unprofitable service and to raise rates. As a result, they actively participated in 
the drafting of legislation on deregulation.31 
 Similarly, after the dissolution of the Bell system,32 the new regional 
Bell operating companies (RBOCs) actively supported deregulation so as to be 
allowed to enter markets proclaimed off-limits. Various methods of political 
persuasion were used, including pressure on the Department of Justice, lobbying 
of Congress and the FCC, and further litigation.33  The Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 permitted the RBOCs to enter businesses from which they had 
been excluded in the 1982 order, including long-distance and equipment 
manufacturing.34  
 Other market participants such as cable television and radio 
broadcasters also influenced the 1996 Act. This list can be expanded to include 
companies in the energy business endorsing the Energy Policy Act of 1992;35 
the banking industry (except for community banks who feared for their 
existence) in anticipation of the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994; and the financial 
services industries that supported the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. 
SElECTED GlOBAl REGUlATORy ExPERIEnCES
 While the situation with regard to business regulation has evolved 
to a less vigorous posture, the fact is that the agencies continue to exist and 
the laws remain on the statute books. It is unlikely that the regulators would 
be oblivious to political pressure or public opinion in making decisions on 
when to take action. However, there is no assurance that a new executive or 
Congress will not change direction and try to reinstitute 1930s-era controls. 
For example, the recent near-chaotic conditions in the airline industry could 
have led to a call to reinstate the CAB; fortunately, that has not happened 
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experience and created a Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) with weak 
enforcement powers (as was likely MacArthur’s intention). The early years 
saw few actions against business, and policy was reversed in the 1950s when 
the Western allies saw the Soviet threat to the Pacific region as a reason to 
develop an economically strong ally. The result was weak antitrust policy, 
which continued for the next four decades.
 From the period of rebuilding and growth, beginning in about 1950 
and continuing through the mid-1980s, the Japanese economy experienced 
growth rates of about10 percent a year. It became common wisdom in the 
West that Japan would become a serious rival to the U.S.. However, various 
scandals, poor investment decisions, questionable lending practices, and the 
inevitability of the business cycle led to an end to Japanese prosperity.49 By 
the beginning of the 1990s, the economy fell into a deep recession that may 
be finally ending in 2007 Symptoms have included massive deflation; a drop 
in the Nikkei stock index from 39,000 to 11,000 (now nearly 17,000 late in 
2007); a continuous decline in land prices in large cities; and the growth of 
government debt to 170 percent of gross domestic product (as compared with 
50 percent in the U.S.).
 The JFTC is the sole agency that enforces antitrust. As it does not 
have cabinet rank, other agencies like the Ministry of Finance are perceived as 
more important with regard to economic policy. Typical regulatory functions 
are assigned to the agency, such as investigating suspected violations, holding 
hearings on these incidents, calculating damages to be paid to the government 
in satisfaction of illegal behavior, and notifying the public prosecutor of 
the JFTC’s intention to bring criminal charges. Damages are assessed as 
“surcharges,” the statutory procedure to seize unfair profits from offending 
companies. However, unlike in the U.S., the amount of damages is set by 
regulatory schedule and may be far below a company’s actual anticompetitive 
gains.50
GE-Honeywell merger, companies headquartered in the U.S. were approved to 
proceed by the American regulators while the Europeans disapproved.42 
 In the Microsoft case (see the discussion in Chapter 2), the second 
U.S. district court resolved the case with minimal penalties, while the EU 
has pursued significantly more stringent remedies.43 The situation continues 
to unfold, with recent testimony from both sides to the European Court of 
First Instance to the effect that portions of the European Commission’s remedy 
announced have been a complete failure. Microsoft was ordered to remove its 
Media Player from Windows XP but has seen almost no computer manufacturer 
or consumer interest in the resulting product. Microsoft continues to challenge 
the requirement that it disclose technical information to competitors on the 
grounds that this would breach its rights to valuable intellectual property.44
AnTITRUST In JAPAn
 Following World War II, the American occupying authorities ordered 
General Douglas MacArthur to end the zaibatsu, or cartels, which had 
controlled Japan’s economy before the war.45 The U.S. Departments of State 
and Justice, supported by President Truman, determined that these cartels 
had been strong supporters of the militaristic prewar government and major 
beneficiaries of war-related industrial production and that they prevented the 
formation of a middle class that was an essential requirement of a peacetime 
economy.46 Although MacArthur feared the possibility that this action would 
destabilize the postwar recovery, he eventually agreed to demand that the Diet 
(parliament) pass a weak law on competition.47 As a result, the zaibatsu were 
simply replaced by the keiretsu, large companies that practiced cooperation 
through cross-shareholding to dominate the Japanese economy in the years 
after the war.
 The Antimonopoly Act (AMA)48 followed American legislative 
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Act of 1986.57 The legislation drew heavily from the SEC regulatory model in 
the U.S. and, among other things, eliminated fixed commissions. Furthermore, 
the separation of brokers and dealers was removed in favor of competing 
market makers. 
 Another series of scandals led to calls for further reform. These incidents 
included Robert Maxwell’s problems, the BCCI debacle, and several insider 
trading cases. The crisis at Barings Bank then precipitated more legislation, 
which created the Financial Services Authority (FSA-UK) in 1997.58 In 1998 
the agency was given the authority to oversee the banks, taking that power away 
from the Bank of England, and it eventually became a governmental super 
regulator for the financial services, from securities, banking, and insurance.59 
The FSA-UK was also provided with expanded enforcement powers that 
included the right to bring actions against violators and impose sanctions.60 
 Several steps were taken to unify regulation. First, a single ombudsman 
was to be created by the agency to handle complaints by customers in all 
sectors of public finance, as opposed to the various hotlines and websites for 
federal and state agencies in the U.S.. The FSA-UK replaced six separate 
insurance funds with a single Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
(“FSCS”), which provides customers with compensation in the event of the 
insolvency of a financial service firm. This sharply contrasts with the U.S. 
system that spreads responsibility among the FDIC and separates funds for 
insurance companies, thrift institutions, credit unions, and pension funds. 
 The FSA-UK is also seeking publication of comparative information 
disclosure for a range of financial instruments that would allow more informed 
investment decisions. The agency assigned one office to develop policy on 
issues across all financial sectors to develop a common approach to risk and 
capital requirements. There has been no comparable effort in the U.S., where 
there are separate capital requirements for insurance companies, banks, broker-
dealers, and commodities futures. 
 The relatively puny enforcement of antitrust in Japan can be attributed 
to three significant factors: the continuing dominance of the keiretsu, including 
the concept of interlocking ownership of industrial companies and banking; 
the mild enforcement procedures granted to the JFTC; and the cultural 
preference of Japanese society to avoid legal situations and litigation.51 The 
recent recession has lessened the power of the keiretsu and has led to efforts 
by the Japanese government to increase efforts to bring real competition into 
the country.
 Antitrust in Japan is globally perceived as largely ineffective, and the 
country is considered as one of the least hospitable to foreign business. Despite 
the recent recession, few specific measures have been pursued to encourage 
competition. Statements from government officials indicate official interest in 
the situation,52 but many Western businesspeople continue to complain about 
closed markets and favoritism toward local companies.53
fInAnCIAl SERvICES REGUlATIOn In BRITAIn
 For much of their history, financial institutions in Great Britain relied 
on self-regulation and the potentially unpleasant result of official disapproval. 
The Bank of England’s regulatory role was also as the central bank and lender 
of last resort. A more formal bank regulatory system was introduced in the 
Banking Act 1979, which was in turn replaced by a strengthened Banking Act 
1987.54 The insurance industry was largely controlled by Lloyd’s of London, 
and although shaken by scandals in the 1970s, it continued to rely on self-
regulation. This failed to prevent further scandals or the losses that came from 
a series of disasters in the 1980s.55
 The moralistic regulatory approach of the London Stock Exchange was 
questioned after a series of scandals that began in the 1970s in the securities 
markets,56 leading to corrective legislation in the form of the Financial Services 
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 To deal with this situation, various steps were taken. The Japanese 
Diet (parliament) enacted the Financial Reform Act of 1992, which authorized 
the establishment of capital requirements for banks and created a Securities 
Exchange and Surveillance Commission (SESC) as the regulator of the securities 
markets. An attempt at further reform occurred in 1996 through a “Japanese 
Big Bang” (similar to the earlier ones in the U.S. and UK) that deregulated 
Japan’s financial services. The plan allowed banks, insurance companies, 
and brokerage firms to compete with each other without the restrictions that 
had kept these activities separate.64 The government also announced a plan to 
deal with the massive amount of nonperforming debt in the economy and to 
dissolve bankrupt companies. 
 In 2000, the SESC and other supervisory agencies were succeeded 
by the Financial Services Agency (FSA-Japan).65  Some concern has been 
expressed that all of these reforms may not have accomplished very much. 
FSA-Japan lacks strong enforcement mechanisms and is only an investigative 
agency with no authority to impose sanctions. When FSA-Japan has attempted 
to take aggressive action by suggesting bad debt write-offs, many medium-sized 
and smaller companies went bankrupt. Various large banks were supported by 
the government, and the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and the Nippon 
Credit Bank were nationalized after these institutions could no longer be kept 
afloat. 
 Significant problems continue in monitoring the behavior of financial 
securities companies. For example, Japanese legislators are demanding stricter 
monitoring over stock trading after the head of Internet startup Livedoor was 
arrested on suspicion of violating securities laws. The Livedoor situation has 
led to calls for the creation of a regulator with powers equivalent to those in 
the American SEC, particularly due to a major Tokyo stock market sell-off,in 
January 2006. Prosecutors have charged the chief executive officer Takafumi 
Horie with violations of various securities laws including spreading false 
 In developing its regulatory approach, the FSA-UK is focusing 
on high-risk firms while requiring other firms to report and to comply 
with standards of conduct stated in its rulebook. The agency, like the 
SEC, has placed heavy emphasis on the supervisory responsibilities of 
senior corporate managers and has begun a program of enforcement 
actions, imposing fines and banning the guilty from trading in London. 
fInAnCIAl SERvICES REGUlATIOn In JAPAn
 As noted in the section on antitrust in Japan, General MacArthur 
demanded changes to various Japanese laws and business practices, 
including laws on antitrust and on financial services. A Securities 
Commission for the Supervision of the Securities Business was established 
by law, largely derived from the American SEC.61 Banks became members 
of the keiretsu, described earlier, and the central bank became the 
Bank of Japan while the Ministry of Finance managed financial policy. 
 Unlike the relative balance of policymaking through the Congress, the 
President, and the Federal Reserve, the Japanese Ministry of Finance became 
the dominant component of financial planning and regulation, leaving only a 
limited role to the Bank of Japan and abandoning aspects of the MacArthur-era 
attempt at opening markets to Western capitalism. The financial exchanges 
and the Japanese Securities Dealers Association also provided some minimal 
regulatory oversight.62  
 However, poor bank lending and investment practices and the extended 
economic recession beginning in the late 1980s led to serious crises in financial 
services. Most of Japan’s largest banks have had capital shortages that compromise 
their ability to meet the Basel Committee’s guidelines for international banks.63 
Yamaichi Securities, the fourth largest securities firm in Japan, failed and for a 
time was supported by the Bank of Japan and later purchased by Merrill Lynch. 
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are publicly traded will use “regulatory arbitrage” to seek the least intrusive 
opportunities to raise capital.69 In sum, nothing from international experience 
changes the conclusions reached in Part I that the U.S. should end all business 
regulation except for protections for consumers and the environment.
information.66
 On a positive note, the agency has been seeking greater public 
disclosures from firms with difficult financial circumstances. It raised its bank 
capital adequacy threshold for intervention and correction, although Japanese 
banks are still well below the Basel minimum international standard.67 FSA-
Japan increased regulatory controls over the insurance industry following some 
well-publicized insurance firm failures. Barriers to entry are being reduced, 
allowing some foreign competition in insurance.
wHAT THE U.S. SHOUlD DO
 Business regulation has followed various routes over the centuries, 
from a policy of lax enforcement (Japan) to official displeasure (Great 
Britain) through a review of potential offenders (the U.S.) through stringent 
restraint (the European Union). Interestingly, the general concept of regulation 
seems largely to be a creature of U.S. experience as exported to our allies 
and competitors.68 However, the American requirement to set limits on the 
behavior of business has diminished as economic emergencies have ended, 
and this country finds itself in the difficult position of trying to compete in 
the global economy. The only appropriate regulatory model appears to be the 
British FSA, which has taken a consolidated approach to financial services, 
focusing on risky situations that could lead to systemic failure. 
 The U.S. and Japan are largely unsuccessful when considering the 
requirements of twenty-first-century business, while European regulators 
appear to have lost touch with the idea of sensible remedies for problems 
in commerce. This issue has reached a critical moment with the merger of 
the NYSE and Euronext, as there is no formal mechanism for monitoring 
exchanges that cross national boundaries. While there will be a greater sharing 
of information among officials of governments and exchanges, companies that 
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CHAPTER 8: 
ESSEnTIAl GlOBAl REGUlATIOn – 
THE fInAnCIAl mARkETS
 This is the grass that grows wherever the land is and the water is,
This is the common air that bathes the globe.
Walt Whitman (1819–1892), “Song of Myself” 
 In Chapter 7 we reviewed some of the history and outcomes attributable to regulation in the U.S. and in other developed 
economies. Included in the discussion was the current role of the European 
Union in antitrust, which is an interesting situation where a regional economy 
has largely preempted the oversight responsibilities of its member nations. 
Some observers have begun to seriously consider the ramifications of this 
“weakening” of national sovereignty and how the rule of law, particularly 
business law and regulation, may be affected in the future.1  This chapter 
examines the sovereignty issue with regard to the regulation of business and 
then considers international arrangements that are providing governance in the 
situation of the financial services industries.
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Figure 8-1: 
internAtionAL orgAnizAtions
Name
Date 
Created
Purpose
Global Banking Organizations
Bank for 
International 
Settlements (BIS)
1930* Fosters cooperation among central banks, 
international financial institutions, and 
governments
International 
Monetary Fund 
(IMF)
1944 Fosters stable foreign exchange arrangements; 
supports balance-of-payments equilibria; assists 
countries experiencing financial crises
World Bank 1944 Provides loans and grants to developing 
countries to enable development of infrastructure
Organization 
for Economic 
Cooperation and 
Development 
(OECD) (preceded 
by the Organization 
for European 
Economic Co-
operation in 1947)
1961 Promotes economic development among 
member nations; develops model legislation on 
international trade
World Trade 
Organization 
(WTO) (preceded 
by the General 
Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade in 
1947)
1995 Negotiates reduction and elimination of tariffs 
and other trade barriers; mediates trade disputes
SOvEREIGnTy AnD InTERnATIOnAlISm
 The territorial boundary is a basic premise of law that enables 
governments to define appropriate conduct within its defined area.2  Affairs 
between countries have historically been managed by treaties and agreements, 
sometimes involving multiple signatories and sometimes only a few, sometimes 
reached openly and sometimes secretly, but inevitably based on the concept of 
a community of sovereign states.  However, the system of national sovereignty 
failed to prevent international crises by early in the twentieth century, and 
President Woodrow Wilson and other world leaders decided to initiate the 
formation of new procedures to mediate global problems. 
A wORlD vIEw BECOmES A nECESSITy
 The creation of the League of Nations and its rejection by the U.S. 
Senate is a story too well known to justify retelling here.3 Following the 
hostilities of World War II and to honor the memory of President Franklin 
Roosevelt, the allies formed the United Nations (UN), a permanent institution 
to resolve global conflicts. Other transnational organizations created at about 
that time included the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1944, the World 
Bank in 1944, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, and the 
European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, the predecessor of the European 
Union; see Figure 8-1 for an explanation of the activities of various political 
and economic agencies created as a result of World Wars I and II.
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largely by fear of the Soviet Union, the American tradition of isolationism was 
effectively replaced by global activism. 
 Some of the decisions led to happy results, for example, the work of 
certain UN agencies such as UNESCO; and some resulted in tragic outcomes, 
for example, the SEATO pact which ultimately led to the American involvement 
in Vietnam.4 As the U.S. and other countries have progressed through the past 
half century, the successful international organizations have gained important 
positions of oversight, significantly improving the prospects for peace and 
economic security.
 It is remarkable that these organizations have largely overcome past 
mistakes and inept decision-making. For example, the IMF has learned a great 
deal about developing country loans and has moved away from requiring 
stringent austerity measures as a condition for funding.5  The UN has made 
various errors in managing its numerous programs, but seems to be learning 
from its mistakes and now appears to be functioning more efficiently.6 The 
WTO has been made to understand the necessity for providing a forum for 
the demands of poorer countries, and although the lesson was taught through 
violent protests, its discussions now extend beyond tariffs and trade barriers.7
nATIOnAl InTERESTS AnD TwEnTy-fIRST-CEnTURy REAlITIES
 Despite movement toward international business regulation, existing 
nation-state legislation remains, largely outdated and ineffective. It disregards 
the realities of global competition; the fact of free trade and people movement 
in the nations of the EU; the ascendancy of the multinational corporation; 
technological advances in computers, telecommunications, and e-commerce; 
international capital flows; and other dynamic changes in the twenty-first-
century economic structure. It further ignores the process of cooperation, 
bargaining, and partnering that must and does occur to achieve important goals, 
Name
Date 
Created
Purpose
Regional Economies
Association of 
Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)
1967 Promotes economic growth among member 
nations; expects China to join
European Union 
(EU) (preceded 
by the European 
Coal and Steel 
Community in 
1951 and the 
European Economic 
Community in 
1958)
1994 Establishes economic policy for member 
nations; abolished trade barriers; operates central 
bank (except for non-euro countries)
North American 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
(NAFTA)
1994 Operates free trade area among member nations
Other
North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization 
(NATO)
1949 Assures military security of member nations
*The U.S. became a member in 1994.
 The defining event that imposed control by these and other organizations 
was almost certainly World War II. Americans can probably appreciate the 
global demand for improved international problem-solving mechanisms, but 
it is only those countries that experienced years of war’s devastation on their 
own soil that could not imagine reverting to the older, failed system of national 
sovereignty and international alliances.  To the credit of the U.S. and driven 
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capital controls
Greater exchange rate flexibility or the reestablishment of stable, 
even fixed, rates between currencies
More forceful responses by the international community to economic 
crises or a laissez-faire approach to economic crises
Revisions to the mission of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
through more funding and charter and governance changes, or the 
creation of a super-world central bank like the European Central 
Bank or the Federal Reserve with powers to root out corruption and 
compel countries to install the institutional prerequisites for stable 
financial markets
ASSUmPTIOnS ABOUT THE GlOBAl fInAnCIAl SySTEm
 Five assumptions are made concerning the operation of the international 
financial system:
1. The Deregulation of Financial Markets. Global financial markets 
should continue to deregulate while encouraging prudent lending and 
investing decisions. The actions of open markets support savings and 
efficient investment allocation while allowing rational consumption 
decisions and portfolio diversification. In the past, developing countries 
and banks often stifled financial transactions and directed credit decisions 
to unfortunate outcomes.
2. The Global Mobility of Capital. International financial liberalization 
and growth in the flow of capital are inevitable and irreversible. Domestic 
•
•
•
including the convergence of policies toward accepted outcomes regarding the 
environment, health issues, protection of human rights, and other basic global 
expectations.8
 As Part I of this book explains, business regulation is not required 
in most situations, and substituting bureaucratic decision-making for the 
market economy inevitably leads to poorer results. In traditional concepts 
of regulation, decisions are based on narrow industry definitions and vague 
statutes that are subject to judicial interpretation following years of litigation. 
For those businesses where such control is deemed essential, the complexity 
and speed of today’s economic environment require a dynamic, global approach 
to oversight.
THE SPECIAl CASE Of THE fInAnCIAl mARkETS
 The financial markets are among the most significant sectors requiring 
regulation because of their fiduciary role9 and the potential for the failure of 
the economic system (often referred to as systemic failure). Therefore, we 
next turn to a review of global (vs. national) actions to stabilize banking and 
the securities markets. The concept of free markets and an unrestricted flow 
of capital in global markets must be tempered by concern for the crises that 
have occurred throughout the world in recent decades, from South America 
to Southeast Asia. Countries are increasingly at the mercy of global financial 
markets, yet many observers complain that little has been done to strengthen 
international economic institutions.10 Suggested “fixes” range from incremental 
to significant reforms, including those made by several national governments 
and international committees. Some of these proposals are contradictory and 
mutually incompatible:
Liberalization of international capital markets or the imposition of •
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InTERnATIOnAl BAnkInG
 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) provides a venue for 
national bank supervisors and regulators to pool their expertise and develop 
international standards for bank regulation. Prompted primarily by the 
failure of the Herstatt Bank,13 the Basel Committee of the BIS (consisting of 
representatives from the bank supervisory authorities of the major industrial 
countries) began in 1975 to develop the Basel Capital Accord (Basel I), which 
was eventually adopted in 1988. International bank signatories agreed to hold 
their institutions to minimal capital requirements of 8 percent of risk-weighted 
assets.
BASEl I AnD II
 The 1995 Market Risk Amendment permitted banks to use their 
proprietary models to calculate correlations among and within broad risk 
categories (such as interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, and equity price risk) 
in order to come up with more economically sophisticated risk weights, and 
the 1997 Core Principles for surveillance of banking and financial systems 
identify five categories of standards for sound supervision and regulation. 
The weight for each class of asset ranges from zero (for assets thought to be 
very safe, such as the government debt of developed countries) to 100 percent 
(for unsecured loans to consumers and companies). In practice, the rules vary 
slightly across countries: in Japan, for example, shares in other firms can 
be counted as capital, and the minimum capital ratio for banks that are not 
internationally active is only 4 percent.
 The capital of American banks is now 13 percent of risk-weighted 
assets, up from 10 percent in 1990 (vs. the Basel minimum of 8 percent). Banks 
have improved their risk management partly by passing credit and market risks 
and international capital flows are being driven by powerful changes in 
information and communications technologies that make restrictions on 
financial transactions unlikely to succeed.
3. The Dissemination of Capital Market Information.  Although the 
efficient market hypothesis would conclude otherwise,11  imperfect 
distribution of information can give rise to overshooting and sharp 
corrections. Some of the relevant “data,” such as whether a government 
will follow through on reform and maintain its commitment to monetary 
and fiscal discipline, are unavoidably based on opinion and conjecture as 
much as hard evidence. This encourages investors to draw inferences from 
one another’s actions and to move in a herd. 
4. Financial Market Safeguards. A system of market guarantees is 
essential despite the moral hazard that may result.12 History shows the need 
for deposit insurance and a lender of last resort to contain systemic risks 
to financial systems; see Chapter 3. To be sure, provision of this safety net 
encourages market participants to take on additional risk, heightening the 
need for vigorous supervision and regulation of the recipient institutions. 
5. Where Economics Meets Politics. Economic policy is framed in 
a political environment. It cannot be assumed that regulators and other 
economic policymakers will carry out their tasks without allowing 
themselves to be influenced by political considerations. To the contrary, 
lobbying and pressure politics inevitably shape the policies that are 
pursued. Realistic strategies require acknowledging these pressures and 
not assuming that policymaking institutions such as the lMF can be made 
to follow rigid apolitical rules. 
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THE CURREnT BAnkInG EnvIROnmEnT
 Banks have become more resilient to unexpected economic or credit 
problems. These days they are a much less important source of corporate 
finance than they used to be, so they are less exposed to a downturn in the 
economy. In America, the largest financial institutions now supply 20 percent 
less of the money that companies raise each year than just a decade ago and 
far less than in other countries.17  Bigger companies are increasingly likely 
to tap the capital markets, which are far deeper in the U.S. than in Europe 
or Asia. Much of American banks’ recent success is due to their increased 
ability at managing this basic function of transferring capital from savers to 
borrowers. However, figures from the Federal Reserve show that large banks 
began tightening their credit standards and imposing more stringent terms well 
before the start of the most recent recession.18
 As well as improving their reading of the economic forecasting, banks 
have become adept at diffusing the risk of their loans through a variety of 
risk management techniques. Mortgages, for example, are often securitized,19 
taking them off the books of the originating banks. The repeal of laws restricting 
banks’ geographic movement (the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994) has allowed them 
to enter every state, making them less exposed to local economic problems. 
The repeal of prohibitions on commercial and investment bank activity in the 
same institution (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999) has permitted the use 
of capital in profitable and potentially higher yielding activities.
CURREnT ACTIvITIES In GlOBAl fInAnCIAl CRISIS mAnAGEmEnT
 Despite calls for change,20 the current system of global regulation 
and control appears to be working. National governments and international 
financial institutions must continue to encourage the identification and 
on to other parts of the financial system, such as other banks, insurers, pension 
funds, and hedge funds. These recipients have been perfectly happy to accept 
those risks, and many of them even understood what they were doing. These 
transfers are through various derivative instruments (such as calls, puts, and 
swaps) and by the outright sale of assets.
  However, U.S. and international financial regulators worry that they 
can no longer see where risks end up. When the tech-stock bubble burst in 
2000–2001 and America’s economy turned down, no one really knew what 
had happened to the risks that would once have been borne mainly by banks. 
The best guess is that the pain was spread broadly across the financial system, 
with no single big institution bearing a dangerously large share of the burden, 
which is what derivatives are supposed to do.
 The Basel I rules changed in 2007 with a new accord, Basel II.14 By the 
turn of the millennium, big banks’ risk-management systems became far more 
sophisticated than required under Basel I. Moreover, Basel I had an unintended 
consequence: its weights did not match the market assessment of the risks that 
banks faced. As a result, banks indulged in regulatory arbitrage,15 disposing 
of risks for which Basel I required more capital than the market did, such 
as credit-card debt or residential mortgages, and retaining assets for which 
the market demanded more capital than the regulators did. The rise in banks’ 
capital-adequacy ratios reflects this process as well as better risk management. 
Basel II is intended to bring regulatory capital requirements more into line 
with actual risk and to reflect improvements in the best banks’ practices. Banks 
will use complex mathematical models to evaluate the necessary cushion to 
avoid financial market shocks.16
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o The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, created by 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to oversee the auditors of public 
companies in order to protect the interests of investors and the public 
interest; see www.pcaobus.org.
Bankruptcy
o Committee J of the International Bar Association to develop a 
model insolvency code to guide countries seeking to reform and 
update their bankruptcy laws; see www.ibanet.org/committees/SBL-
Jsubs2.asp.
o The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) has adopted a model law on the treatment of cross-
border insolvencies; see www.uncitral.org.
Corporate governance
o The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) reported on global principles of corporate governance, 
focusing on the accountability of management, disclosure and 
transparency, and communication with shareholders; see www.oecd.
org.‡
o The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) 
to improve global standards of business management and 
accountability; see www.icgn.org.
o The Cadbury Committee on Corporate Governance to require 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange to state in their 
accounts whether or not the code had been followed; see www.
indiainfoline.com/nevi/cadb.html.
•
•
adoption of international standards for minimally acceptable practice 
governing bank supervision and regulation, securities market operation and 
oversight, accounting and auditing practices, and insolvency or bankruptcy 
codes. International organizations are already active in a number of these areas 
to identify standards or to coordinate the process through which others agree to 
them; see Figure 8-2.
Figure 8-2: 
seLeCted oversight ACtivities oF 
gLobAL FinAnCiAL mArkets
Access to capital markets
o A Special Data Dissemination Standard (established by the IMF) 
to provide economic and financial information by countries seeking 
to access international capital markets. A code of fiscal transparency 
has been promulgated to be adopted as a standard of good fiscal 
practice by its member countries, and it anticipates developing an 
accompanying code for monetary and financial practices; see www.
dsbb.imf.org.
Accounting
o The International Accounting Standards Board consisting of 
representatives of the accounting profession from more than 100 
countries to promulgate international accounting standards; see 
www.iasb.org.
o The International Federation of Accountants (see www.ifac.org) 
and the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (see 
www.intosai.org) to formulate international auditing standards.
•
•
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banking system, stock market, or public debt management and 
when their scramble for the exits brings the financial system and the 
currency crashing down. As of early 2006, no country appeared to 
be in this situation; however, see the comments on past Mexican and 
South Korean crises in the sections that follow.
These occurrences often result from sudden reactions by market participants to 
new information or new interpretations of old information. Prevention could be 
accomplished by placing markets in a state-sponsored regulatory straitjacket. 
However, severe repression means forgoing the benefits of domestic financial 
liberalization and the suboptimal assignment of scarce factors of production. 
Mismanaged economies and the resulting financial crises are so destructive to 
capitalism that most countries and lenders are now behaving responsibly.23 The 
unrealistic monetary or fiscal expansion or the loss of confidence in financial 
institutions could occur, but global discipline imposed by international agencies, 
lenders, and investors appear to be providing the constraints necessary for the 
avoidance of a major calamity.
REACTInG TO CRISES
 International capital mobility has all but erased the line between the 
domestic and international financial systems. This makes it impossible to “fix” 
the international economic system without also “fixing” the domestic financial 
system. As a result, retaining business confidence means assuring the stability 
of domestic financial systems through transparency in operations, adequate 
supervision and regulation of financial institutions, and appropriate auditing 
and accounting procedures. 
Global macroeconomic issues
o Group of Eight (G-8) or Group of Seven (G-7)
Securities markets
o Securities and Exchange Commission (U.S.)
o Committee of European Securities Regulators (Europe)
‡Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
Corporate Governance: Improving Competitiveness and Access to 
Capital in Global Markets, Paris, 1998.
fORECASTInG A CRISIS
 The prevention of a future financial crisis is a critical element in global 
financial regulation. Such a crisis could occur in various forms.
Some countries will continue to experience old-fashioned 
balance-of-payments crises as a result of pursuing excessively 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies that are incompatible 
with their exchange rate commitments.21 Their currencies will grow 
increasingly overvalued, their current-account deficits will widen, 
and their international reserves will fall to the danger point when a 
crisis erupts. Ironically, the country with the greatest exposure to this 
type of crisis is undoubtedly the U.S., with its 2006 current account 
deficit of about $725 billion!22
Other nations will experience crises driven by domestic financial-
sector weaknesses and international capital flows. In those cases, 
a panic will erupt when investors lose confidence in the country’s 
•
•
•
•
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SUGGESTED BAnkInG CHAnGES
 The two remaining issues in managing global financial crises are 
discussed below: managing bankruptcies and managing the use of derivatives. 
Neither of these concerns is likely to cause a systemic risk, and both can be 
addressed through mechanisms that exist and are adaptable to the requirements 
of global financial systems.
mAnAGInG BAnkRUPTCIES
 A number of modest steps might realistically be taken to make 
international debt restructuring a viable option through practices that parallel 
those in the corporate debt markets. Majority voting and sharing clauses 
could be added to loan contracts. This would prevent isolated creditors from 
resorting to lawsuits and other means of obstructing settlements that improve 
the welfare of the debtor and the vast majority of creditors. Other desirable 
changes to loan contracts include collective representation clauses (making 
provision for an indentured trustee to represent and coordinate the creditors in 
the case of sovereign debts); and clauses providing that a minimum percentage 
of bondholders must agree for legal action to be taken. 
 The addition of such clauses to bond contracts is the only practical way 
of creating an environment conducive to flexible restructuring negotiations. It 
can be done by legislators and regulators in the U.S. and UK, the principal 
markets in which international bonds are issued and traded, without ceding 
any jurisdiction or authority to a global agency. This approach is infinitely 
more realistic than imagining the creation of some kind of world bankruptcy 
court for sovereign debts that is empowered to establish settlement terms.
In a crisis, the global community can either run to the rescue or stand 
aside:
Run to the rescue of the country in crisis. For example, at the end of 
1994, Mexico had $28 billion of short-term debt but only $6 billion 
of international reserves. Given the obvious inability to service its 
existing obligations, Mexico would either default, risking its global 
credit standing for decades, or have to find a willing angel. The U.S. 
realized that NAFTA and the economic (and possibly political) future 
of its southern neighbor would be jeopardized and arranged with the 
IMF for adequate credits to redeem maturing loans at full value.
 The situation in South Korea was similar, as the sudden 
realization in 1997 of the possibility of default caused foreign 
creditors to withdraw their deposits in South Korean banks. With the 
decline of reserves to about $5 billion below debt obligations, the 
U.S. and the IMF felt compelled to lend sufficient funds to stabilize 
the country’s precarious financial situation. Geopolitics was a critical 
factor in the decision to support the country, particularly given the 
continuing threat from North Korea. Incidentally, following these 
two crises, the IMF was subjected to some criticism for bailing out 
governments and international investors.24 
Stand aside and let nature run its course. For example, in the summer 
of 1998, Russia devalued the ruble and suspended debt service 
payments, with devastating impacts on the Russian economy and 
global financial markets. Confidence was destroyed; the country’s 
access to international capital markets was curtailed; and financial 
markets were roiled in East Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, 
and even Europe and the U.S.. However, no bailout occurred and the 
situation eventually settled down.
•
•
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SECURITIES mARkET OPERATIOn AnD REGUlATIOn
 Changes in the legislative and regulatory oversight of global securities 
markets have actually been underway for some time. Beginning with the 
May Day 1975 ending of fixed brokerage commissions (see Chapter 4), the 
American markets have been forced to learn to compete with global, electronic 
markets through a variety of completed and contemplated actions. A partial list 
is summarized below; see Figure 8-3 for an explanation of these changes.
Discount and Internet trading of securities for institutions and 
individuals
Changes to clearing and settlement practices and timing
A global shift to public ownership of stock exchanges
The use of decimalization rather than fractions to make pricing fairer 
for buyers and sellers of stocks and bonds
Changes to the executive management structure of the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
Actions to end the specialist system at the NYSE 
Electronic order–matching for nearly all exchanges except the NYSE
Movement toward de facto globalization of the securities markets 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
mAnAGInG DERIvATIvE RISk
 There has been a dramatic increase in the use of credit derivatives, 
especially credit-default swaps (insurance against the risk of default), which 
have been bought overwhelmingly by large international banks. In 2005, 
American banks held more than $500 billion of credit-default insurance; on 
the other side, they were guarantors of almost $400 billion-worth. Until the 
mid-1990s, this market barely existed. The effect of all this has been to reduce 
the impact of corporate defaults on the U.S. banking system.25
 By early 2004, banks had more than $70 trillion worth of derivatives 
on their books,26 which is twice the amount of five years ago. Much of the 
activity is designed to protect the value of the mortgages they hold. Although 
there has been ample evidence of the likelihood of rising interest rates, the 
concern is that derivatives could result in significant losses, particularly as 
these contracts take time to unwind. The 1994 increase in rates wreaked havoc 
on banks’ securities holdings, incurring a significant loss in portfolio values. 
 Similar strains are starting to reappear, including the subprime credit 
crisis in mid-year 2007, although banks are loath to talk about their use of 
derivatives before they have to do so. Former Federal Reserve Chairman 
Greenspan argued that the widespread use of derivatives spreads risk among 
different market players, including nonfinancial companies, making the 
financial system a lot safer. All the same, Greenspan reminded banks that they 
need to keep pace with changes in the market and “readjust accordingly.”27 
The Comptroller of the Currency and other regulators must keep a watchful 
eye on derivative positions, particularly in periods of interest rate (and foreign 
exchange) volatility.
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T+3 to T+1 reduces the settlement risk profile of the U.S. 
securities industry. In addition, T+1 will serve as a catalyst 
for changes in processing, thereby enabling the U.S. market 
to function effectively and maintain its competitive position. 
Finally, more streamlined processing will make it possible 
for the U.S. market to support daily trading volumes in the 
billions of shares.
 The Securities Industry Association has developed 
a list of actions, or “building blocks,” which are needed to 
achieve T+1. The ten building blocks are the minimum set 
of initiatives that need to be implemented to move from 
T+3 to T+1 processing. They include changes to regulation, 
information technology, organizations, and behaviors. 
Implementing the building blocks will streamline securities 
processing throughout the industry and result in substantially 
reduced error processing, reconciliation, and rework. In 
the end, it is the asset owners (the institutional and retail 
customers) who will benefit from reduced processing costs 
with T+1.
A global shift to public ownership of stock exchanges.  
 Stock exchanges around the world are converting 
from being member-owned cooperatives to being publicly 
traded firms.  This shift reflects a variety of causes including 
greater access to capital, the need for greater efficiency in 
operation, and the increasing heterogeneity of members’ 
interests leading to difficulties in cooperative decision-making.  
This change is both widespread and accelerating; eight of the 
world’s ten largest stock markets are now publicly traded 
firms, with proposed conversions pending for several other 
markets. In 1995 there were no publicly traded exchanges; 
now there are twelve, with a market value approaching $25 
Figure 8-3: 
expLAnAtion oF ChAnges to 
seCurities mArket operAtion And reguLAtion
Discount and Internet trading of securities for institutions and 
individuals. 
 May Day (May 1, 1975) ended the fixed commission 
system, allowing securities firms to charge any amount 
deemed reasonable to their clients. Several discount brokers 
then entered the business in competition with established, 
full-service broker-dealers, focusing primarily on retail 
customers (rather than institutional investors). With the 
advent of personal computer systems and the Internet, many 
of these discount brokers realized that trading costs would 
be greatly reduced through electronic data entry. As a result, 
commissions are a fraction of their pre–May Day cost, with 
some firms charging as low as $5 for a trade that may have 
originally cost hundreds of dollars. The lure of inexpensive, 
online trading has converted an estimated one-fifth of all 
stockholders to these types of accounts through the discount 
brokerage operations of banks and such firms as Charles 
Schwab, Datek, Ameritrade, and E*Trade.
Changes to clearing and settlement practices and timing. 
 Through the work of the Group of 30, securities 
markets have expedited the clearing and settling of investment 
transactions through global standardization and systematic 
reductions in the time to clear and settle trades.* Originally 
requiring five trading days to complete the recordkeeping and 
funding of a trade (known as “T+5”), the goal for the U.S. 
financial services industry is to settle all trades one day after 
trade date (“T+1”) from the current “T+3.” The move from 
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of possible trading abuses and conflicts of interest at the 
exchange and elsewhere in the financial industry, including a 
series of investigations by New York State Attorney General 
Elliot Spitzer. As of mid-2004, the functions of chairman 
and CEO have been separated, interim chairman John Reed 
proposed various reforms, and Attorney General Spitzer has 
sued Grasso for the return of his compensation package.
Discussion on the ending of the specialist system at the 
NYSE. 
 Currently, when an order comes in to the exchange, 
either by phone or electronically, it is sent to one of some 430 
specialists, who handles all of the trading for that stock and 
several others. These specialists are the people in the colored 
jackets that can be seen in TV news shots of the trading 
floor. Each specialist, who is stationed at a booth on the 
floor of the exchange, essentially conducts an auction of his 
stocks, matching buyers and sellers or dipping into his own 
company’s holdings to make sure there are enough shares 
available. Once buyers and sellers are matched, the specialist 
reports the results of the transaction and the information is 
sent out to quote systems so that others know the stock’s most 
recent trading price. On electronic exchanges like NASDAQ, 
computers scan all the orders and match up buyers and sellers 
at the best available price.
Electronic order–matching for nearly all exchanges except 
the NYSE.  
 In contrast to the specialist system described above, 
when brokers receive an order to buy or sell a stock on an open-
order environment (such as the NASDAQ in the U.S.), they 
have the option of directing that order to a market maker or to 
billion.  In the U.S., only the NASDAQ and the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange currently have traded shares, although 
the Philadelphia Stock Exchange has announced plans to 
convert to public ownership.**
The use of decimalization rather than fractions to make 
pricing fairer for buyers and sellers of stocks and bonds.
 In January 2001, the major U.S. exchanges switched 
trading to increments of one penny from fractions (⅛=12½¢; 
¼=25¢; ⅛=37½¢; ½=50¢; ⅛=62½¢; ¾=75¢; ⅛=87½¢; and 
for low-priced shares, sixteenths of a dollar were quoted). The 
SEC and congressional proponents of decimalization pushed 
the U.S. markets to drop their traditional fractional trading, 
in part so they would be up to speed with markets elsewhere 
in the world. Supporters of the change to decimals have said 
the new trading increments benefit investors by reducing the 
so-called spread, or the difference between the highest price 
buyers offer for a stock and the lowest price sellers ask.
Changes to the executive management structure of the NYSE.  
 Scandal affected the exchange in 2003 after 
revelations that Chairman Richard Grasso was awarded a 
$187.5 million pay package by a board of directors that he 
essentially controlled. One particularly irksome item was the 
$5 million bonus Grasso received for getting the exchange up 
and running after September 11, 2001. Thousands of others 
on Wall Street worked tirelessly at the time without any extra 
compensation. 
 Though Grasso is widely credited with preserving the 
New York exchange’s share of the market for stocks, during 
his tenure the exchange developed a reputation for being an 
insiders’ playground. His departure unleashed revelations 
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Management, Cornell University, 2003, for an analysis of 
the performance of the twelve publicly traded exchanges. Of 
the world’s ten largest stock exchanges, only the NYSE and 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange are non-shareholder owned. Also, 
see “Searching for a New Center: US Securities Markets 
in Transition” at www.frbatlanta.org/news/CONFEREN/
fm2004/OHara.doc.
 Such developments admittedly have both positive and negative 
implications, but the effect inevitably will be to make the securities markets 
more efficient and less prone to sudden collapses, such as those that occurred 
in 1929 and 1987. 
wHAT THE U.S. SHOUlD DO
 As we noted earlier in this chapter, financial markets require 
coordinated international control due to fiduciary responsibilities to depositors 
and to the risk of systemic collapse in the event of the failure of a major bank 
or securities firm. The essential point of these evolutionary adjustments is 
that global financial markets are “fixing” themselves, albeit with supervision. 
Differences in economic, social, and legal traditions complicate the process 
of reaching agreement on and enforcing procedures and standards. What may 
work in Mexico may not work in Russia or Japan, and political realities as well 
as economic pain cause delays, mistakes, and conflicting advice. 
 The realization that global financial markets are interdependent 
requires and generally achieves responsible behavior among governments 
and oversight agencies. The U.S. should continue to support and promote 
global efforts at oversight of financial markets.As to other business regulation, 
Walt Whitman’s admonition that opens this chapter applies to the developed 
economies: the same ideas that apply to the U.S. apply internationally. 
an electronic order–matching system. The electronic market 
provides the network to display bidding and asking prices. 
Electronic communications networks facilitate computerized 
matching of buy and sell orders.
Movement toward de facto globalization of the securities 
markets. 
 Although there is no single global marketplace for 
bonds and equities, there have been several initiatives to 
create a de facto world securities market. These include:
Cross-listing of equity shares on home country and 
one or more foreign exchanges, allowing a company to 
expand its investor base and access to capital 
ADRs (American Depository Receipts), an investment 
security traded on a U.S. exchange as a receipt for shares 
originally issued and traded in another country 
Global registered shares, traded on multiple exchanges 
usually in U.S. dollars and euros
Global bonds, a large international issue of debt sold 
simultaneously in the major bond markets in varying 
maturities and denominated in the major world 
currencies
*See the Group of 30 website, www.group30.org, and its 
various publications, for example, Global Clearing and 
Settlement: A Plan of Action, 2003.
**See Alfredo Mendiola and Maureen O’Hara, “Taking 
Stock in Stock Markets:  The Changing Governance of Stock 
Exchanges,” working paper, Johnson Graduate School of 
•
•
•
•
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Neo-Liberalism,” 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 1014, 
1055-56 (1997).
2 For a review of the development of jurisdictional principles, see David J. Gerber, 
“Beyond Balancing: International Law Restraints on the Reach of International 
Laws,” 10 Yale Journal of International Law 185 (1984).
3 For a discussion of the negotiations on the Treaty of Versailles that ended World 
War I, see Margaret Macmillan, Paris 1919 (2001). For a review of the Senate’s 
debates and the ultimate rejection of the League of Nations, see Thomas J. Knock, 
To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (reprint 
edition, 1995).
4 UNESCO is the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
 The interests of free trade and global competition have succeeded 
in restoring the world’s economic systems in the post–World War II period, 
and to a degree far beyond anything previously experienced. The developed 
economies have various important future agendas, which we discuss in Chapter 
10, but overseeing the regulation of business should not be on anyone’s list.
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poor countries, see Keith Bradsher, “Vows of New Aid to the Poor Leave the Poor 
Unimpressed,” New York Times, December 15, 2005, at select.nytimes.com/gst/
abstract.html?res=F00E17FB34550C768DDDAB0994DD404482. On agricultural 
issues, see Keith Bradsher, “Trade Officials Agree to End Subsidies for Agricultural 
Exports, New York Times, December 19, 2005, at select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.
html?res=F40914FF3C540C7A8DDDAB0994DD404482. On exceptions, there are 
numerous reports of countries requesting special treatment, from India for textiles, to 
the pharmaceutical industry for generic drugs, to the European nations on American 
steel tariffs.
8 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., “The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on 
the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism and Democracy,” 31 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 769, 791-816 (1998).
9 A fiduciary is an organization that holds assets for another party, often with the legal 
authority and duty to make decisions regarding financial matters on behalf of the 
other party. Banks and securities firms are leading examples of fiduciaries.
10 Based on an informal survey by the author, in the decade of the 1990s there were 
some 150 published analyses or commentaries on global financial crises. However, 
the flow of studies has slowed considerably in the past few years, probably due to the 
lack of a recent crisis.
11 The efficient market hypothesis states that stocks trade at their fair value because 
existing prices incorporate and reflect all relevant information. Thus, it is impossible 
for investors to either purchase undervalued stocks or sell stocks for inflated prices, 
and the only way an investor can possibly obtain higher returns is by purchasing 
riskier investments. This concept is incorporated in the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). See any standard text on corporate finance for a further explanation.
founded in 1945 to promote international cooperation among UN member states and 
associates in the fields of education, science, culture, and communication. SEATO 
was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, an alliance organized in 1954 by 
Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and the U.S.. Following the defeat of the French in Indochina, SEATO was created 
to oppose further Communist gains in Southeast Asia. While it legitimized the 
U.S. presence in the Vietnam War, the U.S. abandoned the country in 1973 and the 
organization was disbanded in 1977.
5 For an analysis of the role of the IMF in recent financial crises and the search for 
global financial stability and governance, see David Vines and Christopher L. Gilbert 
(eds.), The IMF and Its Critics: Reform of Global Financial Architecture (2004). The 
role of the IMF is undergoing an interesting reexamination as the global economy 
improves; see Matt Moffett and Bob Davis, “Booming Economy Leaves the IMF 
Groping for Mission,” Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2006, A1, A12.
6 The UN has made an impact on the international political climate in its ability to 
create new organizational mechanisms to deal effectively with the changing nature 
of conflict, which is steadily shifting from interstate wars to intrastate insurgencies. 
However, mistakes continue to be made, such as the scandal involving the Oil-for-
Food program blamed by many observers on Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Other 
criticisms involve the organization’s continuing problems in local dispute resolution, 
personnel assignment, financial mismanagement, and inadequate concerns for human 
rights. For a balanced recent assessment, see Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, 
and Roger A. Coate, United Nations and Changing World Politics (2004).
7 Protests in Seattle and other WTO meeting sites have alerted industrial countries 
to the developmental needs of poorer countries, particularly with regard to 
agricultural subsidies and special exemptions for certain industries and services. On 
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assets – such as mortgages – from their balance sheets, transferring them to investors 
willing to accept the risk that there may be default on some of the loans or a general 
rise in interest rates. In return for accepting these risks, investors receive the revenue 
stream generated by the assets, e.g., the mortgage interest paid by homeowners.
20 For example, see the French proposal to vest additional decision-making power in 
the Interim Committee of finance ministers that oversees the operation of the IMF, 
with the goal of enhancing accountability, allowing the institution to respond more 
quickly to crises; or the Canadian proposal providing for an IMF-sanctioned pause or 
payments standstill to be invoked in the event of financial difficulties. Government of 
France, Facing International Instability: Twelve Proposals for a European Initiative 
(1998). Canada, Department of Finance, “Finance Minister Announces Six-Point 
Canadian Plan to Deal with Global Financial Turmoil,” Press Release, 1998; at www.
fin.gc.ca/news98/98-094.e.html.
21 The balance of payments is a report of all transactions by a country with other 
nations, including imports, exports, aid, and military expenditures. The two 
components of a country’s balance of payments are the current account, the net of 
exports and imports of goods and services; and the capital account, the net change 
in assets and liabilities. Typically a country with a large current account deficit will 
experience equivalent purchases of assets, including financial assets (e.g., stocks and 
bonds) and physical assets (e.g., companies and real estate).
22 In 2006, exports were $2.096 trillion, and imports were $2.818 trillion, a current 
account deficit of $722 billion. See “Table A: Summary of U.S. International 
Transactions” (July 2007), at www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2007/07%20July/0707_itaq_text.
pdf.
23 Like every generalization one can make about economic behavior, there will 
12 Moral hazard is the potential loss when the provision of insurance or guaranties 
encourages the affected parties to take more risks. 
13 Germany’s Herstatt Bank is a famous example of a banking failure due to 
settlement risk. On June 26, 1974, Herstatt had taken in all its currency receipts 
in Europe but had not made any of its U.S. dollar payments when German 
banking regulators closed the bank down at the end of the German business day. 
Counterparties were left holding unsecured claims against the bank’s assets. 
14 See Overview of the New Basel Capital Accord, April 2003, at www.bis.org/bcbs/
cp3ov.pdf. For a brief history of Basel I and II from a U.S. perspective, see www.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2005/20051006/default.htm.
15 Arbitrage is the simultaneous buying and selling of an asset, usually in different 
markets where price differences may exist due to imperfect information, speculation, 
or other factors. 
16 Damian Paletta, “U.S. Banking Regulators Agree on Basel II Capital Standards,” 
Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2007, A4.
17 For all banks, the decline is about 13.75 percent. Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
Table A.2.A/B, Spring 2004, at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2004/
04springbulletin.htm.
18 See “Profits and Balance Sheet Developments at U.S. Commercial Banks in 
2003,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, Spring 2004, at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
bulletin/2004/spring04_profit.pdf.
19 Financial securitization gathers similar assets together to create securities that can 
be sold in public markets. Banks use this technique to remove a particular group of 
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always be important exceptions to this observation. A current example is Venezuela, 
whose leader, President Hugo Chávez, seems intent on nationalizing important 
industries and driving away investors with capital.
24 See, e.g., Jane Little, “Regional Review: The IMF Under Fire,” Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston (Quarter 2, 1998), at www.bos.frb.org/economic/nerr/rr1998/q2/
litt98_2.htm; or U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee Study, “IMF Financing: 
A Review of the Issues” (March 1998), at www.house.gov/jec/imf/imf.htm.
25 Bank for International Settlements, Sovereign Credit Default Swaps, BIS Quarterly 
Review, December 2003, at www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0312g.pdf.
26 Extrapolated from Office of the Comptroller of the Currency statistics; see www.
occ.treas.gov/ftp/deriv/dq303.pdf.
27 “Financial Derivatives,” Remarks before the Futures Industry Association, Boca 
Raton, Florida, March 19, 1999; reprinted at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/1999/19990319.htm.
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CHAPTER 9: 
ECOnOmIC AnAlySIS Of BUSInESS REGUlATIOn
The age of chivalry has gone. 
That of sophisters, economists, and calculators has succeeded, 
and the glory of Europe is extinguished forever.
Edmund Burke (1729–1797), Reflections on the Revolution in France
 This chapter should discuss details of the economics of business regulation, that is, the use of quantitative analysis to determine 
the contribution that legislation and administrative decision-making have made 
to the improvement of American competitiveness and productivity.  However, 
it is somewhat astonishing to report that a few pages would suffice to review 
the various studies conducted on the relevant costs and benefits as analyzed 
by Congress, the President, and the various regulators noted throughout this 
book. Instead, we will consider what should be done, in reasonably practicable 
terms, to provide such analysis.
STAnDARD ECOnOmIC mETHODOlOGy
 Congress has passed numerous laws to regulate business, several 
of which were discussed in Part I. The U.S. has been emulated by various 
countries and international organizations in the effort to control the activities 
of companies, and some of these efforts have been described in Part II. Rather 
than economic analysis, laws were passed on a good faith basis, in the general 
belief that there was evidence of fraud, collusion, or other wrongdoing and that 
the public needed to be protected. 
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THE THEORy Of COST-BEnEfIT AnAlySIS
 When governments attempt to use economic analysis, the standard is 
generally cost-benefit analysis (CBA). The future stream of anticipated benefits 
is quantified and discounted to their present value using a specified interest or 
discount rate, and this total is compared to the costs incurred in generating the 
benefits in a ratio format. As a simple example, a public project that yields 
$500,000 million in benefits for ten years and costs $1 million to implement 
would yield a cost-benefit ratio of about four and a quarter times assuming a 3 
percent discount rate.2 
 The naïve government official might claim that the cost-benefit ratio is 
five times, as $500,000 for ten years divided by $1 million appears to produce 
an arithmetic result of five. However, the CBA must reduce benefits received 
in the future at a predetermined discount rate. The general rule is that projects 
with a CBA that exceed one should be undertaken, and in situations of capital 
limitations – which all governments experience – the projects with the highest 
ratios should be given priority, assuming that other considerations, such as 
public safety or national security, do not take precedence.
 This approach provides the cover of preciseness and is seemingly 
objective, although astute observers will note that judgment calls and guesses 
are required to conduct the analysis. It is particularly difficult to evaluate 
projects with a large number of possible outcomes with many interests of 
stakeholders affected by the decision. Representatives of various constituencies 
may lobby for their viewpoints, and decisions may be based on the demands of 
the moment rather than on a coherent long-term policy. For example, the SEC 
was rushed into existence by the Roosevelt Administration because of the bad 
acts of a few Wall Street investment bankers, while the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
essentially resulted from the collapse of Enron and the problems at WorldCom, 
Tyco, and other companies.
APPROPRIATE ECOnOmIC AnAlySIS
 In reviewing these actions in the U.S. and in other countries, it is 
difficult to find a single instance where economic analysis was performed 
to determine the appropriateness of a business regulation.1 This comment 
applies to all phases of the process: the consideration of the law establishing 
the regulation; the regulatory process as proposed by the administrative 
agency (“ex ante analysis”); or the period following some experience with the 
regulation (“ex post analysis”).
The applicable economics should specify four types of benefits and costs.
1. Benefits that develop through greater competition, improved corporate 
governance and public trust, and general confidence in the stability and 
safety of markets.
2. Direct costs to the government, which arise as an administrative entity 
enforces controls and courts hear cases brought by the government or 
private plaintiffs against supposed “violators.” 
3. Direct costs to business, including the additional expenses of 
compliance, the pursuit of suboptimal strategies due to legal barriers, and 
the costs of litigation or advocacy at administrative hearings. Where they 
were known or could be reasonably estimated, we listed the direct costs to 
business in Part I. 
4. Implicit costs that occur as the result of regulation but are difficult or 
impossible to quantify. We will discuss these costs later in this chapter.
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Figure 9-1:
Costs oF CApitAL For seLeCted CompAnies
Company Cost of 
Debt 
Capital 
(%)1
Cost of 
Equity 
Capital2
Percentage 
of Debt on  
Balance 
Sheet3
Percentage 
of Equity 
on  Balance 
Sheet4
Weighted 
Average Cost 
of Capital 
(%)5
Boeing 5.1 8.3 21 79 7.2
Dell 
Computer
8.1 14.5 1 99 14.4
ExxonMobil 4.7 5.9 2 98 5.9
General 
Electric
4.7 9.8 21 79 7.6
H. J. Heinz 5.0 5.1 26 74 4.6
McDonald’s 4.9 9.3 18 82 8.2
Pfizer 4.7 6.2 4 96 6.1
Wal-Mart 4.8 6.6 9 91 6.3
1 Note: All calculations are based on data from late 2005.
 The cost of debt capital is calculated from average yields on similarly rated bonds.
2 The cost of equity capital is based on Capital Asset Pricing Model estimates.
3 The proportion of debt is based on each company’s book value of debt plus any 
preferred stock issued.
4 The proportion of equity is based on the market value of each company’s 
common stock.
ASSUmPTIOnS In CBA
 CBA is a capital budgeting technique closely resembling the two major 
business capital budgeting methods, net present value (NPV) and internal rate 
of return (IRR). The major requirements of NPV, IRR, and CBA are that:
The project life is knowable. However, how can one accurately 
determine the life of a dam, a bridge, a manufacturing facility, or 
restrictions on aggressive competitive behavior of a business?
The magnitude and timing of the cash inflows (benefits in CBA) 
and cash outflows (costs) can be specified. Every manager can 
cite projects with cost overruns or unexpected delays and glowing 
opportunities that turned into major disappointments or disasters.
 A third problem exists with CBA that is not present in the private 
sector: the determination of the correct discount rate. We calculate the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC or ACC) based on the proportion 
of debt and equity used to finance a business times the after-tax cost of each; 
see any standard corporate finance text for an explanation of these concepts. 
Businesses experience a wide range of WACCs, depending on such factors as 
the market’s perception of risk, the size of the company relative to its industry, 
the maturity and innovation of the business, and numerous other factors. For 
WACCs of typical U.S. companies, see Figure 9-1.
•
•
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Figure 9-2:
FederAL government disCount rAtes 
For Cost beneFit AnALysis
Estimated Project Life Nominal Interest Rates Real Interest Rates
3 year 4.7% 2.5%
5 year 4.8% 2.6%
7 year 4.9% 2.7%
10 year 5.0% 2.8%
20 year 5.3% 3.0%
30 year 5.2% 3.0%
Note: Nominal rates are stated rates as used in the Budget of the U.S. Government 
for fiscal year 2006. Nominal rates are used in lease-purchase decisions. Real 
rates are determined based on nominal rate forecasts but after the removal of the 
inflation premium. Real rates are used in cost benefit analysis.
Source: OMB Circular No. A-94, “Discount Rates for Cost-Effectiveness, Lease 
Purchase, and Related Analyses,” Appendix C, revised January 2006; at www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a094/a94_appx-c.html.
 A more realistic rate for private (business or industry) benefits would 
probably be determined using the WACC concept. The following explanation 
uses rates as of mid-2006. We can use the after-tax rate on “AA” rated long-
term debt for the cost of debt capital, equal to 3.75 percent.4 The cost of equity 
capital is based the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which defines the 
market rate as:
Re = Rf + β (Rm)
Where: Re is the cost of equity capital
5 The weighted average cost of capital is based on the percentage of debt times 
the after-tax cost of debt capital (using an assumed 35 percent tax rate), plus the 
percentage of equity times the cost of equity capital.
Source: Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers, and Alan J. Marcus, Fundamentals 
of Corporate Finance (5th edition, 2007), Table 12-4, 334.
DISCOUnT RATES AnD BEnEfITS
 The analysis is not as simple as our previous example when realistic 
discount rates and a full benefits listing are provided. We’ll briefly discuss 
each of these issues.
PUBlIC AnD PRIvATE DISCOUnT RATES
 Government has no equivalent for the cost of capital, so the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) assigns the appropriate rate to use, based 
primarily on the U.S. government’s borrowing costs. An annual OMB circular3 
lists interest rates for various types of government-mandated CBA analyses; see 
Figure 9-2 for the 2006 rates. While this approach at least brings consistency 
to the analysis of public projects, it cannot be argued either that:
Any one discount rate reflects the true cost of actions forgone or 
actions protected by law for businesses of all sizes and risks
or that:
The OMB’s rate of 3 percent (30-year real interest) is representative 
of the cost of capital experienced by American business in coping 
with business regulations.
•
•
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POSSIBlE BEnEfITS RESUlTInG fROm BUSInESS REGUlATIOn
 Benefits are either public or private depending on specific situations. 
A public benefit accrues to everyone; a private benefit applies to specific 
constituencies. For example:
Antitrust advocates would probably argue that private benefits 
include elimination of conditions of restraint of trade or monopoly 
within an industry and that public benefits involve the avoidance of 
injury to competition and to the consumer.
Bank tying opponents might stress the private benefit of unbundling 
credit and noncredit services offered to corporate clients and the 
resulting access to credit for borrowers. Public benefits could include 
greater access to banking services for businesses and consumers.
Proponents of corporate governance would certainly discuss the 
prevention of fraud and the resulting public benefit to society and the 
private benefit to shareholders in avoiding reduced stock prices and 
adverse publicity.
Airline passengers would be enthusiastic about the public benefit of 
fewer flight delays and having more choices among carriers at their 
local airport. Private benefits enjoyed by the airlines may include 
more gate access and improved aircraft utilization.
 If the government were to calculate benefits, it would clearly 
overestimate the result when true WACCs are applied to private benefits. Our 
earlier example of $500,000 in benefits for ten years and costs of $1 million 
yielded a cost-benefit ratio of about 4.25 times with a 3 percent discount 
•
•
•
•
Rf   is the risk-free rate on short-term U.S. Treasury bills, 
about 5 percent 
β    is the Beta for a portfolio of stocks (defined as 1.0 
based on the Standard & Poor’s 500 market index)
Rm is the market risk premium calculated over the past 
eight decades of stock market experience, about 7.0 
percent5
The result is that Re equals Rf (5 percent) plus a Beta of 1.0 times the current 
market risk premium of 7.0 percent, for a total of 12 percent. 
 The WACC for private benefits is about 9.5 percent, assuming that 30 
percent of the typical balance sheet is funded by debt and 70 percent by equity; 
see Figure 9-3. Compare this to the WACC equivalent for public benefits of 3 
percent as specified by the OMB; it’s less than one-third of the rate for private 
benefits! If the capital markets are about right for the private sector, it is hard 
to reconcile the corporate cost of capital with the OMB public sector amount. 
Figure 9-3: 
CALCuLAtion oF AverAge Cost oF CApitAL
Assumed 
Proportion of 
Balance Sheet
Cost of Each 
Form of 
Financing*
Weighted Cost of Financing
Debt 30% 0.0375 0.01125
Equity 70% 0.1200 0.08400
Total 100% 0.09525
*See explanation in text.
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has ever been required to justify the existence of these laws and regulations! 
Congress simply assumed that the costs and benefits were appropriate to 
each situation, and never systematically considered the need for an economic 
review at the time of the passage of the legislation or in the years following 
implementation.
OTHER CBA AnAlySES
 There is limited academic research on the costs (but not the benefits) 
of regulation available through the Mercatus and Weidenbaum Centers.9 The 
reported data are based on social and economic oversight, with the latter category 
most closely matching the topic of business regulation.10 The estimated cost 
of economic regulation will be $5.8 billion in fiscal year 2006, up from $1.2 
billion in 1980 and $2.5 billion in 1990, about a 5 percent annualized growth 
rate (in the 1990 to 2006 period). Specific agency or department costs for the 
business regulation portion are presented in Figure 9-4, and total about $3.25 
billion. 
Figure 9-4: 
Costs oF business reguLAtion
(seLeCted FederAL reguLAtors)
Department or Agency
Spending (millions 
of current dollars)
Staffing (full-time 
equivalent)
Department of the Treasury
Comptroller of the               
Currency
•
 $ 522 2,811
Office of Thrift 
Supervision
•
193 920
rate. Assume now that benefits were split equally among public and private 
constituencies. The resulting CBA would fall to about 3.75 times, still worth 
the investment but certainly not overwhelmingly so.6 And if public funds have 
to be rationed among alternative projects, this investment may very well fail to 
be accepted. Furthermore, for a large number of projects, the CBA might fall 
further when the benefits are valued against realistic costs.
wHAT DOES THE GOvERnmEnT COmPIlE?
 The leading source of federal CBA studies is the annual report of 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that shows the total annual 
benefits and costs of major rules.7 For the 2005 report, OMB listed costs and 
benefits from eight federal departments and one agency, including Agriculture, 
Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security (the Coast 
Guard only), Housing and Urban Development, Labor, Transportation, and the 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
 The 2005 CBA results are impressive, with benefits ranging from 
$68 to $260 billion and costs between $34 and $39 billion, far exceeding 
the required CBA standard of one or greater (as previously explained). The 
OMB and the legislation and regulations that support CBA do not differentiate 
between public and private benefits and calculate all benefits based on the 
OMB public discount rate. It should also be mentioned that OMB uses the 
reports of the agencies rather than its own calculations, a procedure that has 
engendered considerable controversy.8 
 Readers will note that the administrative organizations responsible 
for the business regulation discussed in this book – the SEC, the Justice and 
Commerce Departments, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the 
FAA – are not even mentioned in the OMB report. While this omission is never 
explained, the reason is quite obvious: no CBA or other economic analysis 
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Source: Susan Dudley and Melinda Warren, 2006 Regulators’ Budget Report, a joint 
publication of the Mercatus Center (George Mason University) and the Weidenbaum 
Center (Washington University); at www.Mercatus.org and wc.wustl.edu.
 The list includes the cost of important business regulators, but it does 
not delve into the specifics of necessary activities as opposed to those that 
restrict the freedom of action by business. For example, we do not know the 
breakdown of the SEC budget and how much is spent on Sarbanes-Oxley 
implementation versus such other activities as the review of proposed offerings 
of securities by corporations. In the absence of a systematic review of the 
actual costs of such regulation, it is probable that the final amount would be 
$1.5 to $2 billion a year. It certainly can be argued that this sum would easily 
be worth the efforts of possibly 10,000 in staff working to regulate business or 
that this amount is dwarfed by the size of the total federal budget (about $2.6 
trillion in 200611). However, the benefits are unknown, and the costs discussed 
so far do not address the implicit costs that inevitably exist and should be 
included in any objective analysis.
ImPlICIT COSTS Of GEnERAl BUSInESS REGUlATIOn
 Implicit costs result from restrictions on a company’s freedom to 
operate, to innovate and to survive, and to grow or fail. The extent of implicit 
costs in any grouping of business regulation is a function of the extent of 
previous deregulation. For example, corporate governance has eight general 
categories of implicit costs, while the airline industry, which has been 
deregulated, contains only two categories. This section includes the general 
business regulation of antitrust and corporate governance.
Department or Agency
Spending (millions 
of current dollars)
Staffing (full-time 
equivalent)
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation
634 3,244
Department of Commerce
Bureau of Industry and 
Security
•
83 431
International Trade 
Administration
•
65 408
National 
Telecommunications 
and Information 
Administration
•
57 298
Federal Communications 
Commission
389 1,987
Department of Justice
Antitrust Division• 141 851
Federal Trade Commission 210 1,080
International Trade 
Commission
65 375
Securities and Exchange 
Commission
886 3,933
TOTAL $ 3,245 16,338
Note: Various organizations have been excluded from this table; examples include 
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Farm Credit Administration, the Federal 
Reserve System, the Agriculture Marketing Service (within the Department of 
Agriculture, and various others that do not directly impact business regulation as 
considered in this book.
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3. Protection of Inefficient Producers. The innovative, aggressive 
company had best assume that the law or its competitors will be 
breathing down its neck. If competitors fight in the public marketplace, 
that is the essence of capitalism. But if inefficient competitors run to 
regulators, lobbyists, or legislators for protection, the concept becomes 
subverted.16 And the prospect of treble damages, as permitted in the 
Sherman Act,17 may be sufficient incentive to entrap the unsuspecting 
business competitor.18 The mere threat of litigation makes many 
companies pay up and settle, or cave in to demands to drop a merger or 
other acquisition strategy.
4. Confusion over Corrective Actions. With the exception of attorneys 
and regulators who make their living from antitrust, it is difficult to find 
any thoughtful commentator who supports antitrust in its present form. A 
few of the solutions and remedies that have been suggested include:
More government: develop new law on competition including 
additional institutional mechanisms for review.19
Global antitrust: create a global antitrust policy through the World 
Trade Organization or other international agency.20
Special rules: extend exemptions to antitrust to avoid a “tragedy of 
the commons”21 with regard to the environment, energy, and possibly 
other situations in the national interest.
Hold hearings: begin oversight review to determine twenty-first-
century requirements for antitrust.22
 There are literally hundreds of books and articles on antitrust available 
to the interested reader, each with its own set of solutions. Imagine the scramble 
•
•
•
•
ImPlICIT COSTS Of AnTITRUST
 The implicit costs of antitrust include the following:
1. Predictability in Law Enforcement. As reported in Business Week, 
the Rehnquist Supreme Court disinterest in antitrust left business and 
legal counsel uncertain as to how to proceed in managing companies.12 
The current Roberts Court has adopted a friendly attitude toward 
business, but decisions in 2006–2007 were based on fairly narrow issues 
and could change as justices retire or die and a new President considers 
options for appointments.13
 Predictability is an essential component in operating any business,14 
particularly in the current economic climate which has forced companies 
to look for innovative ways to increase revenues and decrease costs. 
Possible strategic initiatives include outsourcing, downsizing, internal 
growth, and merging with competitors. Yet mergers may be rejected by 
the government despite the economic logic and significant opportunities 
for efficiencies. One case in point was the proposed and quite reasonable 
merger of the office supplies retailers Staples and Office Depot, which 
was rejected as a potential restraint of trade.15
2. Consistency in Judicial Review. Most cases go to trial and, based on 
the facts and the law, counsel says “you’ll win” or “you may lose – let’s 
settle.” With antitrust, there simply is no consistent body of common law 
precedents that clearly indicate how courts will decide. Microsoft clearly 
lost in Judge Jackson’s court. On appeal, the case was remanded. On 
retrial, Microsoft effectively won. Judges do not know how to rule given 
the uncertainty of defining a market, the standards of review that should 
be applied, or which economic theory to apply.
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exceed the requirements that would fulfill the statute.23 Although firms 
may develop more and higher-quality information, it is problematical 
whether the increased benefits outweigh the costs. 
4. Investor risk estimates. Investors and the public generally 
overestimate risks and the need for regulation, leading to lower stock 
prices and a higher weighted average cost of capital. These effects are 
exacerbated by the media’s incentive to sell the story of corporate fraud 
as a continuing saga of wrongdoing that readers or viewers follow every 
day rather than as discrete events.
5. Effective denial of access to public markets. Large, established 
corporations will find it easier to comply with new regulations than 
smaller or newer firms, thereby perversely gaining from corporate frauds. 
Smaller companies may decide to become private or to avoid the U.S. 
public markets to avoid the costs of regulatory compliance.24  Meredith 
Enterprises and Vermont Teddy Bear, two typical situations, made 
decisions to privatize in 2005, citing the requirements of Section 404.25 
The SEC is considering exempting smaller companies from certain of 
these rules, although no decision has yet been announced.26 The whole 
idea of using the public markets to assist small companies in raising 
capital is subverted by Sarbox.27
6. Costs of management refocus or separation. The traditional role 
of management has been to analyze and develop responsive business 
strategies. Management time is used suboptimally to the extent of its 
refocus on regulatory compliance rather than on business decision-
making.28 Some financial managers have departed or are considering 
leaving their positions because of Sarbox pressures. An example is the 
comptroller of Urban Outfitters, whose days are spent “documenting 
for new law review and economic journal topics if Congress were ever to take 
decisive action!
ImPlICIT COSTS Of 
THE REGUlATIOn Of CORPORATE GOvERnAnCE
The implicit costs of regulating corporate governance include the following:
1. Agency costs. A corporation requires management by nonowner 
agents due to the number and dispersion of owners (stockholders). 
Fraud cases like Tyco turn on managers who use their control to benefit 
themselves rather than the owners. In response to increased regulation, 
it is likely that managers will seek to insure against potential liability or 
behave cautiously because of the risk of harming their reputations. The 
resulting shifting and expense of risk will be an extra cost to the firm and 
its stockholders.
2. Resource allocation. Increased liability and regulation may affect 
the flow of resources to particular businesses. Firms whose earnings are 
variable, that are in lines of business where the accounting standards are 
somewhat uncertain, or that use now-suspect business practices such as 
hedging and derivatives are all subject to increased risk. Other things 
being equal, increased liability and regulation will reduce the value of 
“suspect” firms as well as their ability to attract financial and human 
capital.
3. Information costs. Post-fraud case regulation impacts information 
costs by increasing internal data-gathering requirements and auditing and 
consulting fees. A significant problem is that some provisions of Sarbox 
are vague, requiring companies and auditors to interpret and possibly 
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to reasonable and thoughtful ideas on potential reforms, estimated at 
over 2,000 suggestions, opening this possibility for future litigation.
ImPlICIT COSTS Of InDUSTRy-SPECIfIC BUSInESS REGUlATIOn
 The industries reviewed in Part I were banking, financial services, and 
the airlines. Although significant deregulation has occurred in these sectors, 
continuing implicit costs are noted in the sections that follow.
ImPlICIT COSTS Of BAnkInG 
AnD fInAnCIAl SERvICES REGUlATIOn
The implicit costs of banking and financial services regulation include the 
following:
1. Low profitability. For seven decades, banks were restricted to doing 
business in the state in which they were chartered (with certain limited 
exceptions). Although the Riegle-Neal Act now permits full interstate 
banking, there are still about 7,500 banks in the U.S. We previously 
noted the low profitability of the banking sector and the resulting struggle 
to find attractive uses for the capital raised through retained earnings 
(profits) and debt. Banks must be able to show returns commensurate 
with those of other users of invested funds, particularly as technology 
and globalization places U.S. banks in direct competition with 
international, regional, and community financial institutions. Eliminating 
tying restrictions would permit banks to increase their focus on profitable 
corporate relationships, allowing them an opportunity make a fair return 
on capital.
countless procedures and processes” while his job turns into “a struggle 
to explain common sense.”29
7. Compromise of internal auditing. Internal auditors serve the 
important and often unsung function of providing review and control 
of customary corporate accounting activity. Without internal auditors, 
effective procedures would be lacking to ascertain the accuracy of 
journal entries, the proper management of cash, the safeguarding of 
assets, and the payment of liabilities based on appropriate reviews. Since 
the passage of Sarbox, up to half of internal auditing staff time has been 
assigned to the development of internal controls and other compliance 
issues.30 The result has been the compromise of the integrity of the 
financial statements of public companies.
8. New litigation. Legal analysis clearly supports the right of Congress 
to pass Sarbox and to assign administrative responsibilities to the SEC.31 
However, two possible challenges to the law have been identified:
Executive branch appointments are governed by the Constitution, 
with the responsibility assigned to the President and confirmed by 
the Senate.32 Under Sarbox, the SEC appoints the members of the 
PCAOB without any review by appropriate authority. A suit testing 
the constitutionality of Sarbox on these grounds was filed in early 
February 2006 by the Free Enterprise Fund.33
A weaker challenge could be pursued under the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946 (APA)34 and the SEC’s Rules of Practice35 
which together formalize the deliberative process by which SEC 
rules are made. Perhaps most significantly, the APA requires notice 
of proposed legislative rulemaking and the opportunity for the public 
to comment on the proposed rule. The SEC has refused to respond 
•
•
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ImPlICIT COSTS Of AIRlInE REGUlATIOn
The implicit costs of airline regulation include the following:
1. Restrictions on mergers. The U.S. airline industry clearly has too 
many participants. Founder-owner egos, bad decision-making, and easy 
entry have created marginal carriers that have only a slight likelihood 
of earning a reasonable return in the long run. Ticket prices are often 
irrational, may be substantially less than the equivalent cost if the journey 
were made by automobile,37 and are developed primarily to fill seats. It 
can be argued that private capital has the right to be irrational; however, 
airlines use public facilities including the FAA, airspace, and airport 
facilities. The public, the passenger, and the investor or lender all have a 
stake in rationalizing the industry. The logical solution is consolidation 
through merger.
2. Limitations on carrier access to public facilities. As noted above, 
airlines use various types of public facilities. As long as a fair price is 
paid for access to those facilities, all carriers should be treated equally 
by airports and the FAA. Furthermore, efficient solutions to managing 
airspace should be sought, whether it involves technology, peak-hour 
pricing, privatization, or other innovations.
wHAT THE U.S. SHOUlD DO
 While it appears that our focus on public and private benefits, and on 
explicit and implicit costs, is unique, there have been any number of studies 
criticizing CBA, the regulatory process, and other components of business 
2. Inefficiency in corporate services. The prohibition on the payment 
of interest on corporate demand deposit (checking) accounts forced the 
creation of the sweep family of products, a rather inefficient process to 
generate earnings on bank balances. In the absence of sweeps, balances 
would either sit idle or earn nominal earnings credits to use against 
charges for bank services. The Federal Reserve has opposed proposals to 
end this restriction, claiming that the U.S. Treasury would lose an annual 
$100 million.36 However, that money belongs to corporate depositors 
and not to the government and effectively constitutes a tax on American 
business. It should also be noted that small and medium-sized companies 
pay a disproportionate share of this cost, as they often cannot use the 
sweep option because the monthly fees for the product can be in excess 
of $100 or because their community bank does not offer the service.
3. Inappropriate regulatory coverage. The passage of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 allowed financial services companies to 
enter any financial business but did not change the regulatory mix 
that provided oversight and protection for depositors, policyholders, 
shareholders, and the general public. Mismanagement does occur, and 
in cases of failures like Executive Life, Mutual Benefit Life, Franklin 
National Bank, Allfirst Bank (of Maryland), and Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, everyone loses, including taxpayers, employees, and the 
community. The regulatory structure should be consolidated to reflect 
the types of integrated strategies pursued by large financial companies. 
A logical organization would be to focus on institutional and individual 
concerns as discussed at the end of Chapter 4. A lesson of history is 
that inappropriate regulation inevitably leads to a corporate collapse 
somewhere and sometime, and such a failure will quickly turn into a very 
costly affair.
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times. It will become clearer in the next section why the 3 percent rate was chosen.
3 OMB Circular No. A-94, “Discount Rates for Cost-Effectiveness, Lease Purchase, 
and Related Analyses,” Appendix C, revised January 2006; at www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/circulars/a094/a94_appx-c.html.
4 Calculated as 5.75 percent times (1 – U.S. corporate tax rate of 35 percent) = 3.75 
percent.
5 Based on calculations in Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers, and Alan J. Marcus, 
Fundamentals of Corporate Finance (2007), from data in Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, 
and Mike Staunton, Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of Global Equity Returns 
(2002) as updated by the authors.
6 The calculation would be similar to note 2, but using 6.281 as the interest factor for 
the private benefits portion would result in a CBA of 3.70.
7 The data cited are from the 2005 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of 
Federal Regulations, Office of Management and Budget, Table 1-2, 8. For the most 
recent data, see www.ombwatch.org/regs/regacctg/2006/2006Draft.pdf.
regulation.38  The general thrust of these reports is that the methodology is 
seriously flawed, with such absurd findings as the saving of a life costing as 
much as $72 billion!39 Some commentators would improve the process;40 our 
recommendations have been noted throughout this chapter. 
 The existence of so many categories of implicit costs of business 
regulation should have caused some in Congress to consider applying the 
same cost-benefit analysis required in social regulation. We could fairly easily 
quantify several of these costs, such as the cost of litigation (the cost of trials 
and appeals) or denial of access to public markets (the incremental cost of 
capital for financings) for corporate governance, or lowered profitability 
because of restrictions on tying arrangements (the difference between actual 
and market average returns) for banks. Other costs are obviously more difficult 
to quantify, such as consistency in judicial review for antitrust or inappropriate 
regulatory coverage for financial services companies.  
 In any event, the total of the costs for business regulation could very 
well exceed the present value of any benefits generated. This is particularly 
likely when the true discount rate – the business cost of capital and more 
than three times the OMB rate – is used in calculating the present value of 
private benefits. While admittedly difficult, this analysis has never occurred, 
and regulations continue regardless of economic justification. Despite these 
significant problems in the application of CBA to public choice, all branches of 
government are dependent on the results attained from some form of economic 
analysis. Rather than try to push the proverbial camel through the eye of a 
needle,41 the solution may be to quantify those benefits and costs that can 
be quantified and to overtly recognize and discuss those that cannot. This is 
clearly preferable to ignoring these factors and blindly assuming that antitrust 
or corporate governance or any other area of business regulation is worth any 
price paid.42
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CHAPTER 10: 
GlOBAlIzATIOn AnD BUSInESS REGUlATIOn
We have met the enemy, and he is us.1
Walt Kelley (1913–1973)
 When the first business regulation was enacted, America was fighting its Civil War and President Lincoln needed to 
stabilize banking and the issuance of currency. The enormous industrial boom 
that followed that war led to the economic development of the nation and 
changed the country from agrarian to industrial, from village to urban, from 
small merchant to giant corporation, and by the end of World War I, from 
a developing political state to a world power. Congress was alarmed by the 
growth of the trusts and the resulting injury to competition, and by populism 
and the potential for significant political change. As a result, restrictions on big 
business began to be enacted toward the end of the nineteenth century.
 At the time of the passage of the Sherman Act, imports of goods to the 
U.S. were not significant enough for Congress to consider them as a source of 
competition for businesses that were attempting to restrain trade or monopolize. 
The nation was just beginning to industrialize, and given the time to cross 
the oceans, commerce was conducted largely between domestic companies. 
During the ensuing 115+ years, imports (excluding petroleum) have increased 
at three times the growth rate of American manufacturing.2  The competitive 
situation in the twenty-first century is global and largely technology and e-
commerce oriented,3 and America is scrambling to compete with economies 
whose labor costs are as little as one-tenth of ours. 
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Figure 10-1: 
seLeCted eConomiC growth rAtes
(bAsed on estimAtes oF reAL gross domestiC produCt)*
Region/Country % of Growth (2005)
European Union 1.7
Developed Countries
France 1.6
Germany 0.9
Great Britain (United Kingdom) 1.7
Japan 2.4
U.S. 3.5
Developing Countries
Bahamas 3.5
Brazil 2.4
China 9.3
Czech Republic 6.0
Egypt 4.9
Hungary 4.1
India 7.6
Indonesia 5.4
Pakistan 6.9
Russia 5.9
Venezuela 9.3
*In constant dollars, eliminating inflation.
Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2006, at www.cia.
gov/cia/publications/factbook; Economic Outlook No. 78, 2005, at www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/41/33/35755962.pdf.
wHy THE URGEnCy?
 Business regulation has been in existence for more than a century, so 
some skeptics may wonder at the need for action now. After all, it was haste 
that led to many of these laws in the first place, and thoughtful deliberation 
would seem to be the proper approach. Past economic cycles followed 
relatively leisurely paths, and economies required centuries or generations to 
industrialize and grow. For example, we can count the modern development 
of the U.S. as requiring more than half a century, from about 1865 to about 
1920. Similarly, the rise and fall of the Soviet Union required three-fourths of 
a century, from the Russian Revolution of 1917 to the collapse of Communism 
in 1991.
GlOBAl ECOnOmIC InITIATIvES
 In contrast, the present economic cycle has seen the ascendancy of 
centrally planned economies into global free market participants in about 
fifteen years, with the very real prospect of their shared leadership with the 
U.S. and possibly the European Union by the middle of the twenty-first century. 
The two fastest-growing countries are China and India, but others, including 
Brazil and Russia, may experience equivalent development. Japan and other 
Southeast Asian economies could be starting a recovery which could also push 
them into leadership contention; see Figure 10-1. World governments cannot 
afford to wait around for something to happen, because the imbalances that 
exist between the undeveloped, the developing, and the developed countries 
will inevitably become more pronounced. The result could be a political or 
economic catastrophe, perhaps triggered by the collapse of a currency, or a 
major bank failure, or the sudden decline in a financial market.4 
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policy ideas except to ask the Chinese to stop manipulating their currency. 
Instead, efforts have been focused on tax relief for investors to keep them 
buying stocks and repeal of the alternative minimum tax (AMT). 
lImITATIOnS TO ECOnOmIC POlICy
 Economic policy is, of course, a dual effort, between the fiscal 
decisions made on spending and taxes by Congress and the President and 
monetary decisions on interest rates and the money supply made by our central 
bank, the Federal Reserve (the Fed). The Fed has attempted throughout the 
past decade or so to steer its policies toward managing inflation while keeping 
the economy in a growth mode, and its performance has been commendable. 
However, the global economy and not U.S. demand is now driving the prices 
for commodities, and the Fed has neither the policy tools nor the models and 
data to help business to grow at a healthy and orderly pace.10
 There is an ongoing debate as to whether the U.S. can compete with 
this enormous new motivated and educated workforce in Asia, in Eastern 
Europe, and in the developing areas of the Americas. U.S. jobs have been 
increasing in sectors that are somewhat difficult to export, including services 
and construction, while the stagnation in manufacturing is an old story.11 Some 
service jobs have been outsourced to other countries, and most of us have had 
the experience of speaking with a representative of a computer or a credit card 
company in Ireland or India. 
 However, only about one-tenth of all service jobs could be performed 
outside the U.S.,12 and few construction jobs could ever be exported. 
Furthermore, recent evidence indicates that the U.S. economy is increasing 
employment at a rate equivalent to that experienced by American companies 
in international locations.13
 Some measures have been taken to deal with the new global realities, 
including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); attempts at 
expansion of NAFTA, including the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA) and various bilateral trade agreements;5 the European Union (EU); 
periodic meetings of the Group of Eight (G-8) finance ministers; industry-
specific global agreements and the World Trade Organization (WTO); and 
other initiatives. No particular political party or lobbying effort is driving these 
actions, and most Western politicians can (and do) claim some measure of 
credit. 
THE COmPETITIvE POSITIOn Of THE U.S.
 America’s dominant position that existed for decades is being 
challenged by the European Union, by the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), and by advances in countries throughout the globe.6 Only 
35 of the top 100 in the global 100 companies are now based in America, with 
another 49 located in Europe, 11 in Asia, and the others in various countries 
around the globe.7 A more interesting statistic is the rise of companies outside 
the fortresses of strong business regulation – the U.S. and Europe – clearly 
indicating the potential for future global ascendance. 
 The Current Account is the net of a country’s imports and exports and 
is used in calculating a country’s Balance of Payments.8  The U.S. is running 
a Current Account deficit of $700 billion,9 the federal budget deficit exceeds 
one-half of a trillion dollars, and the dollar has been falling against the world’s 
other major currencies. Every proposal that has a chance of dealing with 
the economic situation gets beaten down by one or another lobbying group: 
healthcare changes, Social Security, tax reform, movement on balancing the 
federal budget, energy conservation – the list goes on and on. Our growing 
struggle to compete has elicited no initiatives from a government with few 
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Number of Global 
200 Companies in 
Country
Number of 
“Smaller” Global 
200 Companies*
% of “Smaller” 
Global 200 
Companies
Chile 6 5 83.3%
Indonesia 6 5 83.3%
Note: “Smaller” companies are those in the second half of the Forbes list.
Source: Derived from data in Forbes Global 2000, 2006 edition, issue of April 17, 
2006, as supplemented from website data at www.forbes.com.
CHInA AnD InDIA
 China and India are special situations primarily because of their 
size, with a combined population of some 2.5 billion people, or more than 
one-third of the population of the world. Other significant differences include 
their demand for economic development, their readiness to cast aside previous 
political and economic beliefs, their access to vast amounts of resources, and 
their willingness to work with Western companies through joint ventures and 
other forms of business organization. Smaller countries like Japan and South 
Korea have had periods of unusual prosperity, but in the modern history of the 
world, only the U.S. is equivalent in size, access to resources, and growth. The 
case of Japan is particularly interesting, as America and the rest of the world 
actually felt economically threatened by Japanese competitors until the1990s, 
when a fifteen-year-long recession began.15 
 China has oriented its economy to manufacturing, while India uses 
its educational system to provide technological expertise, particularly in 
medicine and science, and in computers, software, and engineering. A synergy 
is beginning to develop between the two countries, with collaborations on 
orders from multinational companies to blend the technology of India with 
the advanced manufacturing of China in such products as medical devices, 
GROwInG ECOnOmIES AS COmPETITORS
 The number of growing-economy companies is still relatively small; 
the companies in Figure 10-2 represent well less than half of the number in 
the U.S. and fewer than are in Japan. However, the smaller companies – those 
in the second half of the Forbes list – are nearly 60 percent of the total for the 
developing countries, a significantly greater proportion than in the U.S.14 The 
potential for growth and intense future competition is obvious, particularly 
as many of the developing countries have only recently become capitalistic 
and are not limited by the niceties of much of American-style restraints on 
commerce.
Figure 10-2: 
number oF gLobAL 2000 CompAnies in growing eConomies
Number of Global 
200 Companies in 
Country
Number of 
“Smaller” Global 
200 Companies*
% of “Smaller” 
Global 200 
Companies
China 64 36 56.3%
South Korea 51 29 56.9%
Taiwan 41 24 58.5%
India 33 26 78.8%
Brazil 19 9 47.4%
South Africa 18 11 61.1%
Mexico 17 8 47.1%
Malaysia 14 9 64.3%
Russia 14 4 28.6%
Turkey 14 8 57.1%
Thailand 13 10 76.9%
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Egypt Orascom Construction Inds 
Hungary MOL Oil & Gas
Hungary OTP Bank 
Pakistan Oil & Gas Development 
Pakistan Pakistan Telecom 
Venezuela Mercantil Financial Services 
Source: See Table 10-2.
 A quieter but ongoing parallel development has been the explosion in 
skill levels in other countries that are direct competitors with the established 
companies in the West. For example, Mexico has been encouraging 
“hard science” students for the past decade and currently enrolls 450,000 
undergraduates in engineering (versus about 370,000 in the U.S.).19 As a result, 
American companies are shifting production to offshore technological centers, 
where an experienced engineer earns about $30,000, well less than his or her 
American counterpart. Similarly, Argentina has become a growing center 
for software development, with companies attracted by low salaries, a well-
educated labor force, and tax breaks for companies choosing relocation.20
COmPETITIOn OR COllABORATIOn?
 American companies are using developing countries for technical skills 
but not to collaborate with existing manufacturing, engineering, marketing, 
and computing facilities, at least to the current time.21 While there is some 
talk about the potential for cross-border cooperation,22 actual experience 
shows fairly low levels of integration and communication. Companies seem 
to go to developing countries for two reasons: to hire talented (and less costly) 
professionals and to begin to compete in local markets. The organizational 
computer systems, and advanced mechanical devices.16 This growth will be 
supported by an emphasis on intellectual development, particularly when 
compared to the mediocre results in the U.S., which is producing about one-
tenth the number of engineers and scientists each year.17 However, there are 
enormous obstacles to overcome as China and India develop economically, 
including rural poverty, inadequate infrastructure, and bureaucratic and 
inflexible governmental structures.
OTHER DEvElOPInG ECOnOmIES
 The economic development in China and India has had extensive 
media exposure, and estimates are that over three-fourths of all new research 
and development centers will locate there in the next few years.18  Other 
developing economies may begin to enjoy some of this economic growth; see 
Figure 10-2 to see countries often prominently mentioned. Smaller countries 
that are now represented on the list of the Global 2000 may surprise some 
readers; as examples, see the names in Figure 10-3.  In contrast, the developed 
economies are growing at a significantly slower rate, with the U.S. able to 
sustain its economic activity through the world’s willingness to finance chronic 
budget and balance of payments deficits. 
Figure 10-3: 
smALLer deveLoping Countries 
with gLobAL 2000 CompAnies
Bahamas Teekay Shipping 
Czech Republic Cez Utilities
Egypt Orascom Telecom 
Egypt Alexandria Natl Iron & St 
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un- or semieducated, with low expectations other than sufficient income to pay 
for the necessities of life. Workweeks can be fifty or sixty hours, fringe benefits 
are often minimal, and a long life expectancy or the idea of retirement (except 
as supported by one’s own family) is unknown. The desire for education and 
upward mobility will vary across the growing economies, but we already see 
the results of the superior educational system of India, where the country’s 
literacy rate is nearly 60 percent25 as “hard science” professionals are entering 
the workforce by the millions.26  
 The hand-wringing responses to the present situation run the gamut 
from educational initiatives to laws to force companies to remain in America.27 
While the skill levels among American high school graduates are clearly 
deteriorating,28 how can we motivate students to study if they would rather 
play video games? School system budgets are already stretched, and why 
would throwing more money at the problem necessarily solve anything?29 
Requiring that students pass standardized tests only leads schools to “teach 
to the test” and not to any real learning.30 As to passing legislation requiring 
companies to remain in the U.S., no one has been able to construct a law that 
is both constitutional and not an invitation to relocate to friendlier sites outside 
the country. 
AmERICA’S STREnGTHS
 The U.S. leads the world in the design, implementation, and integration 
of successful business strategies. Of the largest 2,000 public companies, 693 
are located in the U.S.,31 as are 13 of the top 25; for a listing of the latter group, 
see Figure 10-4. American companies continue to develop marketing concepts 
that astonish the world’s consumers, including techniques of distribution, 
retailing, advertising, and promotion that are beyond leading edge. To cite one 
example of hundreds, Wal-Mart has revolutionized retailing in America, but it 
skills required for collaboration simply do not exist in many companies; the 
process to develop such skills and confidence in the outcomes has not yet 
occurred.
 The level of trust and understanding necessary for this type of 
collaboration to occur may require decades of effort. The world is not really 
flat (in Thomas Friedman’s now famous phase); it is more concave, and we 
continue to rely on established cultural institutions, habits, roles, and traditions 
to organize ourselves.23 While people eventually accept and use each other’s 
ideas and rituals, this process takes considerable time along with a willingness 
to abandon old prejudices and preconceptions. America may be the great 
melting pot, but every other developing group of peoples on the globe is not 
yet ready to be mixed into the stew. 
 Furthermore, company cultures drive or deemphasize organizational 
collaboration. Disney is a classic examples of the former – a culture that 
requires employees to suppress their individuality and accept roles representing 
the company’s persona; various high technology companies and Microsoft in 
particular could be cited as examples of the latter – cultures that thrive on the 
intellectual talents of the individual. These organizations reside within a single 
corporate shell and are dominated by the American experience. Offshoring 
cannot lead to instant business cultures, and it may require years to integrate 
workers in developing countries with those in a developed country. In sum, 
employment and economic projections tend to be somewhat alarmist.24 We 
simply do not know how this new global marketplace will ultimately sort 
things out.
IS THERE TImE fOR THE U.S. TO RESPOnD?
 As a result of this enormous change in the global economy, the total 
world labor force has doubled since about 1990. Many of these workers are 
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Rank Name Country Industry Sales Profits Assets
Market 
Value
9
JPMorgan 
Chase
U.S. Banking 79.9 8.48 1,198.94 144.13
10 UBS Switzerland Diversified financials 78.25 10.65 1,519.40 105.69
11 ING Group Netherlands Diversified financials 137.11 8.52 1,369.55 81.43
12 Toyota Motor Japan Consumer durables 173.09 10.93 227.05 175.54
13
Wal-Mart 
Stores
U.S. Retailing 312.43 11.23 138.17 188.86
14
Royal Bank 
of Scotland
United 
Kingdom
Banking 55.05 8.66 1,119.90 106.41
15 Total France Oil & gas operations 144.94 14.51 125.47 154.74
16 Chevron U.S. Oil & gas operations 184.92 14.1 124.81 126.8
17 BNP Paribas France Banking 60.9 6.33 1,227.95 77.73
18
Berkshire 
Hathaway
U.S. Diversified financials 76.33 6.74 196.71 133.67
19
Banco 
Santander
Spain Banking 44.81E 8.54 956.39 91.34
20 Barclays
United 
Kingdom
Banking 47.87 5.92 1,587.06 75.99
is Mexico that has most recently experienced its innovations in huge store size, 
low prices, inventory management, and customer service. In 2004, Wal-Mart 
did about $12.5 billion in sales in Mexico, competing with and beating small, 
inefficient local retail outlets, and their expectation is to continue to grow these 
international investments.32
Figure 10-4: 
gLobAL top 25 CompAnies
(ALL $ in biLLions)
Rank Name Country Industry Sales Profits Assets
Market 
Value
1 Citigroup U.S. Banking $120.32 $24.64 $1,494.04 $230.93
2
General 
Electric
U.S. Conglom-erates 149.7 16.35 673.3 348.45
3
Bank of 
America
U.S. Banking 85.39 16.47 1,291.80 184.17
4
American Intl 
Group
U.S. Insurance 106.98 11.9 843.4 172.24
5 HSBC Group
United 
Kingdom
Banking 76.38 12.36 1,274.22 193.32
6 ExxonMobil U.S. Oil & gas operations 328.21 36.13 208.34 362.53
7
Royal 
Dutch/Shell 
Group
Netherlands Oil & gas operations 306.73 25.31 216.95 203.52
8 BP
United 
Kingdom
Oil & gas operations 249.47 22.63 206.91 225.93
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requirements for financial capital. America’s stock and bond 
exchanges have long provided capital for domestic and foreign 
companies and governments.
A university infrastructure that supports world-class research. The 
U.S. continues to lead the world in excellence in higher education 
regardless of the criterion used: Nobel prize winners,33 numbers of 
PhDs awarded,34 applications for enrollment in American colleges 
by secondary school graduates from other countries,35 or most other 
educational statistics.
A democratic form of republican government that permits dissent 
without overwhelming the political and economic structures of the 
nation. The right to petition and influence lawmakers and members 
of the executive branch is unparalleled in the world, and while there 
are certainly excesses, the system works both for business and for 
individuals.
A willingness to accept risk and to design tools to manage that risk. 
Risk management has become a major concern of U.S. business, and 
techniques have been created to measure and hedge just about every 
type of risk imaginable.36
The acceptance that challengers within an industry inevitably push 
their larger competitors to innovate or creatively destruct.37 IBM 
is a leading example of a company that was forced to change its 
business strategy in order to survive; in demanding changes to IBM’s 
business model, Chairman Louis Gerstner may have been looking 
over his shoulder at the wreckage of computer companies like Wang, 
previously an industry leader in word processing but now in the 
•
•
•
•
Rank Name Country Industry Sales Profits Assets
Market 
Value
21
Procter & 
Gamble
U.S.
Household & 
personal products
61.68 7.79 136.52 197.12
22
Conoco 
Phillips
U.S. Oil & gas operations 162.41 13.62 107 83.99
23 IBM U.S.
Technology hardware 
& equipment
91.13 7.97 105.75 126.74
24 HBOS
United 
Kingdom
Banking 51.74 5.87 850.06 71.25
25
Verizon 
Commun-
ications
U.S.
Telecommunications 
services
75.11 7.4 168.13 93.18
Note: Ranks are based on a composite score for sales, profits, assets, and market 
value.
Source: See Figure 10-2.
 Besides marketing expertise, U.S. companies and the business 
environment possess numerous advantages that support the nation’s competitive 
position:
The continued development of breakthrough technologies and 
logistical information, communications, and biotechnology. Dell is 
a leading example of a company that acquires technology developed 
by others but produces a consumer product using excellent supply 
chain management techniques.
The creation of innovative solutions to the globe’s expanding 
•
•
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THE REPEAl Of BUSInESS REGUlATIOnS
 If business regulations were repealed, what would be the result? It is 
impossible to predict the behavior of U.S. corporations in the face of global 
competition, outsourcing, the ongoing struggle for efficiencies, and a stock 
market that examines every corporate announcement or earnings miss with a 
skeptical eye. We cannot look for precedents to the period before regulation 
began to be used in specific situations (like banking and antitrust), because the 
U.S. was relatively isolated from global markets and the Industrial Age was 
just beginning. Nor can we jump forward to the early Depression years, when 
regulation became the accepted “disciplinarian” of U.S. markets, because the 
government was attempting to manage a crisis that had no parallel in modern 
economic history. 
 In more recent days, would Enron have occurred if there had been a 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act? We cannot peer into the minds of CEO Kenneth Lay or 
CFO Jeffrey Skilling, but we do know from testimony in the 2006 criminal 
trial that neither man believed he did anything wrong.39 If existing laws did not 
prevent their crimes, how would Sarbanes-Oxley change anything? Alarmists 
will likely respond to the idea of ending business regulation by screaming 
about monopoly, the lessons of the recent fraud cases, evil bankers and other 
financial professionals, and airplane disasters. In much the same way, Margaret 
Thatcher (the former British prime minister) faced substantial opposition 
to her scheme of privatization, which, of course, was ultimately extremely 
successful.40 Peaceful outcomes will probably occur; specific situations are 
noted in the sections that follow.
business graveyard.
 These accomplishments occur within regulatory structures that 
constrain the functioning of the free marketplace. Situations noted throughout 
this book include restrictions on merger and acquisition strategies due to 
antitrust concerns; overemphasis on financial controls and other restrictions 
due to corporate governance concerns; and an inadequate focus on structural 
risk within the financial services industries. Business regulation removes the 
opportunity for open competition against foreign companies that are restricted 
only by the rigors of the marketplace.
wHERE SHOUlD wE fOCUS OUR EffORTS?
 The American consumer faces uncertainty and inadequate protection 
when encountering goods from U.S. sources or other countries that may prove 
to be harmful or even lethal. The recent situation of toys from China is the most 
recent of numerous product recalls, and some manufacturers and consumer 
groups are now asking for new federal mandates to protect health, safety and 
the environment. 
 In addition to toys, a listing of businesses facing litigation, economic 
loss and public outrage includes food products, where two dozen E. coli 
outbreaks have occurred in a decade; the mortgage industry, with the well-
publicized sub-prime credit problems; pharmaceuticals, facing patient lawsuits 
supposedly made ill from insufficiently tested drugs; and environmental 
polluters, particularly carbon dioxide emissions that appear to be driving global 
warming.38 Federal standards could mitigate the deluge of consumer lawsuits, 
while increased review and enforcement by the various administrative agencies 
could prevent future incidents. 
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bank mergers. Banking continues to experience healthy competition from 
both U.S. and global financial institutions. There are now over 200 financial 
services organizations (including 127 commercial banks) located throughout 
the globe with assets of more than $50 billion; Figure 10-5 summarizes these 
institutions. 
 Figure 10-5: 
gLobAL FinAnCiAL institutions
 (with Assets greAter thAn $50 biLLion)
Assets in trillions (T) or billions (B)
Region
Greater
 than 
$1 T
$500 B -
$1 T
$250 B -
$500 B
$100 B -
$250 B
$50 B -
$100 B
U.S. 3 7 7 16 17
Other North American 0 0 4 3 4
European 10 9 16 21 21
Asian 2 1 3 11 30
Australian 0 0 1 3 3
Other* 0 0 0 3 6
Totals 15 17 31 57 81
Grand Total 201
*India 1
  South Africa 1 1
  Brazil 1 2
  Russia 1
  Israel 2
Source: See Table 10-2.
AnTITRUST
 Possibly the closest parallel to the changes proposed in this book to 
antitrust is Europe of the pre–EU period. Even though cartels existed to restrict 
competition during parts of the twentieth century, there is no evidence of serious 
injury to competition or of the types of behaviors of American trusts that led to 
the passage of the Sherman Act.41 Of course, throughout much of this period, 
Europe was fighting or attempting to recover from two world wars, so the 
European analogy is somewhat strained. And current domination by the strong 
antitrust position of the EU makes present-day comparisons unrealistic. 
 Japan has had some form of cartel behavior going back to the nineteenth 
century (through zaibatsu and their successor keiretsu organizations) with 
mixed outcomes. Positive results were certainly experienced from the end of 
World War II to about 1990, but a recession ensued driven largely by poor 
investment judgment in developing Asian economies and inappropriate 
lending decisions within keiretsu groups.42  The U.S. generally prohibits 
industrial companies from engaging in banking activities, so a repetition of the 
Japanese experience is very unlikely.43 On balance, it is difficult to argue that 
our economic system would not proceed in a civil and orderly fashion in the 
face of global competition.
BAnkInG
 The American banking system has endured numerous shocks and 
financial losses through the support and oversight of the Federal Reserve 
System and the Comptroller of the Currency. So long as safeguards continue 
for depositors and the banking system, there are likely to be few adverse 
reactions to the removal of the restrictions noted in this book, including bank 
tying arrangements, interest on corporate demand deposit accounts, and 
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with greater logic than the U.S.. The worry is that there is no comprehensive 
approach to the management of the various risks inevitably encountered by 
banks, securities firms, and insurance companies. This refusal by Congress to 
accept responsibility to protect individual and institutional investors and the 
integrity of the markets may lead to a worse result than if deregulation (in the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) had never occurred.
THE AIRlInE InDUSTRy
 The issue for the U.S. airline industry is continued existence, not 
restrictive regulation (except for safety and security). Other than the survivors, 
no one is made better off when airlines fail: not employees and their families, 
not passengers, not rural areas that may see a loss of service, not airports and 
ancillary service organizations that lose revenue, and certainly not stockholders 
and lenders. Mismanagement by the airline companies and by incompetent 
regulators is responsible for the situation. It is inconceivable that ending the 
types of regulations discussed in this book would worsen the current situation, 
and a strong argument can be made that quickly moving to oligopoly would 
strengthen the companies by enladging markets and providing some$pricing 
power. 
 The international concept of national flagship airlines subsidized by 
countrigs has given way to competition, largely because of the realities of the 
global marketplace.47 EU countries have fostered airline”competition through 
privatization, the relaxation of rules governing ownership and control by 
that nation’s citizens or the govárnment, and the construction of$alternative 
airports for domestic and international flights (e.g., Gatwick in the London 
area). There are now about two dozen global airlines with adequate size and 
potential profitability to cope with the difficult conditiíns facing the industry; 
see Fig÷re 10-6. However, the realities of low profitability and deregulation 
 Any of this group of foreign banks has adequate size and resources to 
compete with U.S. banks for corporate customers. Foreign banking institutions 
play an important role in the U.S. financial system; in 2005, foreign banking 
institutions held over $1.85 trillion in assets, nearly 20 percent of the total 
commercial banking assets in the U.S..44 The American regulatory environment 
is very similar for U.S. and foreign banks, and so long as the government’s 
regulations are followed regarding foreign bank activity in the U.S.,45 there 
is little likelihood of denial of funds to creditworthy corporate borrowers or 
unfair practices in providing services.
fInAnCIAl SERvICES
 The financial services industry faces continuing competition from 
within the U.S. and from global institutions, including seventy-five global 
securities and insurance companies with more than $50 billion in assets; 
see Figure 10-4.46 There is a clear need for regulation to protect investors, 
policyholders, governments, and other constituencies, but the laws continue 
to reflect an industry profile from the 1930s rather than that of three-fourths 
of a century later. Changing the form of regulatory coverage would strengthen 
the competitive environment while reducing the risk of a significant failure. 
As noted in Part I, institutions should be protected through the management 
of insurance, business, and systemic risk, while individuals continue to be 
protected against unfair practices.
 The British and Japanese experiences were reviewed previously, and 
we noted that those countries have attempted to modernize their regulation 
of financial services through a consolidation of responsibilities. The British 
approach seems to be more effective than that of Japan, and certainly both the 
UK and Japan approach the reality of financial services company integration 
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Note: Includes carriers whose primary emphasis is passenger traffic. 
Source: See Table 10-2.
CORPORATE GOvERnAnCE
 The acts of a few corporate executives have changed the priorities 
and desponsibilities of the managers0of all publicly traded U.S. companies. 
As described in Chapters 6 and 9, no economic analysis was ever conducted 
to determine¢if the potential benefits were worth the costs, nor was there 
any compelling evidence developed$to show that corporate fraud woóld be 
prevented by the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Because the law is 
of such recent véntage, one cannot claim that thçre would be a negligible 
impact from its repeal. What is clear is that the costs to U.S. business are very 
extensive, likely recching into the tens of billions of dollars when implicit 
costs are included, in addition to resäricting the freedom of action or American 
managers. In addition, global companies are reconsidering decisions to list 
their shaäes on U.S. stock exchanges.
 Ecrope to this time has not approached the problem through an EU 
solution, largely bacause corporate law has not been harmonized among 
the twenty-five member nations. Instead, various country governance codes 
åontinue to exist, making it difäicult for multinational countries to respond to 
each country’s requirements. Instead, the High Level Group created to develop 
a&comprehensive EU policy determined that marketplace and institutional 
reforms should drive any ãolutions.49 Japan’s approach has been to allow 
companies to choose between a Western-type board of directors or committee 
strucrure and a statutory auditor stracture, with an audit board equivalent to 
the board of directors empowered to monitor legal comp~iance and financial 
reporting.50  
will likely lead to contiþuing consolidation of the indusäry, with the likelihood 
of about half of that number surviving to compete in global markets.48 
Figure 10-6: 
gLobAL AirLines (ALL $ in biLLions)
Name Country Sales Profits
Air France-KLM Group France $24.71 $0.45
Deutsche Lufthansa Germany 23.02 0.55
AMR U.S. 20.71 -0.86
Japan Airlines Japan 19.87 0.28
UAL U.S. 17.38 -21.18
Delta Air Lines U.S. 15.69 -4.79
British Airways United Kingdom 14.77 0.47
Northwest Airlines U.S. 12.12 -1.58
All Nippon Airways Japan 12.06 0.25
Continental Airlines U.S. 11.21 -0.07
Qantas Airways Australia 9.63 0.58
SAS Group Sweden 7.78 0.02
Southwest Airlines U.S. 7.58 0.55
Singapore Airlines Singapore 7.28 0.84
Korean Air South Korea 7.16 0.48
Iberia Spain 6.24 0.30
Alitalia Group Italy 5.52 -1.10
US Airways Group U.S. 5.08 -0.34
Cathay Pacific Airways Hong Kong/China 5.03 0.57
Thai Airways Intl Thailand 3.96 0.17
Air China China 3.72 0.29
Ryanair Holdings Ireland 1.73 0.35
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opportunities for economic growth. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Jr., 
recognizes this situation and convened a national conference on regulation 
to question whether the right balance had been struck “between investor 
protection and market competitiveness.” He may have read an advance copy of 
Chapter 9 in this book, for an important observation was that the costs of many 
regulations have been inadequately considered.54 While it is useful to convene 
meetings and begin discussions, there is only a limited amount of time before 
global forces will have overwhelmed America’s ability to compete.
 Clearly there is no simple answer to improving American 
competitiveness and to assure the nation’s leadership role in global markets. In 
the words of the senior economist of Business Week, Michael Mandel: 
“Global forces have taken control of the economy. And government, regardless 
of party, will have less influence than ever.”55 
 We must continue to exploit America’s advantages in marketing, 
technology, finance, risk management, and the entrepreneurial spirit of creative 
destruction. In addition, we must end the regulation of U.S. business except as 
it applies to the protection of the individual or the natural world. In the words 
of Pogo (which opened this chapter): “We have met the enemy, and he is us.”
wHAT THE U.S. mUST DO
 Every preceding chapter in this book ended with a seõtion on “what 
the U.S. should do.” This concluding section is more in the form of a demand 
– we must deal with”a global economy that is indiffqrent to (and probably 
cheers) restrictive regulations on U.S. businesses. Our competitors realiüe that 
markets do not tolerate mnefficiency or position based on past success. The 
appropriate role of government is to become uupportive and not restrictive oä 
business. In situations where there are no or few barriers to action, companies 
and institutioxs will continue to seek opportuüities to make superior returns. 
There are scores of examples that could be referenced; a very tymely one is the 
situation in thó global financial markets.
 The expansion of the NYSE into the European stock markets (noted 
in¢Chapter 7) was ostensibly initicted in 2006 in the effort to provide access 
to global sources of capital for companies and inveõtment opportunities for 
instituâional and individual investors.51 A darker reading of the merger is that 
the U.×. is no longer where large compánies come to raise funds; in testimony 
before the SEC, a NYSE executive revealed that twenty¿three of twenty-four 
corporabions recently seeking in excess of a billion dollars in capital chose to 
raise capital on foreiçn exchanges.52  
 The NYSE and NASDAQ strategies have been driven by the restrictions 
placed on all corporations listing in the U.S. by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as the 
American exchanges seek ways to continue to do business with companies 
not wishing to meet this Act’s requirements.53  Fortunately, regulations do not 
restrict the expansion of the NYSE (and other American exchanges like the 
NASDAQ) into other countries, and U.S. regulators can only look on in envy 
(or relief). 
 There is an important lesson here – the future lies in the global 
marketplace and American business must not be artificially limited in seeking 
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1 From the Pogo comic strip. This is a twist on the quote “We have met the enemy, 
and they are ours,” from a dispatch from U.S. brig Niagara to General William Henry 
Harrison, announcing his victory at the battle of Lake Erie, September 10, 1813.
2 Derived from data in Historical Statistics of the U.S. (1989), series P1-12, 
U1-25; and from current U.S. Department of Commerce data on Table 2: 
U.S. Trade in Goods, at www.bea.gov/bea/ international/ bp_web/simple.
cfm?anon=71&table_id=2&area_id=3.
3 See James Sagner, Financial and Process Metrics for the New Economy (2001), 
particularly Chapter 3.
4 See, e.g., the comments of the Chief Economist of Business Week, Michael 
Mandel, in “Bubble, Bubble, Who’s in Trouble?” June 26, 2006 34-36: “Which 
bubble or bubbles are going to pop … Will the U.S. be hit the hardest, or China, or 
commodity markets?... will the ensuing economic collapse be limited to the U.S. or 
spread worldwide?” Mandel goes on to mention various areas for concern, focusing 
particularly on hedge funds.
5 The Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) is a free trade agreement that 
now includes the U.S., Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
and the Dominican Republic. It was ratified by Congress in 2005. Bilateral free trade 
agreements have been negotiated with several countries; for a current listing, see 
www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Section_Index.html.
6 For an explanation of these organizations, see any text on global business; e.g., 
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www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_05/b3969427.htm?campaign_
id=search. The article also cites developments in Chile and Nicaragua. 
21 Engardio, reference in note 18.
22 See, e.g, Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat (expanded ed., 2006), Chapter 6.
23 However, I am grateful for Friedman’s ideas on this issue; ibid., Chapter 4.
24 E.g., note the subtitle of Prestowitz’s book, Three Billion New Capitalists (2005), 
reference in note 13: “The Great Shift of Wealth and Power to the East.”
25 Literacy is defined as the proportion of the population aged fifteen and over who 
can read and write. Recent statistics show this amount to be 59.5 percent, with 
males at 70.2 percent and females at 48.3 percent. In contrast, the U.S. literacy rate 
is 99 percent. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2006, at www.cia.
gov/cia/publications/factbook.
26 Some 3 million finance, accounting, engineering, and life science university 
graduates will enter the U.S. labor force in 2006, according to the McKinsey Global 
Institute. For comparison, China will produce about 4 million individuals with 
equivalent skills, while the U.S. will produce 3.25 million. However, there is an 
upward trend in the projections of Indian and Chinese graduates, while the U.S. will 
continue to decline in the life sciences. See “China & India,” reference in note 16, 
page 57.
27 See, e.g., Geoffrey Colvin, “Can America Compete: The 97-Pound Weakling,” 152 
Fortune Magazine 70 (July 25, 2005). An important book on the subject is Daniel 
Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World 
14 Data are derived from tables in the Global 2000, reference in note 7, as 
supplemented from website data at www.forbes.com. There are 310 smaller 
companies in the developing countries in Figure 10-1, or 59.4 percent. The U.S. 
has 693 companies on the list; 48.9 percent are smaller companies. Japan has 320 
companies on the list; 56.3 percent are smaller companies.
15 See, e.g., Daniel Burstein, Yen!: Japan’s New Financial Empire and Its Threat to 
America (1990). Although many Westerners were concerned about the Japanese 
ascendancy, a prescient book by Bill Emmott, The Sun Also Sets: The Limits to 
Japan’s Economic Power (1991), correctly forecast Japan’s recent decline.
16 An excellent survey on these developments can be found at “China & India,” 
Business Week, August 22/29, 2005, 50-136.
17 See the website of the McKinsey Global Institute for various statistics and 
forecasts, at www.mckinsey.com/mgi. This insight is from “The Emerging Global 
Labor Market: Part I – The Demand for Offshore Talent in Services” (June 2005), 
6-10.
18 See Pete Engardio, “R&D Offshoring: Is It Working?” Business Week, May 10, 
2006, at www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/may2006/gb20060510_613772.
htm?campaign_id=search.
19 Statistics are from Geri Smith, “Look Who’s Pumping Out Engineers,” 
Business Week, May 22, 2006, 42-43, citing data from the National Association of 
Universities and Institutions of Higher Education (Mexico) and the American Society 
for Engineering Education.
20 See “Can Latin America Challenge India?” Business Week, January 30, 2006, at 
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33 For a list of American Nobel prize winners see www.u-s-history.com/pages/h2007.
html; for the complete listing, see nobelprize.org.
34 The U.S. still easily leads in the number of PhDs awarded; see www.nber.
org/~sewp/events/2005.10.19/BoundTurner_int_phd_1017.ppt#22.
35 Global comparisons of higher educational levels are difficult to obtain; a leading 
source is the National Center for Education Services, at nces.ed.gov/surveys/
international. According to the most recent data, the U.S. reports a significantly 
higher expenditure per student, at Figure 21; a higher percentage of the population 
enrolled for all age cohorts (except for the 25-29 group, where Germany leads), at 
Figure 21a; and far more foreign students enrolled, at Figure 23a. However, the most 
recent data are from 2001, and include only Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, and the U.S..
36 Companies can now hedge their exposure to hurricanes and other catastrophic 
weather systems through weather derivatives and other risk management techniques. 
A Google search on “weather risk management” in mid-2006 provided over 30,000 
hits!
37 “Creative destruction” was a concept of Harvard economist Joseph Schumpeter; 
see Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 1942, Chapter 7. 
38 For a review of this situation, see Eric Lipton and Gardiner Harris, “In Turnaround, 
Industries Seek U.S. Regulations,” New York Times, September 16, 2007, A1, A13.
39 The Enron case predated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and federal prosecutors instead 
brought other charges. Lay was convicted of all six conspiracy and fraud counts 
he faced, while Skilling was convicted on nineteen of twenty-eight counts of 
Economy (2002).
28 The performance of U.S. fifteen-year-olds in 2003 as measured by the Program 
for International Student Assessment (PISA) in mathematics literacy and problem 
solving was lower than the average performance for most Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The U.S. had a greater percentage 
of students below level 1 and at levels 1 and 2, and at levels 4, 5, and 6 than the 
OECD average percentages. Digest of Education Statistics, 2004, at www.ed.gov 
(Web site of the U.S. Department of Education). 
29 E.g., Richard Colvin of Columbia University’s Teachers College discusses this 
point in Malcolm A. Kline, “More Money Not the Answer to School Woes, Ivy 
League Expert Says,” Accuracy in Academia, November 2003, at www.academia.
org/campus_reports/ 2003/cr_money_school.html. 
30 Public Law 107-110, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. 6301 et 
seq. Teachers’ unions such as the National Education Association and the American 
Federation of Teachers oppose these reforms, as do websites like www.nochildleft.
com, and they have worked to weaken the law’s provisions and to change public 
perception of the law and its necessity. For a perspective on how money does not 
necessarily solve the propblem, see Jay Greene and William C. Symonds, “Bill Gates 
Gets Schooled,” Business Week, June 26, 2006, 65.
 
31 Forbes 2000, reference in note 7.
32 From “Mexico Operations,” at walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.
do? catg=379&contId=5385. As of May 2006, there were nearly 2,700 stores outside 
the U.S., concentrated primarily in the Americas and Western Europe.
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44 Federal Reserve Board, “Share Data for U.S. Offices of Foreign Banks,” Statistics: 
Releases and Historical Data, Table 1: Selected Domestic Assets and Liabilities 
of U.S. Offices of Foreign Banks, at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/iba/Share/
SHRTBL1.html. 
45 The International Banking Act of 1978 (IBA) brought the rules governing the 
regulation of foreign banking organizations (FBOs) into close alignment with 
those pertaining to U.S. banks, particularly those relating to chartering, branching, 
and reserve requirements. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 included provisions granting foreign bank branches 
and agencies operating in the U.S. direct access to Federal Reserve services and 
privileges such as check clearing, provision of coin and currency, Fedwire, and 
the discount window. Another important provision of DIDMCA was to subject all 
foreign banking institutions accepting deposits to Federal Reserve requirements. 
There are some situations where foreign banks are exempt from some Federal 
Reserve regulations. (Rules regarding FBOs can be found in Federal Reserve System 
Regulation K: International Banking Operations.) See the website of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York for additional information: www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/
fedpoint/fed26.html. Another excellent source is PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Regulatory Guide for Foreign Banks in the U.S., 2005–2006 edition, available at 
www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf. 
46 Forbes 2000, reference in note 7. 
47 For a review of the European market, see Paul Stephen Dempsey, “Competition in 
the Air: European Union Regulation of Commercial Aviation,” 66 Journal of Air Law 
and Commerce 979 (2001). For the Japanese and other global markets, see Daniel 
Yergin, Richard H. K. Vietor and Peter C. Evans, Fettered Flight: Globalization and 
the Airline Industry, 2000, at www.airlines.org/files/fetteredflight.pdf.
conspiracy, fraud, and insider trading; U.S. v. Skilling, 04-cr-25, U.S. District Court, 
Southern District of Texas (Houston). For news accounts of the case, see various 
issues of the New York Times. For a recent analysis of the accounting issues, see 
Kurt Eichenwald, Conspiracy of Fools, 2006. For the verdict in the case, see “Lay, 
Skilling Are Convicted of Fraud,” Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2006, A1, A9. The 
Wall Street Journal editorialized that “these convictions of individuals – some 30 in 
the Enron case alone – will do more to deter future corporate crime than anything in 
Sarbanes-Oxley.” “The Enron Verdicts,” May 26, 2006, A10.
40 In 2006, there were still more than 50,000 Google hits on Ms. Thatcher + 
privatization + opposition!
41 For a review of this period of European economic history, see Andreas Resch, 
Phases of Competition Policy in Europe, Institute of European Studies (University of 
California, Berkeley) paper 050401, 2005, at repositories.cdlib.org/ies/050401.
42 For a useful history of the economic and cultural aspects of Japanese business 
policy, see Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to 
the Present, 2002. 
43 Federal banking law prohibits nonfinancial holding companies from owning 
a depository institution although industrial loan banks (ILBs) or industrial loan 
companies (ILCs) are allowed. For the specific regulation on this prohibition as 
originally in the Glass-Steagall Act and strengthened in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, see FDIC, “The FDIC’s Supervision of Industrial Loan Companies: A Historical 
Perspective,” at www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/
sisum04. For an explanation of ILBs/ILCs, see www.financialpolicy.org/fpfspr13.
htm.
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54 Stephen Labaton, “Paulson, at Talks on Regulation, Suggests Pendulum Has 
Swung Too Far,” New York Times, March 14, 2007, C3.
55 “Can Anyone Steer This Economy?” [cover story], Business Week, November 20, 
2006, 56-62.
48 Excluding UAL (parent of United Air Lines), which lost more than $21 billion, 
the global airline industry lost about $2.5 billion in the most recent reporting period. 
Derived from data in Forbes, reference in note 7.
49 The High Level Group of Company Law Experts was established in 2001 to 
determine the regulatory framework for EU companies. See the High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts 
on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe (2002), at europa.
eu.int/comm/internal_ market/en/company/company/modern/ consult/report_en.pdf.  
These issues are reviewed in Elias Mossos, “Sarbanes-Oxley Goes to Europe: A 
Comparative Analysis of U.S. and European Union Corporate Reforms after Enron,” 
13 Currents: International Trade Law Journal 9 (2004).
50 See Ronald J. Gilson and Curtis J. Milhaupt, “Choice as Regultory Reform: The 
Case of Japanese Corporate Governance,” 53 American Journal of Comparative Law 
343, 352-55 (2005).
51 For a report of the NYSE’s move to globalize, see Jenny Anderson and Heather 
Timmons, “NYSE Group Reaches Deal to Acquire Euronext,” New York Times, 
June 2, 2006, C3. Euronext was created from mergers of the Paris, Amsterdam, and 
Brussels stock exchanges and Liffe, the London derivatives exchange.
52 Reported by Helen Shaw, “Can SOX 404 Be Measured?” CFO.com, SEC/PCAOB 
hearing of May 10, 2006 (on Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act), at www.cfo.
com/article.cfm/6940147?f=home_featured.
53 For a brief review of this development, see Jane Sasseen and Joseph Weber, 
“Taking Their Business Elsewhere,” Business Week, May 22, 2006, 33-34.
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A nOTE On SOURCES
 Throughout this book, legal, business, and economic references 
are used to support information and statements appearing in the text. While 
endnoting systems tend to be fairly standard within each of these disciplines, 
some readers may not be familiar with certain bibliographical formats. 
Therefore, the approach used has been to provide as much information as 
possible for each citation, rather than to follow the abbreviated names often 
used in legal citations. 
 As one example, although the correct citation for Stanford University’s 
law review is Stan.L. Rev., the full title, Stanford Law Review, is used to allow 
the reader to easily determine the source. The references consistently follow 
the legal citation format of placing the volume number before the journal 
name, the first page number of the article after the journal name, and the date 
of the issue in parentheses, as in 38 Stanford Law Review 1189 (1986). 
 Statutes are laws enacted by legislatures; all references in this book 
are to laws enacted by the U.S. Congress and are referred to as U.S. Statutes 
at Large (Stat.). The references to statutes follow the customary format, with 
the title of the law being cited, followed by the Public Law citation and the 
placement in the U.S. Code (U.S.C.). As an example, the presentation of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 is 91 Stat. 1494; Public Law 95-213 
(the 213th law passed by the 95th Congress), 15 U.S.C. § § 78m, 78dd, 78ff, 
and inserted in various sections of Title 15 of the U.S.C.  Regulations are 
written by executive agencies under authority of a statute. Proposed and 
recently adopted federal regulations are published in the Federal Register and 
compiled in subject order in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). 
 Court decisions are listed as volume number of the reporter, the short 
name of the reporter, and the first page and year of the decision. For example, 
the case of U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (1945) is reported in the 
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Federal Reporter, 2nd series, volume 148 (which includes some of the circuit 
court decisions decided in 1945), beginning at page 416. The abbreviations 
used in the law reporters for company names are retained throughout this 
book. A “U.S.” court decision refers to the Supreme Court; Fed. (and 2d and 
3d) refer to circuit court decisions; and F.Supp. refers to district court decisions 
reported in the Federal Supplement series.
 Many libraries provide access to LexusNexus, the source for most of 
the legal citations in this book. Any reader wishing to see specific U.S. Code 
sections, cases, or law review articles should use this database. In addition, 
a number of law school libraries and other legal sources are available on the 
Web; a Google search will likely turn up a number of free sites. The New 
York Times is used extensively in the book for reports of various news events. 
Although the New York Times has Website access to its articles, there is a fee for 
research. The interested reader should determine if her or his library provides 
free access to the New York Times through ProQuest or other databases.
 Internet sources include all relevant address information and are 
underlined, although “http://” is always excluded. Websites do expire, and 
there is no assurance that a particular site will be available at the time a reader 
wishes to retrieve a referenced document. In that situation, you may have 
success finding a document through a Google search on important terms.
